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ABSTRACT 
 
Lekha Shupeck: Patrocinium Orbis Terrae: Principles of Roman Foreign Relations to the 
Fall of Carthage 
(Under the direction of Richard J. A. Talbert) 
 
This dissertation examines the role of traditional principles and values in Roman 
foreign relations during the period from the end of the Second Punic War to the fall of 
Carthage. It offers a new perspective by focusing on aspects which have not been adequately 
connected, and presents a counterpoint to realist theoretical approaches to early Roman 
imperialism. The principles of Roman foreign relations can be traced back to the institution 
of the fetial priests, whose rituals and religious values were the springboard for these 
principles, including the Roman concept of “just war.”  These ideals developed to become 
part of a larger set of norms concerning Roman foreign relations, including both justifications 
for war and rules about its proper conduct. The Senate enforced this set of rules against 
Roman officials who violated them by abusing and extorting foreign peoples. The victims 
came from across the Mediterranean world, and were drawn from both allies and enemies. 
Their complaints to the Senate were heard, and they were routinely compensated for their 
injuries. Over time, the formalization of these norms led to the establishment of a permanent 
court at Rome for cases of extortion. In its relations with Carthage after the Second Punic 
War, especially when mediating disputes between Carthage and the Numidian king, 
Massinissa, Rome still attempted to adhere to the values and norms which had guided its 
behavior towards foreign people. However, the pressures of Rome’s expanding role in the 
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Mediterranean eventually caused the relationship to break down. Nonetheless, Rome made a 
point of following the letter, if not the spirit, of its own rules, and represented even the total 
destruction of Carthage as conforming to the requirements of just war. While the character of 
Roman imperialism may have changed, the traditional values were maintained in the Late 
Republic through the works of Roman historians and the extortion court. This dissertation 
demonstrates the need for recognition of the role that traditional Roman principles played in 
Roman imperial expansion and for integrating them into analysis of this crucial period. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Abbreviated references to ancient sources follow the conventions of The Oxford 
Classical Dictionary, 4th edition.  
Abbreviated references to modern publications follow the conventions of L’Année 
philologique. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 171 B.C.E.,1 at the beginning of the Third Macedonian War, an incident 
occurred about which we have considerable detail and which is both notable and 
seemingly exceptional. Livy reports that a group of envoys from the Greek city of Abdera 
requested an audience before the Roman senate. There the Abderites wept and 
complained that the praetor L. Hortensius had taken their city by force and plundered it. 
This was because, they said, when Hortensius had requested 100,000 denarii and 50,000 
modii of wheat for his armies, the Abderites had asked for a reprieve so that they might 
send a delegation to the Roman consul and Senate to discuss the matter. In fact, the same 
envoys that stood before the Senate now had barely reached the consul, A. Hostilius 
Mancinus, when they learned that their city had been stormed, their leaders beheaded, 
and the rest of the citizens sold into slavery. To the Senate these actions did indeed seem 
shameful and intolerable, and a senatorial decree was issued on the Abderites’ behalf.2 
The Senate sent two legates, C. Sempronius Blaesus and Sex. Iulius Caesar to find and 
free those who had been enslaved. These legates were also instructed to inform both 
Hostilius and Hortensius that an unjust war (iniustum bellum) had been undertaken 
against Abdera, and that the Senate thought it right that all who had been enslaved be 
                                                          
1 All dates are B.C.E. unless otherwise noted 
 
2 Livy 43.4.11 
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sought out and restored to freedom. The response of the Senate to this incident might be 
surprising, but on closer inspection, it proves to be routine – a similar incident had 
occurred in the previous year concerning the consul P. Licinus Crassus and the 
inhabitants of Coronea.3 
Although Abdera had been granted its freedom by Rome after the defeat of Philip 
V of Macedon in 197, there is no evidence of a special diplomatic relationship between 
the city and Rome. Nor is there an indication that any particular individual Roman 
senator acted as the Abderites’ patron or advocate in this case. Abdera was a prosperous 
city. It was known for its grain production and as a port of trade for inland Thrace. Still, it 
was not so prominent as to obviously warrant special treatment by Rome. Nor was there 
anything truly special about the response the Abderites received from the Senate. There 
are many similar cases in which foreign peoples approached the Senate to demand 
redress for abuse by Roman generals and allies during the second century, and they were 
almost uniformly granted some kind of aid or material assistance. This occurred whether 
those lodging the complaints were Greek allies, hostile Gauls, an obscure Ligurian tribe, 
or Chalcideans led by Micythio, one of Rome’s most steadfast friends. While scholars 
have laid much emphasis upon the historical ramifications of patronage, friendship, and 
other ongoing diplomatic relationships during this period, the behavior of Rome towards 
those who were neither allies nor active enemies is often overlooked. In examining cases 
such as those referenced above, it becomes clear that Rome developed a set of norms 
                                                          
3 Livy Per. 43: The precise nature of the decree concerning the Abderites is not known, but Livy notes that 
a similar decree was passed in the previous year concerning the inhabitants of Coronea, who had been 
mistreated by the consul for 171, P. Licinius Crassus. Additionally, Livy Per. 43 notes that a senatorial 
decree restored those whom Licinius had sold into slavery. 
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meant to guide the treatment of foreign peoples, covering issues from what constituted a 
just cause for war (iustum bellum) to the appropriate disposition of captured foreign 
property. Above all, however, the guiding principle in every case seems to be the desire 
to project an image of Rome and Romans as just, clement, and virtuous.  
This dissertation seeks to add a further dimension to the scholarly understanding 
of Roman foreign relations during the Middle Republic. By examining the links between 
Roman religious and cultural values on the one hand, and institutions and cases like that 
of Abdera on the other, it is possible to see a process of gradual evolution. Moving from 
priestly ritual to formalized legal procedure, these values and norms shaped particular 
interactions between Rome and foreign peoples. Furthermore, this dissertation will seek 
explanations for the continued salience of these norms in the second century by applying 
social science theories concerning the strategic use of principled behavior for both 
external signaling and internal social coherence. This analysis will provide additional 
ways of interpreting interactions between Rome and foreign peoples that do not fit neatly 
into other scholarly readings of Roman foreign relations during this period. While others 
have thoroughly documented topics like the rituals of the fetial priests, or the law of war 
(ius belli), before now no one has drawn direct links between these topics and how the 
Roman Senate dealt with cases in which Roman officials or allies violated the principles 
that these institutions had established. By doing so, this dissertation will show that 
traditional Roman values and norms concerning the treatment of foreign peoples and 
states played a strong role in Roman foreign relations during the Middle Republic, and 
that their enactment and enforcement created an image of Rome as a virtuous and 
generous partner that remained powerful through the Late Republic and beyond.  
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Foreign Clientelae, Roman Ambition, and the Lawless Mediterranean 
 
In the past fifty years of scholarship on Roman foreign relations and imperial 
expansion during the Republic, there have been two distinct lines of discussion. One 
focuses on Rome’s diplomatic relationships with allies and other foreign peoples. The 
other seeks out explanations for the motives and mechanisms behind Roman war and 
conquest. Ernst Badian’s 1958 book, Foreign Clientelae, is perhaps the most influential 
work in the former category. In it he posits that the patron-client relationship is the model 
for Rome’s relations with external groups, distinguished from more formal and legalistic 
interpretations by the fact that allies’ “rights and obligations are in practice independent 
of law and treaties and are entirely defined and interpreted by Rome,” to its benefit.4 Still, 
Badian sees this kind of abject clientage as an end result, rather than a starting principle 
of Rome’s increasingly expansionist efforts overseas during the second century. Before 
the Second Macedonian and Second Punic Wars, Rome is well-established in Illyria, 
Sicily, and Sardinia, but makes few diplomatic overtures to other states and seems to 
have no desire to expand further. By 146, with the destruction of Carthage and the final 
defeat of Macedon and the Greeks, Roman domination of large segments of both the East 
and West is assumed, and terms like “socii” have become merely a polite fiction in a 
world where Roman power over its allies is only limited by the will of the Roman 
Senate.5  
                                                          
4 Badian 1958: 114 
 
5 Badian 1958: 115 
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Badian is widely accepted to have been correct about the ultimately informal 
nature of Rome’s relationships with most extra-Italian states. In addition, his 
examination, in the second half of his book, of the role which relationships between 
individual Roman elites and foreign peoples began to play from beginning of the second 
century onwards is also recognized as fundamental to understanding Roman foreign 
relations during the Republic. Even so, his analogy between such individual patron-client 
relationships and the operation of the Roman state as a whole towards other states and 
peoples has been contested. For example, Andrew Lintott criticizes the analogy both 
because it overlooks the language of friendship employed by the sources when describing 
these relationships, and because it implies that the same strict moral obligations applied 
to these relationships as applied to patron-client relationships between individual 
Romans.6 More recently, Paul Burton has attempted to refocus the discourse on this topic 
on the Roman style and method of diplomacy, especially the Roman discourse of 
friendship, rather than equating the terminology of Roman historians with the realities of 
Rome’s imperial power.7 
Following on from Badian’s work, a second line of discussion has been efforts 
made to further define the motivations behind Roman imperialism during this period. In 
his 1979 book, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, William Harris contends that 
the chief reason that Rome went to war was because of the material benefits that accrued 
to Romans because of it, particularly to the elites who led military campaigns. According 
                                                          
6 Lintott 1981: 61-62 
 
7 Burton 2011: 5; For more on the character of clientage in Roman interstate relations, see Braund 1984. 
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to Harris, Roman motives for undertaking a war were primarily economic, although 
aristocratic competition for glory in battle also played a role. In particular, Harris singles 
out the fetial law and its theory of just war as a mere psychological matter for the 
Romans, since the wars they fought were not exclusively in clear defense of themselves 
or allies.8 This view has been criticized by many, including John North, for assuming too 
much about the states of mind and intentions of Roman actors, and for its incompatibility 
with the evidence that Rome did actively choose not to annex many states even after a 
clear victory.9  
Arthur Eckstein took Harris’ perspective further in his 2006 work, Mediterranean 
Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome. Eckstein applied modern Realist political 
theory to the history of the ancient Mediterranean. He maintained that not only was 
Roman practice towards other states completely and calculatedly self-serving, but also 
every other state in the Mediterranean behaved similarly. With the lack of formal 
international law, or any enforcement mechanism targeting violations of shared norms, 
ancient Mediterranean states functioned in a “multipolar anarchy,” the harsh and 
competitive nature of which drove the states acting within it towards aggressive and 
warlike behavior. This approach by Eckstein tends towards treating states as 
undifferentiated actors without distinctive cultures and histories, and depends on 
decision-making individuals within these states being rational actors with access to all 
relevant information about a particular situation.10  
                                                          
8 Harris 1979: 166-175 
 
9 North 1981: 2-3 
 
10 Burton 2011: 16 
 
 
8 
 
 My dissertation is not intended to wholly overturn these theories or replace them 
with another grand formulation of Roman imperialism in the Republic. Rather, it seeks to 
complicate and supplement current scholarly ideas about how the Romans handled 
certain aspects of foreign relations, and how they constructed their self-image in these 
instances to reflect cultural values that had been institutionalized from the Republic’s 
earliest days. While Badian recounts the increasing domination of Rome over its nominal 
allies, at the same time it is possible to document a parallel narrative - the development of 
traditional religious values into a legal regime meant to protect foreign peoples from 
certain kinds of abuse by Roman officials, as well as efforts by the Roman Senate to 
make amends for that abuse where it happened. No doubt, as Badian’s theory would 
predict, these values and behaviors are followed only to the extent that the Romans 
themselves determined. Yet, at the same time, principled behavior had its own logic 
within the realm of Roman foreign relations, and was not wholly determined by 
immediate expediency. For example, contrary to Harris’ reckoning, the principle of just 
war was often cited not just to give legitimacy to wars which were carried out, but also to 
punish and chastise those who contravened the principle by fighting against allies or 
blameless foreign peoples. The Roman Senate frequently repudiated commanders who 
undertook such improper wars, despite the fact that the state might have profited by them.  
Furthermore, while it is true that international law in the modern sense, with its 
multinational treaties, Geneva Convention, and International Criminal Court, did not 
exist in the ancient world, there were some norms that were shared among Mediterranean 
states, the most well-known being the inviolability of ambassadors. It is for this reason 
that, on multiple occasions, we see the Romans turn over to the injured states those who 
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harm ambassadors. Even where both shared norms and multilateral enforcement were 
absent, Rome clearly possessed and acted upon law which governed state interactions 
with foreign peoples.  
Traditional Roman principles concerning the treatment of foreign peoples had 
inherent value to the Romans as a reinforcement of their cultural identity, and these were 
not to be laid aside at will. Furthermore, there was a logic to demonstrating clemency 
towards other states and peoples in order to show the inherent good faith of Rome 
towards any potential partners who might be observing Roman behavior.  For this reason, 
it makes sense to take Roman authors at their word when they refer to concepts like just 
war and ius belli as fundamental to Roman behavior abroad. Similarly, it is rash to regard 
the aid given to foreign peoples who are abused and extorted by Roman generals as a 
mere sop, rather than as a sincere expression of repentance. Such acknowledgements 
need not conflict with the recognition of the changes that took place in Rome’s foreign 
relations as its imperial power increased. Rather, these incidents of principled behavior 
complicate the picture of a uniform decrease in the Roman regard for the rights of allies, 
which some now contend occurred alongside Roman imperial expansion. After all, the 
permanent court for extortion (quaestio de repetundis) was established only three years 
before the final destruction of Carthage.   
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Performing Roman Identity 
 
A further purpose of this dissertation is to explore the idea that certain elements of 
Roman foreign relations were performative in nature, both for external and domestic 
Roman audiences. Social theorists, economists, and scholars of international law have 
long debated why individuals and states sometimes exhibit altruistic or principled 
behavior even when the immediate benefit to themselves is neither immediate nor 
apparent. One outcome of these investigations has been the formulation of what is 
broadly termed “signaling theory,” in which individuals undertake costly or altruistic 
actions, thereby signaling their quality as cooperative partners. Within the discipline of 
ancient history, scholars like Susan Mattern have tried to explain Roman decision-making 
in terms of the education and cultural milieu within which elite Romans were raised.11 
My dissertation attempts to bring these two ideas together, arguing that Roman obedience 
to religious and moral ideas which had long been embedded in Roman culture acted as a 
signal, both to foreign peoples and to Romans themselves. To the former, these signals 
were meant to convey the fact that Rome was a trustworthy partner in diplomatic 
relationships. To the latter, adherence to what were ultimately religious strictures 
demonstrated their inherent worth because of the costs involved in adherence, thereby no 
doubt enhancing group stability and cohesion.  
Valerius Maximus’ work is illustrative of how the Romans’ principled behavior 
was focused on creating a particular identity. In his Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, Valerius 
                                                          
11 Mattern 2002: 14-20 
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seeks to collect and catalogue the notable actions of individual Romans from history in 
order to provide models of both proper and improper behavior as guidance for his 
readers. In the section titled De Fide Publica he includes a story meant to illustrate the 
Romans’ dedication to honor and good faith. In 188, Marcus Claudius, the urban praetor, 
ordered that L. Minucius Myrtilus and L. Manlius be turned over to the Carthaginians by 
the fetial priests, because they had been accused of violence against Carthaginian 
ambassadors.12 Minucius and Manlius, while not easy to identify, bear the names of 
prominent Roman families, making their surrender a significant event. Furthermore, the 
Carthaginans, although formal allies after the end of the Second Punic War, were often 
regarded with suspicion by Rome. These circumstances raise the question of why the 
Romans would choose to perform such a costly action (the loss of two notable citizens) 
without the promise of any commensurate benefit. Valerius Maximus tells us that “In this 
the Senate was considering not those to whom the men were surrendered, but itself.”13  
In his preface to the section in which this story is included, Valerius states that the 
exempla to follow are evidence that fides, the Roman concept of good faith and 
reciprocity, has always flourished in the Roman state, and that all nations have been 
witness to this fact.14 This statement recognizes that there were two sides to Roman 
actions like the surrender of these Roman citizens to Carthage. First, Romans conceived 
of themselves and their society as exceptionally virtuous and observant of certain ethical 
                                                          
12 Livy 38.42.7; Val. Max. 6.6.3 
 
13 Val. Max. 6.6.3 Se tunc senatus, non eos, quibus hos praestabatur, aspexit. 
 
14 Val. Max. 6.6.praef 
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principles, in particular fides. This is a complex term, encompassing “everything on 
which one can rely, a guarantee in the broadest sense, an affirmation, a particular legal 
relationship of people to each other, or a property found in people or things.”15 For 
Romans, fides was the virtue which underlay all relational norms. On the other hand, 
non-Roman peoples could both witness and accept the Roman devotion to fides as part of 
their larger picture of the Romans as a people and state.  
Consciousness of such observation by non-Romans is essential to understanding 
Roman foreign relations under the Republic. Good faith and other norms derived from 
fides played a fundamental role in the ways that the Roman state and Roman officials 
approached and interacted with foreign peoples. Social theorists have often had difficulty 
in reconciling the seemingly altruistic and principled behaviors of actors with the idea 
that those same actors make decisions on the basis of rational self-interest. Scholar have 
struggled to explain how principled behavior can be undertaken in the service of self-
interest when the benefit to the actor is not obvious or immediate. In his influential 
article, “The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior,” Eric Posner argues that such actions 
may be taken in order to acquire a positive reputation which may be useful in future 
interactions.16 This theory has been extended to international law by scholars like 
Andrew Guzman, who focuses on the reputational effects of states’ compliance with 
international laws and norms.17  
                                                          
15 Fraenkel 1916:. 187: “bezeichnet also alles, worauf man sich verlassen kann, Garantie im weitesten 
Sinne, sei es dass sie in einem Akte, einer Versicherung, einem bestimmten rechtlichen Verhältnis von 
Personen zu einander, oder in einer Eigenschaft von Menschen oder Dingen gründet” 
 
16 Posner 1998: 1186-1187 
 
17 Guzman 2002 
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By this model, if the Romans do not adhere to their principles in any particular 
interaction, their reputation for fair-dealing would suffer, and this failure would 
negatively affect future relationships. “Collateral consequences,” as Oona Hathaway calls 
such reputational effects,18 would occur when other states which have observed Roman 
actions premise their own decisions about how to interact with them on the basis of those 
observations. So, if Roman commanders repeatedly made war on allied peoples, refused 
surrenders, or improperly seized property without proper justification, this behavior 
might deter other states from contemplating an alliance with, or surrender to, Rome. 
These considerations are recognized in Roman sources; anxiety about the reputational 
effects of an errant commander’s cruelty is voiced by the Senate.19  
Ian Hurd identifies three reasons why a particular state actor might choose to 
comply with a norm or rule: (1) the actor fears punishment by those empowered to 
enforce the rule, (2) the rule is in the actor’s self-interest, and (3) the actor sees the rule as 
inherently legitimate.20 Enforcement of norms through punishment by an external, 
international authority is an element that was absent from the ancient Mediterranean. The 
punishment of individual Roman commanders for violations of norms was reasonably 
common, and is the focus of Chapter Three of this dissertation. However, domestic 
enforcement of norms does not account for the state level incentives for this enforcement. 
Thus self-interest and devotion to principle must be the primary motivators when the 
                                                          
 
18 Hathaway 2012: 54 
19 Livy 42.8.5  
 
20 Hurd 1999: 379 
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Romans choose to act in compliance with their norms of foreign relations. Self-interest 
has already been mentioned above, and many analyses deem it a sufficient and complete 
motive for any and all seemingly principled behavior. However, Hurd and others explore 
the idea that rules may be obeyed because the actors who obey them see them as 
originating in a process or institution which they consider to be legitimate and in which 
they themselves are participants.21 This claim is linked to the constructivist idea that 
norms and rules are primarily social concepts, and that compliance with these norms is a 
condition of expressing and retaining group identity.22  
Such reinforcement of group identity and strengthening of social cohesion are 
another necessary component for understanding Roman compliance with foreign 
relations norms. This compliance serves to strengthen what Émile Durkheim termed the 
“collective consciousness.”23 The values that inform Roman foreign relations – piety, 
clemency, justice – are also the key virtues emphasized by Roman culture more 
generally. Together with shared beliefs and traditions they serve as a kind of collective 
psychology for Romans. Hence violations of the principles of Roman foreign relations 
not only endanger the practical interests of the state, but also offend its collective 
consciousness. Thus, the state, as the protector of these beliefs, must act to ensure their 
observance.  For this reason, the state is conscientious in carrying out the appropriate 
rituals to guarantee the piety of its foreign relations, in punishing violators, and in 
                                                          
21 Alford 2012: 17-18 
 
22 Alford 2012: 18 
 
23 Durkheim 1997: 39 
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justifying and rationalizing any apparent transgressions when they are in the state’s larger 
interest. The strength of the collective consciousness empowers the cooperative venture 
of the state, which could not survive without strong social cohesion. Social cohesion as a 
motivation for principled behavior also adds a degree of comprehensibility to the costly 
actions which Roman principles of foreign relations often require. After all, the collective 
consciousness, which has been formed over the life of the society through its historical 
development, cannot be expected to consist only of elements which are purely 
advantageous and useful.24 Consequently, Roman foreign relations are often judged by 
state actors on the basis of their “Roman-ness” or “un-Roman-ness” rather than their 
strict utility.  
Analyses that fail to consider the impact of principled action on the conduct of 
Roman foreign relations during the Republic will always fall short in comprehending 
certain aspects of Roman imperialism. By envisioning Romans as fixated on exerting 
hegemonic control over the Mediterranean, and equating the absence of a central 
international enforcement authority with the lack of any real norms for the conduct of 
foreign relations, scholars have created an oversimplified picture of this crucial period in 
Rome’s history. Such models fail to account for the regular punishment of Roman 
commanders who contravened real norms and attacked and abused foreign peoples. I 
maintain that Rome’s traditional values served to shape its foreign relations at least as 
much as imperial ambitions, economic advantage, and pure strategic self-interest. In the 
sphere of foreign relations, Romans respected and sought to obey the values of their 
                                                          
24 Durkheim 1997: 62 
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society because those values were both advantageous to them and had an inherent 
legitimacy and meaning. Adherence to these values was a part of Roman identity, and 
compliance was an assertion of the Romans’ cultural superiority.  
 
 
Sources 
 
 This dissertation aims to examine how Romans both acted upon and thought 
about the principles concerning foreign relations embedded in their culture. While a few 
references are made to epigraphical sources and the works of Virgil and Plautus, the great 
majority of evidence used comes from prose authors, in particular Livy and Cicero. In 
general, there are few literary sources for the period between the end of the Second Punic 
War in 201 and the destruction of Carthage in 146, which forms the heart of this 
dissertation. In addition, with the exception of Polybius, whose extant work relating to 
this period is mostly fragmentary, the sources we do have are writing at least a century 
after most of the events that they record. Furthermore, the practice of history in the 
ancient world was unlike modern methods and more akin to rhetoric than a social 
science.  
 Thus, it is to be expected that the events of the Roman past are not reflected 
perfectly in our sources. On the basis of the scholarship of source criticism we know that 
the writing of history itself does not seem to have emerged among the Romans before the 
late third century. Therefore, it may be presumed that later sources like Livy and Cicero 
did not have access to substantial historical narratives for earlier periods. Still, when we 
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consider the significant events and narratives concerning Roman foreign relations that are 
contained in our sources, it is possible to view them as part of a larger discourse about 
how Romans interacted with foreign peoples. This discourse related to reality by 
influencing how historical actors performed in these interactions, while the discourse 
itself adapted to the reality of events in order to preserve its integrity in the eyes of its 
audience.  In this way, even if the historicity of a particular event cannot be verified 
beyond doubt, we can expect that the sources reflect the way that the Romans typically 
conceived of such events. 
 For this dissertation, which is concerned primarily with the role that traditional 
Roman values played in foreign relations from a Roman perspective, access to the Roman 
discourse concerning these relations is essential. Recurrent citation of ideas like the fetial 
law, just war, and unconditional surrender in the sources allow me to make connections 
between institutions like the fetial priests and the permanent court for extortion that may 
not have been apparent if I had disengaged from this discourse in search of a more 
“objective” version of Rome’s history. For example, the historical accuracy of Minicius 
and Manlius’ surrender to the Carthaginians is of less concern to me than whether 
Romans would have believed that such an incident occurred because it comported with 
their understanding of how Rome generally reacted to Romans who abused foreign 
ambassadors. In the same way, when Cicero writes in De Officiis in 44, long after the 
fetial priests have ceased to function as an active part of Rome’s foreign relations, that 
the fetial law is the basis of the equitable conduct of war, we can believe that he and his 
audience are easily able to see a connection between the conduct of war in their time and 
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the rituals of those priests.25 When viewed in this way, even our sources’ writings 
concerning the earliest periods of Roman history, for which their evidence is the most 
questionable, can be useful in trying to understand the Roman perspective on their own 
foreign relations behaviors.  
 
 
Patrocinium Orbis Terrae 
 
In De Officiis, in the midst of a discussion about the duties owed to one’s 
enemies, Cicero, the well-known Late Republican politician, orator, and author, describes 
the Roman empire of the Middle Republic as “patrocinium orbis terrae” – a guardian of 
the world. The Romans’ idea that their society was uniquely placed, by the natural talents 
and values of its people, to rule the world was a key influence on both the decisions they 
made and the identity they tried to construct through their interactions with other 
Mediterranean peoples. Cicero speaks of the ideal Roman state not as an empire 
(imperium) driven by power, but as a place of refuge for the weak and the abused, a tool 
employed in service of the allies, and one that displayed by its every act the clemency, 
justice, and honor of the Roman people.26 This idea of Rome as a benevolent power in its 
world relied upon Rome’s commitment and obedience to the values, traditions, 
institutions, and laws which governed its existence as a state and a people. The reality of 
these elements and their impact demands that we take them into account in any analysis 
                                                          
25 Cic. Off. 1.36 
 
26 Cic. Off. 2.26-27 
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of Roman imperialism. This dissertation attempts to trace some of the most consequential 
traditional institutions and values which exerted this influence from their origins in early 
Rome through their development and application in the Middle Republic, and on to 
moments of their eventual breakdown. 
Chapter One explores the origins of Roman foreign relations in the institution of 
the fetial priests, and the rituals and duties they carried out. It shows how an institution, 
whose primary purpose was to maintain the pax deorum when Rome formally interacted 
with foreign peoples, became a vehicle for the formalization of a set of foreign relations 
principles often referred to as the ius fetiale. Chapter Two continues to trace this 
formalization, examining the creation of a theory of just war (iustum bellum) among the 
Romans, which is based on the fetial law. Alongside just war, a further set of norms had 
evolved to deal with other aspects of the Roman conduct of war, termed ius belli, and 
together they formed the foundation of Roman foreign relations law. In Chapter Three I 
show how this emerging set of rules was enforced against Roman officials and allies who 
compromised relationships with foreign peoples through acts of abuse and extortion. In 
this chapter I will also follow how the development of these cases led to increasing 
procedural formalization, and the eventual creation of Rome’s first permanent criminal 
court, the quaestio de repetundis, which became the venue for prosecutions of this kind. 
Chapter Four presents a case study of the unique relationship between Rome and 
Carthage from the conclusion of the Second Punic War to the destruction of that city by 
the Romans in 146. The aims of this chapter are twofold. First it demonstrates the 
strength of the Romans’ values concerning the proper treatment of allies by documenting 
the efforts they made to maintain a friendly and just relationship with their former chief 
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rival. Second, this chapter shows how Roman adherence to traditional principles could 
break down under simultaneous pressure both from the unique circumstances of the 
relationship with Carthage, and from Rome’s changing role in the Mediterranean. Finally, 
Chapter Five explores how the history of Roman foreign relations is mythologized by 
writers of the Late Republic, and analyzes the legacy of the quaestio de repetundis.  
When Cicero refers to the patrocinium orbis terrae, or praises the incorruptibility 
of Regulus or Scipio Africanus, he is pointing to a Roman past governed by a set of 
principles and values still observed in his own time. I seek to reach back into that past 
and assess the combined impact of elements of Roman culture and history which have 
been for too long regarded as separate entities. It is possible to see the fetial priests not as 
an institution which became obsolescent by the third century, but rather as the seed of a 
set of legal norms. By tracing the development of these norms from traditional religious 
values through to formal court procedure, it is possible to shed new light on Roman 
foreign relations during the Republic. I am not primarily concerned with the motives 
behind Roman imperialism – whether it was defensive or aggressive, disinterested or 
acquisitive. Rather, my aim is to give due weight to an important element of the Roman 
perspective which has typically been overlooked. I make it clear that throughout the 
critical period of the Middle Republic the Romans regarded themselves as uniquely 
principled among the powers of the Mediterranean. This self-image was not merely a 
token justification for war and peace and alliance and conquest. It was meaningful to the 
Romans as reflecting distinctively Roman values and principles for success in diplomatic 
relationships. This thinking merits the serious consideration and analysis that my 
dissertation provides.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
IUS FETIALE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION 
 
"As for war, justice is defined by the most sacred fetial law of the Roman 
people."27 So says Cicero in De Officiis when discussing the duties which are owed to 
those who have injured Rome. In this category he places not only those with whom Rome 
is actively at war, but also the conquered, those engaged in diplomatic negotiations, and 
those who have become allies through peace treaty. Following Cicero, one would expect 
the fetial law to be a codification of the Roman law of foreign relations. However, as far 
as it is possible to discover it, the ius fetiale is both more and less than this.28 A sacred 
institution, created by a college of priests whose origins are as old as the Roman people 
itself, the ius fetiale is not a simple systematic digest of the self-imposed rules of Roman 
foreign relations. While no text of this law is extant, from what is recorded about the 
priests and their duties and rituals it is clear that the ius fetiale preserves traditional 
Roman practices and beliefs about the just way to deal with foreign peoples. And while 
some of the principles contained within the fetial law are shared with other 
                                                          
27 Cic, Off. 1.36: Ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure perscripta est.  
 
28 The best recent introductions to the subject of the fetials and their law are as follows: Watson 1993; 
Santangelo 2008; Wiedemann 1986; Saulnier 1980; On the Augustan “revival” of the fetial institution, 
which is not within the scope of this chapter, see Zollschan 2011; Fontana 1989.  
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Mediterranean cultures, the fetial law as an institution is unique to Rome.29 These 
practices and beliefs both sprung from and contributed to fundamental Roman religious 
and cultural values. The fact that they were recorded by the priests does not mean that the 
Roman people were otherwise ignorant of these values. Rather the recapitulation and 
codification of these rites by the fetial priests created a set form of these beliefs which 
became a source of authority concerning principles that were already essential to Roman 
culture. For this reason Cicero is able to point to the fetial law as the font of justice in war 
at a time when the college of the fetials had become obsolescent as a discrete institution.   
 Thus, from the first century Roman perspective, the fetial law contained the 
essential elements of Roman mores surrounding foreign relations. It is through the 
examination of this institution that it is possible to uncover the major principles which the 
Romans believed were a fundamental part of their identity when interacting with foreign 
peoples. Some of these principles include the necessity of only engaging in “just war” 
(bellum iustum), the sacred nature of treaties, justice and protection for allies, and, what is 
an inherent part of all of these, the scrupulous observance of the duties imposed by 
religio. The rituals observed by the fetial college enact and reify these principles. 
Furthermore, in addition to performing necessary religious duties, the fetial rites also 
manifest aspects of proper Roman relations with the Other. These aspects are visible and 
expanded upon in later periods when the fetials themselves may not have been 
particularly active. For this reason a study of the fetials, their rites, and their ius, is 
indispensable to full comprehension of the way in which the Romans thought about their 
                                                          
29 While I show below that the fetial priesthood was probably common to the Latin tribes, there is no 
evidence that it developed into a formal institution elsewhere than at Rome.  
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interactions with foreign peoples. Thus the ritual of rerum repetitio forms the basis of the 
Roman concept of bellum iustum. The fetial solemnization of treaties similarly underlies 
the inviolability of a properly made peace (pax). Various other episodes involving the 
priests demonstrate what duties the Romans felt were owed to allies and enemies. 
Furthermore, the deep roots of the fetial institution within Roman society, and the 
Romans’ own accounts of how and when it was created, show that the fetial priests are a 
manifestation of cultural values and beliefs which have been part of Roman culture from 
its earliest days. When the Romans choose to take costly actions, either as a message to 
other peoples or to their own, it is the ius fetiale that they draw upon. In this way, an 
understanding of the fetiales is the first step towards a thorough analysis of how religious 
and cultural values shaped Roman foreign relations under the Republic.  
 
 
The Origins of the Fetiales 
 
As Theodor Mommsen describes in his Römisches Staatsrecht, negotiation 
between the Roman state and foreign states was handled by the college of fetial priests in 
the earliest years of the Republic.30 The most comprehensive and concise ancient account 
of the origins, duties, and functions of the fetial priests is given by Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus in his Ῥωμαϊκὴ Ἀρχαιολογία:  
 
                                                          
30 Mommsen 1887-1888: 675. For Mommsen’s full evaluation of legates more generally see pp.675-701. 
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εἰσὶ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων οἴκων ἄνδρες ἐπίλεκτοι διὰ παντὸς ἱερώμενοι 
τοῦ βίου, Νόμα τοῦ βασιλέως πρώτου καὶ τοῦτο Ῥωμαίοις τὸ ἱερὸν 
ἀρχεῖον καταστησαμένου: εἰ μέντοι παρὰ τῶν καλουμένων Αἰκικλῶν 
τὸ παράδειγμα ἔλαβεν ὥσπερ οἴονταί τινες, ἢ παρὰ τῆς Ἀρδεατῶν 
πόλεως ὡς γράφει Γέλλιος οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ἀπόχρη δὲ μοι τοσοῦτο 
μόνον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι πρὸ τῆς Νόμα ἀρχῆς οὔπω τὸ τῶν εἰρηνοδικῶν 
σύστημα παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἦν . . . ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ὅσα ἀνάκειται 
τούτοις τοῖς εἰρηνοδίκαις ἐπελθεῖν διὰ πλῆθος οὐ ῥᾴδιον, 
κεφαλαιώδει δ᾽ ὑπογραφῇ δηλῶσαι τοιάδ᾽ ἐστι: φυλάττειν ἵνα μηδένα 
Ῥωμαῖοι πόλεμον ἐξενέγκωσι κατὰ μηδεμιᾶς ἐνσπόνδου πόλεως 
ἄδικον, ἀρξάντων δὲ παρασπονδεῖν εἰς αὐτοὺς ἑτέρων πρεσβεύεσθαί 
τε καὶ τὰ δίκαια πρῶτον αἰτεῖν λόγῳ, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πείθωνται τοῖς 
ἀξιουμένοις, τότ᾽ ἐπικυροῦν τὸν πόλεμον. ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν ἀδικεῖσθαί 
τινες ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἔνσπονδοι λέγοντες τὰ δίκαια αἰτῶσι, τούτους 
διαγινώσκειν τοὺς ἄνδρας εἴ τι πεπόνθασιν ἔκσπονδον καὶ ἐὰν δόξωσι 
τὰ: προσήκοντα ἐγκαλεῖν τοὺς ἐνόχους ταῖς αἰτίαις συλλαβόντας 
ἐκδότους τοῖς ἀδικηθεῖσι παραδιδόναι τά τε περὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς 
ἀδικήματα δικάζειν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς συνθήκας ὅσια φυλάττειν εἰρήνην 
τε ποιεῖσθαι καὶ γεγενημένην, ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τοὺς ἱεροὺς δόξῃ 
πεπρᾶχθαι νόμους, ἀκυροῦν καὶ τὰς τῶν στρατηγῶν παρανομίας, ὅσαι 
περί τε ὅρκους καὶ σπονδὰς ἐπιτελοῦνται . . . 
 
They are chosen men, from the best families, and exercise their holy 
office for life; King Numa was also the first who instituted this holy 
magistracy among the Romans. But whether he took his example 
from those called the Aequicoli, according to the opinion of some, or 
from the city of Ardea, as Gellius writes, I cannot say. It is sufficient 
for me to state that before Numa’s reign the college of the fetiales did 
not exist among the Romans. . . . The multitude of duties, to be sure, 
that fall within the province of these fetiales makes it no easy matter 
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to enumerate them all; but to indicate them by a summary outline, 
they are as follows: It is their duty to take care that the Romans do not 
enter upon an unjust war against any city in alliance with them, and if 
others begin the violation of treaties against them, to go as 
ambassadors and first make formal demand for justice, and then, if the 
others refuse to comply with their demands, to sanction war. In like 
manner, if any people in alliance with the Romans complain of having 
been injured by them and demand justice, these men are to determine 
whether they have suffered anything in violation of their alliance; and 
if they find their complaints well grounded, they are to seize the 
accused and deliver them up to the injured parties. They are also to 
take cognizance of the crimes committed against ambassadors, to take 
care that treaties are religiously observed, to make peace, and if they 
find that peace has been made otherwise than is prescribed by the 
holy laws, to set it aside; and to inquire into and expiate the 
transgressions of the generals in so far as they relate to oaths and 
treaties . . . 31 
 
Here Dionysius outlines the duties which the priests undertook to ensure the proper, 
religious conduct of Rome’s foreign relations, and also places their origin with the king 
Numa Pompilius. Numa was the fabled second king of Rome, and, by crediting him with 
the fetial college’s creation, Dionysius is choosing to espouse a particular narrative. 
Numa is recorded in the ancient sources as having been the originator of the greater part 
of traditional Roman public religion. Livy tells us that he was famed for his justice and 
piety, and most learned in all matters of law, both human and divine.32 It was on this 
                                                          
31 Dion. Hal. Roman Antiquities, trans. E. Cary.  2.72.1-5  
 
32 Livy 1.18.1 
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basis that he was offered the kingship by the Senate. He is credited with the creation of 
the Temple of Janus, the cults of Fides and Terminus, and the creation of the major 
Roman priesthoods: the augures, flamines, Vestals, Salii, and pontifices, along with the 
fetiales. In essence, Numa is considered to be the founder of the significant religious 
elements of the Roman state. It is significant that in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives, he is paired 
with the designer of the Spartan constitution, Lycurgus. For this reason, if Romans 
believed that Numa created the fetiales, they must have considered them, their rituals and 
laws, as fundamental to the continued piety and fortune of the Roman Republic, and one 
of its oldest institutions.  
 However, ancient writers do not all agree on the identification of the fetial college 
with Numa. Livy places their origins with the fourth king of Rome, Ancus Marcius,33 and 
Cicero with Tullus Hostilius, the sixth. In either case, these authors’ attribution of the 
fetials is not arbitrary. Ancus Marcius was said to be Numa’s grandson, and similarly 
pious, while also aggressive in his defense of Rome.34 Thus, his motivation in creating 
the fetiales was to bring religious scruple into the Roman conduct of war in the same way 
that Numa had brought it into the domestic functions of the state.35 Tullus Hostilius was 
similarly associated with war, particularly the long conflict with Alba Longa: the story of 
the Horatii is included under his reign. He is also said to have built the first Senate house 
(Curia) and the Comitium, earning him a place alongside Numa and Ancus as a founder 
                                                          
33 Penella 1987 argues that Livy is only referring to the ius fetiale as originating with Ancus Marcius, while 
the fetial priesthood was an earlier institution in Livy’s text. 
 
34 Livy 1.32 
 
35 Livy 1.32 
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of signal Roman institutions. Similarly to Livy on Ancus, Cicero states that Tullus 
Hostilius instituted the fetial rites “so that war, if it was not announced and declared 
publicly, would be judged unjust and impious.”36 This assertion, along with the archaic 
(or archaizing) details of the fetial rituals described by these authors, serves to show that 
the fetiales and their ius were connected, in Roman minds, to the regal period. This is the 
period during which they considered some of their most essential cultural institutions to 
have originated. To place the fetiales alongside the likes of the Flamen Dialis and the 
Curia was to give them equal legitimacy and status as a fundamental part of the religious 
and political functions of the Roman state. Thus it is necessary to regard them, as 
Romans with any knowledge of their cultural heritage must have, as an indispensable part 
of Roman traditional practice.  
 If the ancient sources can tell us what the Romans themselves believed, they also 
give some indications about the historical origins of the fetial priests. The way that the 
rituals of the priests are described seems to show that they had aspects in common with 
the early legis actiones, the earliest forms of Roman civil procedure.37 These were so 
ancient that they seem to have already undergone a certain amount of formalization by 
the time of the drawing up of the Twelve Tables. However, the fetial rites may have been 
yet more ancient, since the symbolism of the rites, involving implements like a spear of 
cornelwood, sacred herbs, and a flint stone might seem to indicate a time before materials 
like iron were in common use. Furthermore, for the fetials to have been of any use to the 
                                                          
36 Cic. Rep. 2.31 
 
37 Wiedemann 1986: 487 
 
 
 
28 
 
Romans, the priests must have been intelligible as an institution to those peoples with 
whom the Romans had occasion to use the fetials in the period of their origin. This must 
have been the larger group of Latin tribes, which Rome came to dominate very early on 
in its growth. Since the tenth century the Latins had formed a discrete cultural group, 
distinct from other surrounding Etruscan and Osco-Umbrian peoples. Archaeological 
evidence indicates that they shared important cultural traditions and evolved together 
from small subsistence villages into more substantial city-states. Despite their cultural 
similarities, the co-existence of numerous individuated Latin groups in a small 
geographical area must have led to frequent conflict. The mythologized histories of early 
Rome depict a state constantly at war with the other Latin tribes, and there is no reason to 
doubt that this was the usual situation in these early years.  
 In this context the existence of a body such as the fetial priests, common to the 
different Latin tribes, and meant to mediate, or at least regularize, conflicts between them 
seems natural. This is impossible to prove definitively, since the literary evidence for 
such a shared institution is primarily Augustan.  Yet Dionysius and Livy, among others, 
point to the Latin tribe of the Aequi (or Aequicoli) as the tribe whom Numa or Ancus 
were imitating when they created the fetials. This evidence seems to indicate the 
possibility that the Latins shared a similar priesthood or type of embassy for the simple 
reason that Numa and the other kings are shown as having created many other religious 
and social institutions out of whole cloth. The importation of the fetials from another 
Latin tribe thus may have been similar to the importation of the haruspices from Etruria, 
who also formed a Roman priestly college.  
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 Whether the fetiales were imported by Rome from other Latins, or had sprung up 
at the same time among all Latin tribes, their original use is only understandable in an 
environment of mutual similar institutions among other Latin and nearby Italic tribes.38 
Yet, as the evidence demonstrates, their use by the Romans extends beyond their 
interactions with other Latin tribes. Furthermore, the principles contained in the fetial law 
persist in Rome’s actions even when the fetiales themselves are no longer recorded as 
carrying out their rites. Cicero’s citation of the ius is followed years later by Octavian’s 
personal enactment of the fetial declaration of war against Cleopatra.39 Clearly, power 
and legitimacy can be drawn from this ancient tradition. Alan Watson describes the 
righteousness of the ius fetiale as providing a “psychological advantage” to the Roman 
state in its interactions with foreign peoples.40 The nature of Roman society dictated that 
such a “psychological advantage,” springing from a confidence in and assurance of the 
piety and justice of Roman actions, must be drawn from continuity, actual or perceived, 
with ancient Roman values and traditions. Thus, the main function of the fetials and their 
law from the fourth century on seems to have been to provide Rome with a reliable 
default source of moral authority which could be used to legitimate its foreign relations. 
 
 
                                                          
38 Santangelo 2008: 89. From Livy there is evidence that they existed among the Aequicoli (1.32) and the 
Samnites (8.39); Servius suggests also the Faliscans (Aen. 7.659) However, this may be analogic 
terminology on Livy’s part, as he often uses the names of Roman institutions when referring to similar 
foreign institutions.  
 
39 Dio Cass. 50.4.5 
 
40 Watson 1993: 27 
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Rerum Repetitio and Just War 
 
The conduct of a just war is perhaps the single most prominent element of Roman 
military conduct which can be directly linked to the fetial priests. Cicero defines the term 
as follows: “No war is just, unless either a request for restitution has been made or an 
announcement has been made and a formal declaration.”41 This short statement lines up 
well with the various descriptions given by ancient authors for the fetial ritual which has 
come to be known as the rerum repetitio.42 Among Livy’s accounts of early disputes 
between the Romans and other Latins, we find a detailed description of the rituals which 
fetial priests performed in order to declare a just war at the time of the king Numa 
Pompilius. It is important to note that, while all evidence points to the fetial priesthood’s 
origins in Rome’s earliest days, the rituals related by later Roman historians are most 
likely reflective of a much later process of formalization and rationalization undergone by 
most of Rome’s religious institutions. As Jörg Rüpke writes, our modern understanding 
of Roman religion can be traced in large part to changes in Roman society that occurred 
between the mid-fourth and mid-first century which pushed Romans to institutionalize 
religious roles and rituals and standardize religious knowledge.43 However, this does not 
mean that the rituals recorded by Livy are unable provide important information about 
how the fetiales operated and how Romans conceived of their role in foreign relations.  
                                                          
41 Cic. Off. 1.36: Ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut 
denuntiatum ante sit et indictum. 
 
42 It is important to note that the phrase “rerum repetitio” does not actually appear in the ancient 
accounts, but is an invention of modern scholars. Santangelo 2008: 66 
 
43 Rüpke 2011: 1-4. 
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According to the ancient sources, just war could only take place in the case of a 
legitimate grievance against the opposing state. Once this was determined by the king or 
Senate, the selected fetial, called the pater patratus, was sent to the borders of enemy 
territory. There he covered his head with the traditional wool fillet of Roman priests and 
recited the following formula: 
 
'audi, Iuppiter', inquit; 'audite, fines' — cuiuscumque gentis sunt, 
nominat—; ‘audiat fas: ego sum publicus nuntius populi Romani; 
iuste pieque legatus venio verbisque meis fides sit'. peragit deinde 
postulata. inde Iouem testem facit: 'si ego iniuste inpieque illos 
homines illasque res dedier mihi exposco, tum patriae compotem me 
numquam siris esse'.44 
 
“Hear me, Jupiter,” he says, “hear me, boundaries” – he names 
whatever people whose boundaries they are – “hear, Divine Law! I 
am the official messenger of the Roman people. I come justly and 
piously as their ambassador, may good faith be in my words.” Then 
he runs through the demands. Next he makes Jupiter the witness: “If I 
unjustly and impiously pray that those men and those things be given 
over to me, then may you never permit me to return to my native 
land.” 
 
He then crossed the boundary and repeated the same formula, then did so again to the 
first person he meets, then again when entering the city gates, and again when he comes 
                                                          
44 Livy 1.32.6-7 
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to the enemy city’s marketplace. If the men, money, or objects he demanded were not 
offered within thirty-three days, he announced the prospect of war thus:  
 
‘audi, Iuppiter, et tu, Iane Quirine, diique omnes caelestes vosque, 
terrestres, vosque, inferni, audite: ego vos testor populum illum' — 
quicumque est, nominat—'iniustum esse neque ius persolvere. sed de 
istis rebus in patria maiores natu consulemus, quo pacto ius nostrum 
adipiscamur'.45 
 
“Hear, Jupiter, and you, Janus Quirinus, and all the gods in heaven, 
and you on earth, and you in the underworld, hear me! I call you as 
witness that those people” – whoever they are, he names them – “are 
unjust and do not give what is due. But about these matters we will 
consult with the elders in our native land, as to how we may obtain 
what is due to us.” 
 
The pater patratus then returned to Rome, and, after the war gained the approval of the 
Senate and people, he would be sent back to the enemy boundary to formally declare war. 
Carrying an iron or wooden spear46 and in the presence of at least three adult men, he 
spoke the following words (in this example, against the Latins):  
 
‘quod populi Priscorum Latinorum hominesque Prisci Latini adversus 
populum Romanum Quiritium fecerunt, deliquerunt, quod populus 
                                                          
45 Livy 1.32.10 
 
46 As noted above, the use of a spear made of iron or fire-hardened cornelwood (hastam ferratam aut 
sanguineam praeustam) seems intentionally archaic if one accepts that Livy is recounting a later, idealized 
version of the ritual.  
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Romanus Quiritium bellum cum Priscis Latinis iussit esse senatusque 
populi Romani Quiritium censuit, consensit, conscivit, ut bellum cum 
Priscis Latinis fieret, ob eam rem ego populusque Romanus populis 
Priscorum Latinorum hominibusque Priscis Latinis bellum indico 
facioque.'47 
 
Whereas the people and men of the Ancient Latins have acted and 
transgressed against the people of the Romans of the Quirites, and 
whereas the Roman people of the Quirites has commanded war 
against the Ancient Latins, and the Senate of the people of the Roman 
Quirites have deliberated, determined, and voted for war to be made 
on the Ancient Latins, Therefore, I and the Roman people declare and 
make war on the people of the Ancient Latins and the men of the 
Ancient Latins. 
 
 
Having said this, the fetial hurls the spear into enemy territory, and war can commence. 48 
 The first part of the rerum repetitio, which is the conveyance of Rome’s demands 
to the offending party, was probably developed in response to a particular kind of conflict 
which the Romans often faced in earlier times. That is that the Romans have suffered an 
injury (real, perceived, or invented) which could justify an act of war against the 
offending party. Yet their response to this situation, in the persons of the fetiales, also 
dictates that before such a war can be declared, they must first make their enemy aware 
of the injury and give them an opportunity to render whatever recompense is due. While 
observance of this rite may have had some practical purpose if it allowed Rome to avoid 
                                                          
47 Livy 1.32.13 
 
48 Livy 1.32 
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war with its neighbors, the great majority of instances of the rerum repetitio which are 
found in the ancient sources are ultimately met by a refusal of the opposing party to make 
any concessions, and subsequently a declaration of war by the Romans. Indeed, the 
formulaic nature of this fetial ritual does not seem calculated to induce negotiation, but 
instead demands prompt capitulation. 
 Furthermore, while the Romans might often expect a negative or absent response 
to their request for reparations, they might also be disadvantaged by the delay that the 
fulfillment of the fetial ritual might cause to their military preparations. For example, in 
426 Rome was plotting revenge against Veii for the help it had provided to the city of 
Fidenae, an Etruscan settlement in Latium, when it had raided Roman territory and 
attempted to attack Rome itself.49 Yet despite the obvious casus belli, the war was put off 
to the next year, because “religious scruples stood in the way” (religio obstitit).50 The 
fetiales would have to be sent to demand redress first. Without them, Livy makes clear, 
Rome would have declared war upon Veii and sent out its armies against the Veientes as 
soon as possible, yet the fetial law stands in the way of any precipitous action. This is 
despite the fact that the Veientes had made an open attack on Rome, and in doing so had 
already violated a truce they had recently made with the Romans.51  
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 However, it may be Livy’s framing alone that construes this episode as one where 
Rome complied with the demands of religion to its own disadvantage. The ritual 
procedure of a fetial rerum repetitio followed by the prescribed declaration of war was an 
occasion which could be useful to Rome both as evidence of Roman piety, restraint, and 
justice, but also of Roman implacability. In 304 the Romans were on the brink of a new 
conflict with the Aequi, a Samnite tribe which had been memorably defeated by 
Cincinnatus in 458 and again in 431 by the dictator A. Postumius Tubertus.  The Aequi 
had been nominally at peace with Rome for some time, while still sending reinforcements 
to the Samnites during their conflict with the Romans. However, earlier in 304 the 
Samnites had asked the Romans for a truce, and an older treaty made between the two 
parties was re-validated. This gave Rome an opportunity to pursue the Aequi now, and 
the fetial priests went to meet them and demand redress. The Aequi’s reaction to this 
demand, as recorded by Livy, was as follows: 
 
temptationem aiebant esse, ut terrore incusso belli Romanos se fieri 
paterentur, quod quanto opere optandum foret, Hernicos docuisse, 
cum, quibus licuerit, suas leges Romanae civitati praeoptaverint; 
quibus legendi, quid mallent, copia non fuerit, pro poena necessariam 
civitatem fore.52 
 
They asserted that it was an attempt, so that by wielding the fear of 
war with the Romans they might be made to submit; just how much 
that was to be wished for, the case of the Hernici showed:  those who 
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were able to choose preferred their own laws to Roman citizenship, 
and for those who had no opportunity to choose, compulsory 
citizenship was a punishment.  
 
Clearly, the Aequi interpreted the dispatch of the fetiales as a ploy intended to ensure 
their total surrender, rather than as a sincere request for whatever reparations were 
demanded. No doubt the Aequi had observed the general sequence of events which 
followed Rome’s employment of the fetials. In this way the rerum repetitio could be seen 
as an ultimatum rather than an opening of negotiations. True, the Aequi had been 
treacherous in their aid to the Samnites, but they had maintained the appearance of peace 
with Rome. To a state with such a poorly prepared military force, the approach of the 
fetial priests was not so much an invitation to assuage the injury they had done to Rome, 
but a prelude to their ultimate defeat and subjugation. The Aequi knew this because they 
had seen it happen to others like the Veientes, the Faliscans, and the Hernici.53 Though 
they still chose to resist Rome, the signaling behavior exhibited by Rome’s employment 
of the fetiales worked. After the Aequi’s defeat and almost total obliteration, the 
Marrucini, Marsi, Paeligni, and Frentani sent embassies to Rome to sue for ally status and 
formal peace treaties, which they were granted.54  
Similarly, the Veientes, in an earlier episode, sent an embassy to intercept the 
fetiales who had been dispatched to them to enact the rerum repetito in order to beg for 
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respite owing to their internal civil discord.55 The favor was granted, but this attempt to 
forestall the rerum repetitio by forestalling the arrival of the fetiales shows that the 
Veientes were aware of the true motivation of their mission. Even the Samnites, one of 
Rome’s fiercest enemies of this period, marked their willingness to make peace with 
Rome in 322 by returning the Roman prisoners of war and plunder that had been 
originally demanded by the fetials.56 The local tribes had watched and learned, and were 
intimidated into playing Rome’s game.  
 This analysis emphasizes the use which the Romans may have made of the fetial 
rerum repetitio in order to signal their intentions and disposition to neighboring peoples, 
and, consequently, to influence the behavior of the latter towards Rome. However, this 
does not mean that the religious and cultural value of this fetial rite should be ignored. 
The rerum repetitio was still a serious and necessary act of piety. Its enactment could 
indeed be a disadvantage where quick action was required, since the matter of war could 
not be put before the people, nor troops levied until it was properly completed. In this and 
other ways it was not akin to ordinary acts of diplomacy. After all, the fetiales, like other 
priestly colleges, were religious specialists, experts in ensuring that Rome’s foreign 
relations were pleasing to the gods. The Senate could be expected to defer to their 
authority on such matters, much as it deferred to the judgment of the augures on the 
taking of auspices. 
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 Indeed, the augurs, being a better attested and better-known priestly college, are a 
helpful analogy when considering the ways in which the fetial priests operated in 
connection with the political decisions of the Senate and people. The augures were the 
masters of religious space within Rome.57 The Senate house, the comitium, and even the 
pomerium were all spaces which were defined by the augurs’ blessings. In this way the 
political was subordinated to, and merged with, the religious: votes on legislation, 
elections, and meetings of the Senate took place within spaces sanctified by the augurs, 
and were continually re-dedicated to their purpose by the auspices taken before any 
particular public event held there. Therefore, the legitimacy of all public business in the 
city was dependent upon the correctness and completeness of the rituals performed by the 
augurs and upon adherence to the rules of their college.  
We can understand the role of the fetiales in much the same way. Instead of the 
area within the pomerium, the fetiales were charged with the sacred space in which the 
Romans confronted other peoples.58 Whether that was at the border between their lands, 
in a foreign marketplace, or before the enemy’s ruling council, the realm of the fetials 
was wherever the representatives of Rome and those of an enemy or ally met in a formal 
capacity outside of the realm of active war. It was they who ensured that the gods were 
satisfied with the righteousness of Rome’s cause. Only with their ritual performance 
could Rome be confident that the gods would favor its efforts in war. Just as the sincere 
religious beliefs of the Romans and their political actors prevented them from doing any 
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business on days when the augurs recorded unfavorable omens, the political decisions of 
Rome with regard to foreign relations were contingent upon the actions of the fetiales.  
For this reason, Hans Drexler rightly calls the fetial law the natural starting point 
for any exploration of the Roman concept of iustum bellum.59 Even in the Middle and 
Late Republic this concept was underpinned by and generally conformed to the ritual 
procedure of the original fetial rites. These rites were so deeply ingrained in the practice 
of Roman foreign relations that it was impossible for the Roman state to occupy that 
defined space between Rome and the Other without conforming to their outlines.  
 
 
Foedus et Pax 
 
 The fetial ritual which accompanied the solemnization of treaties probably came 
to be viewed by Rome’s allies with similar seriousness. Much like the rerum repetitio, 
the version of the ritual described by Livy reflects a certain deliberate antiquarianism. 
According to Livy, the principal fetial priest chooses another fetial to be the pater 
patratus, who is to lead the group on their mission. In order to designate him as such, the 
original priest anoints the other’s head and hair with a sacred herb (verbena) which he 
has collected from the arx of the city.60 After this, the pater patratus is now able to 
                                                          
59 Drexler 1959: 97 
 
60 Livy 1.24.5-6: Most scholars seem to accept that the “pure herb” taken from the arx and the “verbena” 
are one and the same. However, the text is not altogether clear on this point. Zollschan 2011 states that 
the priests both carried the verbena and wore it on their foreheads. 
 
 
 
40 
 
solemnize the treaty. He does so by reciting the necessary oath dictated by law, including 
the terms of the agreement. Unfortunately, this oath is not preserved by Livy, who insists 
that it is too long to be worth repeating.61 Presumably it is a formulaic construction 
similar to that he describes as being recited during the rerum repetitio. Standing before a 
pig prepared for sacrifice, the pater patratus then calls on Jupiter to be a witness to the 
treaty and asks him to punish the Romans if they betray it: “For if they are the first to 
defect by public decision with deceit and malice, then on that day may you, Jupiter, thus 
smite the Roman people, just as I here on this day smite this pig; and smite them so much 
more, as you are so much stronger and more powerful.”62 The pig is then slaughtered and 
sacrificed to secure the god’s attention and favor.63 
 The ritual is sufficiently impressive that the noted antiquarian emperor Claudius 
chose to revive it when he made treaties with foreign peoples, sacrificing the pig himself 
in the Forum.64 However, perhaps most illustrative of the cultural import of this rite is 
Livy’s account of the Battle of the Caudine Forks and its aftermath. Michael Crawford 
argues that Livy’s version of the event became popular when the Roman general, C. 
Hostilius Mancinus, was handed over to the Numantines in 137, after his defeat at their 
                                                          
61 Livy 1.24.6:  pater patratus ad ius iurandum patrandum id est sanciendum fit foedus multisque id verbis, 
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62 Livy 1.24.8: si prior defexit publico consilio dolo malo, tum illo die, Diespiter, populum Romanum sic ferito, 
ut ego hunc porcum hic hodie feriam; tantoque magis ferito, quanto magis potes pollesque.' 
63 The implement used (saxo silice) is often translated as “flint knife.” However, Wiedemann 1986: 485 
contends that this is more likely to be the stone used to incapacitate the animal so that it falls on to the 
sacrificial knife. 
 
64 Suet. Claud. 25.5 
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hands.65 The reason given by the Senate was that Mancinus had, in defeat, made a peace 
agreement with the Numantines that was unfavorable to Rome and could not be ratified. 
According to Plutarch, in doing so the Senate referenced the events of the Caudine Forks 
to provide historical justification for its choice.66  
 Livy reports that in 321, during the Second Samnite War, two Roman armies were 
trapped by the Samnites in the Caudine Forks, a series of narrow passes in the Campanian 
section of the Apennines. Faced with this dilemma, the Romans were at a loss. The 
Samnites too had no set strategy for how to take advantage of this successful ambush.67 
The retired and elderly Samnite general, Herennius Pontius, father of the current general, 
advised them either to set the Romans free or to kill them all: for the former would mean 
lasting peace and friendship, and the latter would cripple the Roman forces to an extent 
from which they could not recover. The Samnite council rejected both of these 
propositions, and instead decided that it would let the Romans go, but only on condition 
of concessions and as the defeated party. Herennius presciently warned the Samnites that 
this situation would only inflame the Romans’ desire for revenge.68 Meanwhile the 
Romans were becoming desperate due to lack of supplies, and sent messengers to the 
Samnite general to sue for peace, hoping that the two forces might be able to come to 
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some agreement that could lead to an equitable peace treaty, or if not, to provoke a 
battle.69 
 Considering the Romans’ miserable position, the Samnite general, Pontius the 
younger, laughed off these demands. Instead he offered them the option to leave 
peacefully, having surrendered their arms and other goods.70 Urged by their strained 
circumstances, the Roman consuls met with the Samnite leader to negotiate. However, 
“they denied that they were able to make a foedus without the order of the people and 
without the fetial priests and the sacred rites and other necessary rituals.”71 This point is 
essential to the intention of Livy’s story, which is to differentiate between the nature of a 
foedus, which is a formal peace treaty ratified by the people and ritually sanctified by the 
fetials, and a sponsio. While a foedus binds the Senate and people of Rome, a sponsio is 
only binding upon those who make the agreement, according to Livy.72 Crawford argues 
that this is a fictitious distinction, which imports the Roman civil law concept of a 
sponsio, a private oral contract between individuals, to justify what might appear to be 
Roman faithlessness.73  
 For the Romans were faithless to this agreement. The Roman generals agreed to 
sacrifice their arms, along with promising that Rome would withdraw its colonies and 
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armies from Samnite territory, and leaving behind six hundred equites as hostages.74 
Upon their return to Rome the newly elected consuls for that year immediately raised the 
matter of the Caudine Forks truce before the Senate. Spurius Postumius, one of the 
humiliated generals, was allowed to speak first. He defended the truce, saying that 
although dishonorable, it had been necessary to preserve the legions. However, he 
argued, the agreement had no force at Rome without the vote of the people. Therefore, he 
and the other generals ought to be handed over to the Samnites by the fetial priests, in 
order to free Rome of any obligation. In the meantime the consuls for that year could 
gather their armies and wait for the surrender to be finalized. At that point the Romans 
would be able to renew hostilities without offending the gods.  
 Some Roman officials did object that, since the Romans were unable to return the 
Samnites to their previous situation, they could not legally consider the agreement to be 
nullified by handing over its guarantors. Yet they were eventually swayed by Postumius’ 
fiery rhetoric and the fact that, if the Samnites had truly wanted to solidify the peace, they 
ought to have sent negotiators to Rome while the legions were still captive in order to 
secure a true peace.75 This part of the narrative is interesting for two reasons. First, it 
reveals the internal legal reasoning which the Romans must have felt was requisite to 
such a situation. If the agreement made by Postumius could be legally categorized as a 
sponsio, with a sponsio’s attendant characteristics, the undesirable treaty could be 
avoided if the correct steps were taken. Here the distinction between foedus and sponsio 
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is taken seriously for the purposes of the narrative of the situation. Whether the 
distinction truly existed in the larger Roman legal context is irrelevant. Within the context 
of the story the Romans had devised a way to make what they wanted to happen happen, 
while still ensuring that they were on the right side of the law and in no danger of 
offending the gods. This is a classic way that parties who are invested in signaling a 
particular ethical identity to others deal with events which might seem to cast doubt on 
their good character. The concerned party may attempt to explain the lapse in ethical 
behavior as exceptional, or an aberration or mistake. Or they may, as in this case, find a 
way to rationalize their behavior as not a lapse at all.76  
 The second aspect of this narrative is that the Romans in the story are presented as 
assuming that the Samnites will understand the workings of Rome’s fetial law. The fact 
that Postumius suggests that, if the Samnites had been serious about peace they would 
have come to the Senate to demand a properly solemnized foedus, presumes much 
knowledge of Roman culture and politics on their part. Yet perhaps the Romans care little 
about what the Samnites might or might not think or understand, and more about their 
own perception of their ethical persona. The coda to the Caudine Forks story is perfectly 
illustrative of this turn of mind. Postumius and the other officials who had negotiated the 
truce were led by the fetials, shackled and chained, to the Samnite assembly. When there 
the lead fetial, Aulus Cornelius Arvina, made the following statement: “Because these 
men, without orders from the Roman people and the Quirites, promised that a treaty 
would be struck and because of this committed a crime, I give up these men to you so 
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that the Roman people may be freed from an evil impiety.”77 Immediately upon these 
words, something shocking happened. Postumius struck Arvina in the thigh with his knee 
as hard as he could and shouted that he was a Samnite citizen, and that the fetial legate 
had been violated by him in contravention of the ius gentium, and that this was a just 
cause of war for Rome.78  
 If this story seems incredible, that is because it is. Most modern scholars have 
discounted everything in the story after the disaster at the Caudine Forks.79 However, 
while the legend was a helpful piece of propaganda later, when the Senate wished to 
repudiate Mancinus, it remains possible that the basic outline of the narrative came into 
popular existence long before this time. Stories which demonstrated signal Roman values 
were always popular with Roman authors. Postumius’ willingness to sacrifice himself for 
the sake of Rome in many respects mirrors that of the famous hero M. Atilius Regulus, 
who turned himself over to the Carthaginians during the First Punic War in order to 
honor an oath. In fact, Cicero relates their stories together, along with that of Mancinus.80 
Assuming that the Caudine Forks story was current well before 137, the truth or fiction of 
it is irrelevant for the purposes of determining its meaning within the larger context of the 
fetial priests as an institution. The crucial role played by the priests in the narrative must 
arise from a broader sense of the importance of the fetial law and rites to both the legality 
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and the piety of treaties. The Romans' willingness to use the ius fetiale as cover for other 
motives only shows how invested they were in presenting themselves as ultimately both 
pious and just. For if the Romans were not seriously devoted to the idea of themselves as 
a particularly morally disciplined people, then there would have been no need to invent a 
story that relies so conspicuously on obscure distinctions between the concepts of foedus 
and sponsio. 
 It is possible to see a common thread of Roman self-regard at the heart of this 
narrative: the Romans may be cunning and deceptive, but they are always somehow able 
to present themselves as adhering closely to their own mores when the matter concerns 
their outward relations. In some ways this potentially fabricated version of the Caudine 
Forks story is more useful to an analysis of the import of the fetials than the truth. The 
parsing of the fetial law and what is and is not ethically permissible puts on display the 
important role that the fetials and the values which they represented played in the conduct 
of Roman foreign relations. The fetiales are boundary-keepers, providing a set of 
principles that is meant to guide Roman decisions. However their other, equally 
important function is to ensure that the acts of the Romans always come within those 
bounds, and enjoy the favor, or at least the tolerance, of the gods. Sometimes some clever 
maneuvering, which comes with an intimate knowledge of their own Roman value 
system, is necessary to make that happen. While it is more likely that the Romans simply 
accepted the peace made by Postumius, the fantastic tale of his surrender provides much 
more insight into Roman self-identity than the true story would.  
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Allies and Others 
 
 One of the reasons why Postumius’ violence towards the fetial, Arvina, is an 
effective part of the story of the Caudine Forks truce is because of the Roman belief in 
the sacred inviolability of ambassadors. In his 1625 work, De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Hugo 
Grotius quotes sources as diverse as Cicero, Varro, Diodorus Siculus, Statius, Velleius 
Paterculus, and Procopius in his extensive footnotes all to reinforce the point that the 
right of embassy is sacred and so are the persons of ambassadors, and these rights are 
enshrined by laws both divine and human.81 In a section of the Digest, Pomponius points 
specifically to the ius gentium, the Roman term for the law that is common to all peoples, 
as the source of this idea.82 It is to this fundamental value that we can trace back the 
modern immunities which ambassadors to foreign countries commonly enjoy. Since the 
fetial priests were charged with all matters involving the sacred aspect of diplomacy, it 
was their duty to punish any Romans who dared to outrage the envoys of other peoples. 
Nonius Marcellus, the fourth century C.E. grammarian, citing Book III of Varro’s De 
Vita Populi Romani, gives us this summary of the priests’ obligations in these cases: “If 
the ambassadors of any people have been violated, the offenders, even if they are nobiles, 
should be surrendered to their city; and the twenty fetiales may consider this matter, give 
judgment on it, decide it, and resolve it.”83  
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 There are two incidents recorded by the ancient sources which show the fetial 
priests carrying out this duty. The first is recorded by Livy’s epitomator, Valerius 
Maximus, Cassius Dio, and Zonaras. In 272, ambassadors from Apollonia, a Corinthian 
colony in Ionia, had come to Rome on some diplomatic mission. A fight had broken out, 
and in its course the aediles Q. Fabius and Cn. Apronius had struck the Apollonians.84 
They were then delivered by the fetial priests to the Apollonians. Dio’s version of the 
story only mentions Fabius as the offender, but adds the detail that the Apollonians, 
rather than punishing him, sent him back to Rome uninjured.85 
Here it is again possible to see the two aspects of Roman fetial performance 
discussed above. By surrendering Fabius to the Apollonians at the hands of the fetial 
priests the Romans are conforming to their own internal legal and religious expectations. 
This is not to deny that the inviolability of diplomats was a widespread value in the larger 
Ancient Mediterranean world. Rather, the specific steps Rome took to deal with such 
incidents were distinctive. After all, violence towards ambassadors could be interpreted 
as an act of war, for which the gods might take vengeance.86 The fetial arrest, judgement, 
and surrender of offenders of this value was the Roman procedure for expiating such a 
sin, and as such was unique to them.87 Having undertaken and completed that procedure, 
Rome could consider the gods to have been appeased and the matter closed. The sources 
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do not indicate that the Apollonians’ return of Fabius had any effect on the Romans 
securing this result. After all, they had performed the ritual perfectly.  
This outcome is indicative of the other aspect described above. Romans were 
either ignorant of, or indifferent to, the ability of the recipients of their fetial performance 
to understand the nuances of the process. Certainly, the fact that they had taken action in 
response to the violation of the Apollonian ambassadors might have been a meaningful 
signal to the Apollonians and other potential allies. Certainly also, the Romans deployed 
such signals with intention and attuned to their possible effect. However, the signaling act 
was not merely for the benefit of others, but also for the Romans themselves. Another 
incident similar to that of Q. Fabius demonstrates this fact. It occurred in 188, and is 
recorded by both Valerius Maximus and Livy. The Second Punic War had concluded just 
twelve years previously, but the Roman Senate was still careful to observe the niceties of 
the fetial law with regard to the Carthaginians. Valerius describes the incident as follows: 
“The consuls, M. Aemilius Lepidus and L. Flaminius, made sure that L. Minucius and L. 
Manlius were surrendered to the Carthaginian legates by the praetor M. Claudius by 
means of the fetiales, because they had laid hands on them.”88 By way of futher 
explanation, Valerius continues: “It is clear that, in doing this, the Senate regarded not so 
much those [Carthaginians], but itself.”89 
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This is the essential point in a thorough analysis of the functions of the fetial 
institution. The judgement and ritual surrender of Roman officials who violated foreign 
ambassadors were undertaken chiefly for the sake of preserving and reinforcing Rome’s 
own values and traditions. While third parties may have recognized the sacrifice as 
meaningful and appreciated the gesture, the particularities of the process were purely 
self-interested. For example, in 101, when political rivals wished to discredit the 
infamous tribune L. Appuleius Saturninus for pointing out the bribery by which 
Mithridates of Pontus was corrupting the Senate, they chose to put Saturninus on trial for 
violation of the ambassadors who had delivered the bribe money.90 By portraying 
Saturninus as someone who would abuse the person of an ambassador, his rivals believed 
that they would be able to permanently disgrace him. This is the thread running through 
much of the fetial performance. While, in general, the rites undertaken may have been 
seen by foreign peoples as indicative of the character of the Roman state as an ally or 
enemy, the details of the rites were fully intelligible only from a Roman perspective. 
These acts ensured that the gods looked favorably upon the Roman ventures that they 
consecrated, and this pax deorum could only be insured where Roman traditions and 
values were precisely obeyed.  
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Conclusion 
 
 All this is not to say that the institution of the fetial priests persisted unchanged 
through the centuries. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there was a time during 
the Late Republic when the fetial law as a concept superseded the acts of the actual fetials 
in importance. Yet this itself is evidence that even as certain practices waned, the values 
which had evolved with them continued to be fundamental to Roman foreign relations. 
Certainly, with the growth and expansion of Roman overseas interactions and territory, 
rituals which had been formed by conflicts with nearby Latin tribes of equal status might 
prove inadequate to new conditions. Still, there was clear reluctance to abandon an 
institution which had so much meaning and importance for the Romans, and so the 
system adapted. For example, according to Servius, in the early third century, when the 
Romans wished to declare war on Pyrrhus, whose home kingdom was across the Adriatic 
in Epirus, they forced one of his captured soldiers to buy a plot of land near the temple of 
the war goddess Bellona. This plot was then declared enemy territory and the ritual spear 
was hurled into it. From this point on, the temple of Bellona was used as a stand-in 
whenever the Romans needed to declare war on an enemy overseas.91 We see this ritual 
continuing to hold significance, as when Octavian, as fetial, threw the ritual spear before 
the temple of Bellona when declaring war on Cleopatra in 32.92 
                                                          
91 Serv. Aen. 9.52 
 
92 Dio Cass. 50.4 
 
 
 
52 
 
 The fetiales probably long maintained their practice of solemnizing treaties. No 
doubt, since such matters are negotiated ahead of time between the parties there was 
more time to prepare a legation of fetials to perform the ritual on site. This is shown by 
Livy’s account of the fetiales’ mission to Carthage in 201, sacred herb in hand, to finalize 
the treaty which ended the Second Punic War. Such rites could also have been routinely 
modified for use in Rome, as in the Emperor Claudius’ performances in the Forum which 
were noted above, if travel was inconvenient. By and large, however, there is evidence 
that the diplomatic aspects of fetial practice were taken over by senatorial envoys, while 
the priests themselves gained an advisory role.93 Livy shows the fetiales answering the 
Senate’s questions about the proper way to declare war on Philip the V in 200 – 
specifically whether it would be proper to make the declaration at one of Philip’s military 
camps, or whether it must be made to the king himself.94 Similar inquiries were made 
about declaring war against Antiochus III in 191, and in addition the Senate asked 
whether the Aetolians warranted a separate declaration, or whether, as Antiochus’ allies, 
they were included under that which would be made to him.95  
 This incident also includes mention of the many demands for restitution by 
ambassadors (legatis repetentibus) made by Rome to Antiochus, which seems to indicate 
that even if other kinds of envoys had replaced the fetial priests, the forms and structure 
of their rites were to some extent preserved. More importantly, the values they and their 
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law represented continued on. As will be shown in successive chapters, the concept of 
bellum iustum remained powerful as the Republic expanded its empire, finding new and 
tortuous ways to make its wars appear just. This reliance on the appearance of virtue 
rather than virtue itself has been seen in the application of the fetial law throughout this 
chapter. Even so, Romans did take these values seriously; performance was an inherent 
part of what constituted them. Whether that performance was intended to impress 
outsiders or reassure Roman citizens, this aspect remains the same. Indeed, the 
performative nature of Roman foreign relations cannot be underestimated. Yet, as we will 
see, repeated performance of values and principles can create its own momentum, giving 
rise to new ways of applying those principles when relating to foreign peoples.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
IUSTUM BELLUM AND IUS BELLI: PRINCIPLED CONDUCT OF WAR 
 
According to Livy, in 200, soon after the start of the Second Macedonian War, a 
Roman legate by the name of Lucius Furius Purpurio found himself defending Rome’s 
reputation before a meeting held by the Aetolian League. The League was attempting to 
decide whether or not to ally itself with the Romans in conflict with Macedon. The 
Macedonian representative had already opened with a scathing indictment of Rome’s 
treatment of its allies in Italy, and now it was Purpurio’s turn to defend his motherland 
and refute the accusations point-by-point. First, it was true that a legion sent to defend 
Rhegium during the war with Pyrrhus had committed a crime in seizing the city for its 
own, but did Rome approve of this atrocity? No, it went to battle against the guilty 
legion, and having won, punished it brutally, and restored the city to its people. As for 
Syracuse, its siege in 214 had been necessitated by the fact that it was under the 
domination of foreign tyrants allied with Carthage, and it too had been returned to 
independence soon after its seizure.96 And certainly the Campanians had been treated 
more leniently than they deserved. After all, they had defected to Hannibal and murdered 
the Roman garrison after being defended so vigorously by Rome in the Samnite Wars and 
even gaining citizenship. If their chief city had been razed to the ground and all their 
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people put to death they still should not have been able to complain. Instead their city 
was preserved while they were relocated to new land, and more of their leaders 
committed suicide out of shame than had been executed.97 As a further proof of the 
Romans’ leniency, peace and freedom had even been granted to conquered Carthage!98  
This speech, although likely an invention of Livy, is a remarkably faithful 
representation of the image of itself which the Roman state wished to present to the 
outside world during this period. Two distinct threads run through Purpurio’s refutation 
of the Macedonians’ claims. First, he is at pains to point out that each instance of Roman 
aggression was undertaken in accordance with the fetial principle of bellum iustum. Both 
Syracuse and Capua had allied themselves with Carthage during a period of open war and 
thus become Rome’s formal enemies. Rhegium had been improperly seized, but the 
legion involved had been punished for this violation and the city had been freed. Clearly, 
in Purpurio’s mind, and likely that of Romans more generally, this rendered the 
Macedonian complaints moot. Furthermore, in addition to these conflicts having been 
properly undertaken in accordance with fetial law, Purpurio points out that the Romans 
went further, displaying notable indulgence towards the conquered. He even speculates 
that the greater danger was that such generous treatment would incite more peoples to try 
their fortunes at war against Rome.99 
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The precise nature of this indulgence is a matter of some interest when seeking to 
understand the performative aspect of Roman foreign relations. Clearly, in emphasizing 
Rome’s clemency the Roman representative seeks not only to absolve Rome of charges 
of cruelty, unjust war, and devastation, but also to claim that Rome is exceptionally 
lenient in its treatment of conquered peoples. This comes into sharper perspective when 
Purpurio’s speech is compared to the speech given by Athenian delegates, who were also 
Roman allies, immediately preceding his own in Livy’s narrative. In this speech the 
Athenians bewail the devastation of their people and land. However, “They did not 
complain that they had suffered the treatment of enemies from an enemy, for there are 
certain laws of war (belli iura) which it is right (fas) to suffer as well as to make; for it is 
unfortunate rather than unjust that crops are burned, homes destroyed, and men and 
livestock taken as prizes.”100 The Athenian representatives went on to complain of Philip 
V’s impious destruction and depredation of shrines and temples, which ought to have 
been protected property in the course of any licit war.  
This passage makes it clear that some amount of plunder and destruction of 
conquered peoples’ land and property was perfectly within the bounds of the rights of 
war as conceived of by the Athenians. It is possible to link this opinion to a common 
understanding of what may be called a shared law of war, to which peoples like the 
Greeks and Macedonians could be thought to subscribe.  In this context it is notable that 
the Roman Purpurio claims that, even if Capua had been burned to the ground and all of 
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its citizens executed, this fate would not have been more than they deserved.101 Instead, 
the Romans treated them with much more leniency. Here Purpurio seems to be drawing a 
clear distinction between the shared law of war which was cited by the Athenians, and the 
Romans’ own standards of behavior for such a situation.  
 The concept of a natural law shared among all peoples was well established by 
the early Empire, and no doubt current during the Republic.102 Cicero refers to it in De 
Legibus as being the standard by which all other law should be judged.103 However, in 
their own foreign relations the Romans were subject to more specifically Roman 
principles. As has already been shown in Chapter One, the fetial law played a significant 
role in Roman relations with foreign peoples, even when the fetial priests themselves 
ceased to be immediate participants in such relations. From the fetials comes what is 
often called the doctrine of just war, or iustum bellum, which governs the proper initiation 
of wars. Alongside the somewhat more formal iustum bellum, further principles 
concerning the disposition of conquered peoples and property can also be observed to 
exist. As a group these are sometimes termed ius belli, which, while less well-defined 
than iustum bellum, is commonly linked to traditional Roman values and the mos 
maiorum.  
Both iustum bellum and ius belli work in concert. Admittedly, they neither 
constitute a wholly formal Roman theory of war, nor were they consistently and slavishly 
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obeyed by the Romans. Still, their existence as a cultural benchmark which guided 
Roman behavior is vital to a complete understanding of Roman foreign relations in the 
Middle Republic. In addition, their consistent application, influence, and reference in the 
accounts of the ancient sources are indicative of the broader character of Roman foreign 
relations. Iustum bellum and ius belli themselves are not generally applied to military 
strategy within the midst of active war. However, it has been observed that Romans did 
generally shy away from, and often loudly repudiated, any military strategy based on 
deception, such as ambushes or false retreats.104 It was also common for Romans to 
repudiate attempts by deserters to betray their former leaders to the Romans.105 
Furthermore, it is also possible to identify numerous instances in which Romans acted 
outside of immediate self-interest and made a calculated effort to appear unusually 
clement or virtuous in their foreign relations during this period. Thus the principles laid 
down by these more formal rules of war can be seen as part of a larger effort by the 
Roman state to project and perform a particular ethical persona in its relationships with 
foreign peoples. While later chapters will concentrate on how these principles influenced 
Roman behavior in particular situations, it is essential first to examine exactly what 
meaning these ideas had for the Romans. For this reason, it is necessary to outline the 
principles which the terms iustum bellum and ius belli evoked for Romans at this time, in 
order to understand how those same principles influenced foreign relations in the early 
period of Roman imperial expansion.  
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Iustum Bellum 
 
The basis of the Roman theory of just war is, of course, the fetial rituals which 
have already been discussed. However, even as the fetiales transitioned from active 
participants in foreign relations to an advisory role, the importance of just war to Roman 
principles did not fade. As a first point, it is important to note that “just war theory” in so 
far as it applied to the Romans, was not a formal legal theory at the time of the second 
century. Scholars have tended towards such a formalistic understanding, but this does not 
hold with the ancient sources.106 Rather, as Andrew Riggsby puts it, it may be described 
as a kind of “folk theory” which expresses itself mostly through the assumptions made by 
the actors involved.107 Indeed, the actual phrase “iustum bellum” appears rarely in the 
ancient sources, but where it does appear it makes clear the solid place that the concept 
occupied in Roman thought. Both instances of the phrase in Livy actually refer to foreign 
states. In one case it is used to refer to the Aetolians’ inability to wage a “iustum bellum” 
against Chalcis, and differentiates a conventionally announced and conducted war from a 
conflict making use of ambush and guerilla warfare.108 In the second, even more telling 
instance, it describes a situation in which the Athenians, after having had their city 
attacked and plundered by the Acarnanians alongside Philip V, experienced a first 
incitement towards war, which was subsequently made with a formal declaration.  
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It is this meaning of iustum bellum which has the most force in Roman foreign 
relations. As formulated by Georg Wissowa, it requires that any violation of peace 
necessitates expiation by the guilty party (demanded in the rerum repetitio); a refusal to 
perform such expiation dissolves the previous legal situation (of peace or more formal 
alliance) and thus justifies the injured party in its declaration of war.109 It has this force in 
the earliest known example of the phrase in a Latin text, Cicero’s Divinatio in Q. 
Caecilium, in which he disputes Caecilius’ appropriateness as a prosecutor of Verres. 
Here Cicero uses iustum bellum as a metaphor, saying that since Caecilius was Verres’ 
quaestor, acting as his prosecutor would be “iniustum impiumque bellum” because he 
would be attacking Verres without having received any injury from him, and indeed 
would be violating a sacred relationship between a praetor and his quaestor.110 The fact 
that Cicero could use the concept of iustum bellum here (or rather, iniustum bellum) as a 
metaphor for a criminal case seems to indicate that the concept was well-known enough 
for such an extrapolation to make sense to Cicero’s audience.  
Cicero is also our best source in an attempt to understand how this concept 
appeared in the abstract to Romans. Many scholars have long considered Cicero’s 
writings on the topic of iustum bellum to be merely philosophical, reflective of his 
particular intellectual bent rather than of the real influences on Roman foreign relations. 
Further some have even said that these writings were too far idealized to be applicable to 
any actual Roman behavior.111 However, Cicero is an important source for what actually 
                                                          
109 Wissowa 1912: 550-554 
 
110 Cic. Div. Caec. 61-62 
 
111 Notably, Brunt 1978: 159-192 
 
 
61 
 
constituted just war in theoretical terms, and, as we will see later, that theory did have its 
impact upon the reality of Roman foreign relations.  
The place where Cicero discusses this idea at most length is in De Officiis. 
Cicero’s statement about the ius fetiale as the basis of just war has already been 
mentioned in Chapter One. Yet it is worthwhile to dig further into the details of his views 
about what constitute iustum bellum. According to Cicero, the only just cause for war is 
“so that one may live in peace without injury.”112 Further “no war is just, unless, before it 
is declared, a demand for reparations is made or a formal warning given.”113 These are 
the requirements which Rome must meet before waging war, if that war is to be 
considered just. Clearly they derive from the rituals and law of the fetial priests: the 
rerum repetitio is sought and a formal declaration made. Of course, there are some 
distinct differences. In Cicero’s formulation the rerum repetitio is not mandatory, and 
may be replaced by a “warning” (denuntiatum). Furthermore, he insinuates in an earlier 
passage that less than a direct injury might be a sufficient cause of war when he states 
that in his opinion “we should always take care to make a peace which has no trace of 
artifice (insidiarum).”114 This seems to imply that what a modern reader might call a 
“preemptive strike” is sometimes warranted, even against a nominal ally, if subterfuge of 
some kind is detected. For with true enemies there is no possibility of insidiae, as 
hostility is already in the open. Still, despite these apparent deviations, the fact that 
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Cicero begins this discussion by citing the ius fetiale makes it safe to assume that Cicero 
felt he was following in the tradition of those priests, rather than departing from it.115  
In large part this assumption is manifestly true. An injury to peace, whether overt 
or covert, is always necessary in Cicero’s scheme. In addition, there must be some kind 
of warning given to the offending party before an official declaration of war is made, 
whether through a rerum repetitio or some other form of diplomatic effort. In this way 
Cicero’s formulation obeys the spirit of the ius fetiale, if not what one might call the 
letter. This, of course, is the essential characteristic of a folk or cultural, rather than legal, 
theory of just war. It urges one to act in good faith with regard to the values held by (in 
this case) Roman society. Tellingly, in a passage which immediately follows Cicero’s 
treatment of just war, he discusses the importance of keeping one’s word, even when it 
has been given to the enemy. Unsurprisingly, his first example is M. Atilius Regulus, one 
of the heroes of the First Punic War. The negative example given is of an unnamed 
Roman captive of Hannibal, who sought to evade his promise to return to the 
Carthaginians by leaving, returning to, and then leaving the Carthaginian camp again, 
thus, as he claimed, voiding his oath. Cicero strongly disapproves of this subterfuge,116 
saying that “In matters of fides, one must always consider the meaning, not only the 
words.”117 There is no doubt that just war is very much a matter of fides. 
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Fides was an inherently religious concept for the Romans.118 It was the value of 
reciprocal honesty, uprightness, and trustworthiness, embodied by the goddess Fides.119 It 
is meaningfully called upon by the pater patratus in the fetial rerum repetitio, who begs 
Jupiter that his words are uttered “in good faith.”120 In addition he prays that if his request 
is unjust and impious (iniuste inpieque), then Jupiter may bar him from his native land.  
In this way the fetial priest, whose mission is by nature religious, is given charge of what 
constitutes both fides and what is iustus. These values are preserved in Cicero’s 
discussion of the rights of war. Here, the concept of fides becomes more strongly 
associated with the surrender or deditio which occurs after the cessation of hostilities, and 
which will be discussed further below. At the same time iustus and its close associate ius 
are used repeatedly in his general discussions of just war. Thus, as we have seen, “the 
rights of war must be closely observed”, “no war is just unless . . .” and “As for war, 
equitable laws have been compiled by the fetials . . .”121 
By following the guidelines of a just war, the Romans ensured that the gods 
would look with favor upon their cause. Of course, the proof that any war had been 
undertaken with the approval of the gods, and was therefore justly declared, was its 
success. Similarly, failure in war could be blamed upon incorrect ritual.  Before the 
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disastrous Battle of Drepana in the First Punic War, Cicero tells us that the Roman naval 
commander, P. Claudius Pulcher, committed a serious sacrilege. When the auspices were 
taken before the battle, the sacred chickens refused to eat, and so Pulcher had them 
thrown into the sea, saying that they might drink, if they did not wish to eat.122 This story 
has the ring of myth to it, but at the same time it shows how improper religious practice 
was linked to military defeat in the Roman mind. Such inferences were not limited to the 
events of earlier Roman history. Cicero also links Crassus’ defeat by the Parthians in 55 
to a failure to adhere to the principles of just war.123  
Still, it is not proper to regard just war as merely a post hoc method which gave 
extra glory to victory while explaining away defeat. It had real effects on which conflicts 
Rome chose to initiate. Andrew Riggsby points out the case of C. Manlius, who, while 
proconsul in the East, chose to attack the Galatians instead of Antiochus, because he 
could find no cause for war with the latter.124 This strike occurred after he had made 
every effort to provoke some action on the part of Antiochus which would give him a 
legitimate pretext to attack, and so it was not a lack of desire for conflict that stayed his 
hand. The Roman Senate itself was on the hunt for justifications for war five years earlier 
in 192, but was unable to come up with any, despite sending legations to Syria to 
investigate.125  Similarly, after the conclusion of the Second Macedonian War, Philip V, 
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after much negotiation, scrupulously followed the terms of the treaty, and even made war 
on tribes in Thrace to divert attention, so that the Romans could find no cause to take up 
arms against him again.126 Lack of just cause for war could also have other foreign 
relations implications. In 192, foreseeing no opportunity to engage Antiochus, Rome 
refocused its forces on conflicts in Liguria and Spain. Likewise, Philip’s compliance with 
Roman demands was itself the result of concerted diplomatic efforts on the part of Rome 
to satisfy Greek allies and shore up its support in the region rather than to engage in 
further direct conflict with him. 
In fact, throughout Livy it is possible to find many examples which parallel 
Cicero’s formulation of just war. Sigrid Albert has thoroughly documented the kinds of 
instances which are claimed as legitimate justification to initiate war in Livy and other 
sources, including: an attack on a Roman ally, a breach of treaty, the breaking of an 
alliance, refusal of neutrality, an attack on an inviolable ambassador, violation of 
territorial rights, and the refusal to turn over those who may have committed such 
offenses to Rome.127 On this basis Albert argues that Cicero, while to some extent 
romanticizing a past in which values were practiced that had been neglected during of the 
civil wars, was representing a salient aspect of Roman culture. Although Cicero is 
perhaps using the behavior of Roman ancestors as a cudgel with which to decry the 
behavior of his contemporaries, he is also providing formal philosophical documentation 
of a theory which had long been in operation in Roman foreign relations. In this way 
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Albert chooses to frame Cicero’s discourse about iustum bellum as a stage in the 
development of such values. These values, proceeding from a religious origin in the fetial 
ritual, had taken on certain formal and substantive aspects in and of themselves before 
Cicero addressed them as a coherent formal theory. Although they may not have existed 
in this precise way before that point, they had still had a long tenure as cultural norms in 
the minds of Romans. In his writing Cicero merely gave them a prescriptive theoretical 
basis and description.128  
It is important to note that Cicero’s discussion of just war fits in naturally to his 
larger discussion on duties for this same reason. For the values of Rome in just war are 
not very far divorced from the values which Romans held concerning personal 
relationships. Therefore, Cicero sees no need to make any excuses for discussing the 
obligations of a state towards its enemies in the middle of a text which is otherwise 
principally concerned with personal virtue – for the simple reason that they are in many 
ways one and the same. After all, fides, while readily applied to the relations between 
states, is more commonly thought of in its applications in Roman values surrounding 
relationships between individuals, whether personal or transactional. Fides, as Cicero has 
it, is both the foundation of justice, and the underlying structure of stable friendship.129 
This is not to say that relations between states can be properly referred to as friendships. 
Personal patronage relationships between particular Roman individuals and foreign 
peoples often did operate on this basis, and certainly had an impact on decisions made by 
the Senate. However, the way that the Roman state as a whole dealt with, and evaluated, 
                                                          
128 Albert 1980: 25 
 
129 Cic. Off. 1.23; Amic. 65 
 
 
67 
 
possible conflicts seems to have been more driven by general principles of behavior. The 
search for justification for war, as in the cases of Philip and Antiochus related above, was 
ostensibly divorced from the actual motives and intentions behind such a war.  
In this way Roman just war theory presents modern scholars with a particularly 
difficult puzzle. It was clearly an important element in the decisions of the Roman Senate 
and people when war was imminent. It also obviously impacted the choice of when, and 
with whom, the state and its generals chose to enter into conflict. Yet despite being an 
important part of Roman cultural values with regard to foreign relations, and having 
obvious impacts on the choice of whether or not to go to war with a particular enemy, it 
does not conform to modern expectations of what one might call “morality.” For 
example, in 200 on the eve of the Second Macedonian War, the speech which Livy gives 
to the consul P. Sulpicius when he seeks to convince the people to vote in its favor 
revolves around the existential threat to Rome that is posed by Philip V’s power. Philip is 
likened to Pyrrhus, and the public is told that if Rome does not fight him in Greece first, 
it will inevitably have to fight him in Italy. However, in contrast to these statements, the 
actual bill promulgated by Sulpicius and put before the comitia states the basis for war as 
Philip’s aggression towards Rome’s Greek allies.130 While it is entirely possible that both 
of these issues motivated Rome’s declaration of war, it is also true that only one of them 
constitutes justification under the terms of iustum bellum.  
This situation may lead modern readers to assume that the Romans are 
intentionally deceptive or hypocritical. In this case they seem to be hiding their true 
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motivations behind false pieties and outrage about the treatment of their allies. This 
behavior was not uncommon. Johannes Thiel argues that the incongruity between avowed 
Roman causes for war and actual Roman behaviors and motivations means that the 
Romans, not the Carthaginians, were the inherently deceitful party in the Punic Wars.131 
However, this claim applies a modern understanding of morality to a decidedly different 
ancient culture. In our modern world, and even in our legal systems, intent is considered 
to be a fundamental element when evaluating the legitimacy or legality of any particular 
action. Yet, as has often been argued with regard to ancient religion, intent is almost 
immaterial compared to the importance of proper form or ritual. This understanding must 
also be applied to the cultural values and theories, such as iustum bellum, which concern 
the different aspects of Roman foreign relations.  
For example, Romans with traditional values could get quite exercised about 
deception surrounding the commencement of hostilities under certain circumstances. In 
171 Roman commissioners returned to the Senate after conducting peace negotiations 
with King Perseus of Macedon. Livy tells us that they congratulated themselves on 
having deceived the king by offering the prospect of peace only to help Rome gain more 
time to prepare for a planned war. Some senators approved of this ruse, but others felt 
that it was contrary to Roman character and values, saying that it was the custom of their 
ancestors to declare war before beginning it, and often even to notify the enemy of the 
time and place of battle.132 To order preparations for war while feigning peace was a 
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violation of iustum bellum. Anything less was Punic cunning or Greek shrewdness.133 
Although in this instance the majority voted to continue this deception, there was a clear 
argument against it from the perspective of just war theory, not merely moral distaste. 
This distance between the values which fundamentally guided many aspects of the 
Roman conduct of war and modern conceptions of ethics and morality will become 
further apparent in the following discussion of the other aspect of Roman war regulations, 
ius belli.            
 
 
Ius Belli 
 
The Roman theory of just war has a clear origin in the fetial law and rites. 
However, this theory only applies to the determination of whether or not a war can be 
justly initiated. Watson argues that the fetiales played no role in the actual conduct of 
war, and similarly, that just war theory does not relate to anything that occurs after the 
initial declaration of war is made.134 Yet there are certain principles which tend to recur 
in Roman war practices, which are often united under the term ius belli by modern 
scholars. Scholars have long linked ius belli and ius fetiale in their work. For example, 
Coleman Phillipson states that the ius fetiale is the broader category which contains ius 
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belli as well as iustum bellum.135 However, there is no clear evidence of the genealogy of 
ius belli which indicates its exact relationship to the ius fetiale and just war theory. 
Returning to De Officiis, the principles of ius belli are referred to in a general 
manner by Cicero in the following way:  
 
Sunt autem quaedam officia etiam adversus eos servanda, a quibus 
iniuriam acceperis. Est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus; atque 
haud scio an satis sit eum, qui lacessierit, iniuriae suae paenitere, ut 
et ipse ne quid tale posthac et ceteri sint ad iniuriam tardiores.136 
 
There are certain duties that we owe even to those who oppose us, 
from whom we have received injury. For there is a proper limit to 
vengeance and punishment. And I think it is enough that the one who 
has provoked us is made to repent his unjust acts, so that he may not 
act in such a way afterwards, and others may be forestalled in doing 
wrong.137 
 
This passage indicates that there were principles associated with the proper treatment of 
an enemy beyond merely the justice of the cause of war against them. Primarily, Cicero 
seems to be invoking mercy or a moderation of tactics. The enemy should be punished 
for wrongdoing, but not excessively, and the goal of such a rebuke is to ensure good 
behavior and to provide an example to others rather than purely to exact revenge.  
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Cicero refers to ius belli in a few places in his known works, mostly as a 
commonly accepted legal theory. For example, in the Pro Balbo he refers to the law of 
war and peace (belli ius atque pacis) as something which would be familiar to any 
competent military commander, and especially as learned a one as Gnaeus Pompey.138 
These laws encompass “treaties, agreements, and the conditions of peoples, kings, and 
foreign states.”139 Livy has Camillus cite ius belli as the source when he states that 
Romans do not fight against children or the unarmed.140 In addition, Livy relates a story 
in which a Roman consul settles a land dispute by declaring that a particular area had 
been conquered and become Roman territory “iure belli.”141 From this it is possible to 
determine some broad categories for the principles which constitute the Roman ius belli. 
First, it regulates who may or may not licitly participate in a conflict or be targeted during 
it. Second, it determines the appropriate treatment of those who have been subdued, 
whether they offered an unconditional surrender (deditio), or were conquered in active 
combat. Third, ius belli provides for the proper disposition of property at the end of a 
conflict, whether that property be land, persons, or other booty.  
The issue of whether a particular person was a licit or illicit participant in a 
particular conflict returns us to the passage in Livy concerning Camillus. Obviously, 
children and those who are unarmed are not valid targets of Roman military action. 
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Cicero also relates a story in which Cato the Elder forbade his son to engage with the 
enemy after he had been discharged from his initial general’s command. Unless he was 
sworn into service again he could not be considered a licit participant in the conflict, “for 
it is not just for he who is not a soldier to fight the enemy.”142 A similar narrative is given 
by Plutarch in the Life of Camillus. When Clusium was besieged by the Gauls, the 
Clusians begged that Roman ambassadors be sent to negotiate on their behalf. However, 
the three Fabii brothers who were sent decided instead to incite the Clusians to war and 
engaged in battle on their behalf. Of course, an ambassador joining the conflict which he 
was sent to mediate was against the shared law of foreign relations.143 Plutarch has the 
Gallic leader, Brennus, call this act “contrary to the custom of all mankind, that which is 
just and sacred.”144  
More insistently emphasized in De Officiis is the Roman duty to show clemency, 
especially to the unarmed. This is particularly true in the case of those who have 
surrendered, even if that surrender comes in the midst of a battle. Cicero states that when 
Romans are victorious in battle, they should show mercy to those who have fought 
without cruelty or inhumanity.145 However, just as important is the guarantee of 
protection that must be given to those who lay down their weapons and entrust 
themselves to the fides of the Roman general “even if the battering ram has struck their 
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city walls.”146 When a city has been conquered, it is the duty of great men to punish only 
the guilty and spare the multitude.147 That this is a common value is affirmed by a 
passage from Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae, in which the consul of 68, Q. Marcius, tells the 
conspirators that “if they wished to make any case to the Senate, they must put down 
their arms, and proceed as suppliants to Rome, since thus always had been the clemency 
and sympathy of the Roman Senate and people, that no one ever petitioned them in 
vain.”148 Among the Romans, Cicero says, justice has been so well cultivated, that those 
generals who have offered their protection to a conquered or surrendered people become, 
by tradition, the patrons of those states.149 
Of course, the scenario in which this offer of protection most often takes place is 
during a surrender. The form of surrender required by the Romans in order to end a 
conflict peacefully is called deditio. The deditio is, at least ostensibly, a voluntary 
unconditional surrender of sovereignty to Rome. It is often phrased as a deditio in 
potestatem or a deditio in fidem. Each of these formulations indicates a slightly different 
status, and Livy has a surrendering tribe of Gauls “entrusting (dedisse) themselves rather 
to the good faith (in fidem) than to the power (in potestatem) of the Roman people.”150 
Alan Watson speculates that the difference was akin to the differing kinds of property 
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transfer which occur in Roman civil law, and that the type of surrender imposed different 
conditions concerning the treatment of the surrendered people and property.151 
Regardless of this distinction, the deditio is an unconditional surrender which, after 
formal acceptance by the Senate or a magistrate with imperium, meant that the 
surrendered state as it was ceased to legally exist. All of its citizens, land, and moveable 
goods became the property of Rome. Livy formulates a version of the deditio in the regal 
period as requiring the surrender of “the people, city, fields, water, boundary lines, 
temples, goods, and everything divine and human.”152 A similar deditio formula is found 
in an incomplete inscription dating to 104 from Alcántara in Spain. The text, 
reconstructed by Dieter Nörr, lists “arms, siege works, deserters, captives, stallions, 
mares . . . fields and buildings, laws, and everything else.”153  
However, once a deditio had been rendered, Cicero makes it clear that Roman 
values called for mercy towards the surrendered. Those who have not been savage or 
inhumane should be spared and treated well. He compares how many Italian tribes were 
admitted to full Roman citizenship after their defeat, while Carthage and Numantia were 
razed, ostensibly because of their brutal conduct in war.154 In addition, according to 
Virgilio Ilari, because the deditio was a bilateral act from a legal perspective, Romans 
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were compelled to accept it at any time before their attack on an enemy city had begun.155 
Cicero goes further, stating Romans must be ready to accept surrender at any point during 
the conflict.156 Making such an option available may be seen as further clemency on the 
part of the Romans, since a city which was conquered outright could expect to face more 
severe treatment by them than one which had offered a deditio. Sallust puts this best 
when he says, reporting Cato’s speech on Catiline: “when a city is taken, nothing is left to 
the conquered.”157 Conversely, a failure to show mercy to the surrendered is seen as 
contrary to fundamental Roman values. When Marius burns the city of Capsa and kills 
and enslaves its population following its citizens’ offer of deditio to him during the 
Jugurthine War, Sallust terms this act “contra ius belli.”158  
A significant issue to be dealt with after a conquest or deditio was the matter of 
the real property of the subdued peoples. Cities conquered in war were at the complete 
disposal of the Romans. For example, during the peace conference at Tempe after the 
Second Macedonian war, the Roman general T. Quinctius Flamininus points out that he 
can only freely give the city of Phthiotic Thebes over to the Aetolians, because it alone 
had been conquered by force, while other cities in question would need to be considered 
separately because of their differing status.159 When the Aetolians protested that their 
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previous treaty with the Romans had stipulated that all captured cities would be turned 
over to them, while movable property would be allocated to the Romans, Flamininus 
again objected. First, he declared that that treaty had been rendered invalid by the 
Aetolians’ subsequent alliance with Philip V. However, more significantly, only 
Phthiotid Thebes had been captured, while the other Thessalian cities had voluntarily 
come under the sovereignty of the Romans.160 Clearly, then, the status of cities taken by 
force and those which surrendered voluntarily was different in terms of the property 
rights of the victor. It is also clear that ius belli was the default underlying force 
determining the status of conquered and subdued cities. The peace treaty which Rome 
made with Antiochus at the end of the Roman-Seleucid War explicitly forbade him from 
holding any city belli iure, despite the fact that he was still allowed to use military force 
in self-defense.  
As cases below will demonstrate, there seemed to be no specific legal recourse for 
those whose cities and land were taken through ius belli. However, such property could 
be returned through the benevolence of the possessor, which occurred quite regularly in 
the case of Rome. A specific case concerns the Thessalian city of Chyretiae, one of those 
mentioned above that had surrendered to the Romans in the course of the Second 
Macedonian War. An inscription preserves a letter sent by Flamininus to the city in order 
to return certain properties which had come into the Roman’s possession upon their 
victory over Philip. After a formal greeting to the people of Chyretiae and their officials, 
Flamininus writes: “Since in all other matters both I and the people of Rome have made 
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clear our intentions towards you generally, we wish also in the following affairs to show 
how in every aspect we are champions of what is honorable.”161  In the context of this 
letter, honorable behavior consisted of the immediate return of all buildings and property 
in Chyretiae held by the Roman treasury, “so that in this way too you may learn our 
character; that we wish in no matter to be avaricious, valuing above all goodwill and a 
good reputation.”162 He then outlines the procedure by which any Chyretienses who have 
not yet recovered their property might have their claims evaluated by him. The language 
of this inscription makes it clear that the properties are being returned out of a Roman 
sense of honor and generosity, not according to the specific laws of war.  
The disposition of the moveable property of a subdued city which has come into 
Roman possession is also a matter dealt with by ius belli. Cicero has a firm opinion on 
the matter, which he uses the examples of the Roman generals L. Aemilius Paulus, Scipio 
Aemilianus Africanus, and L. Mummius to illustrate. Cicero tells us that, after his defeat 
of Perseus of Macedon, Paulus deposited the whole of the wealth of that state with the 
Roman treasury, such that he eliminated the need for a property tax in Rome. Yet to his 
own home he only brought fame and the honorary cognomen, Macedonicus.163 Similarly, 
after the ultimate destruction of Carthage, Scipio Aemilianus did not enrich himself by 
the overthrow of that city, and his colleague in office, L. Mummius, who had destroyed 
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Corinth, preferred to adorn Italy with the riches of Greece rather than his own house.164 
Of course, this is a high standard to set for any general, and most probably did not live up 
to the reputed modesty of these men. Still, the ideal of the self-sacrificing general existed.  
There are indications that ius belli could be used to determine the proper status of 
deserters and slaves who had been taken in the course of a conflict.165 However, the 
booty which seems most calculated to disturb the Romans’ sense of decency, and that of 
others as well, was sacred objects. An important example of this disturbance is exhibited 
by the case of M. Claudius Marcellus after his successful siege of Syracuse during the 
Second Punic War. According to Livy, Marcellus ensured that his soldiers did not 
commit violence against innocent citizens, but he did leave them free to take anything in 
the city as booty.166 Two years later, in 210, the Syracusans sent an embassy to the Senate 
to complain of the manner of Marcellus’ conquest of their city, including the fact that he 
and his men had despoiled shrines of their sacred objects – specifically, statues of the 
gods and their associated ornaments.167 Marcellus defended his actions before the Senate, 
saying that people who had openly allied themselves with Carthage deserved no less. 
Furthermore, Livy reports, Marcellus says that “As to that which I, as victor, took from or 
gave to individuals, I believe that I have acted in accordance with the law of war (cum 
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belli iure) and the merits of each case.”168 Many senators openly deplored Marcellus’ 
actions. Even so the final resolution failed to openly rebuke him, but rather assigned the 
case to the current consul, who was charged with reviewing the situation and seeing what 
could be done for the Syracusans without detriment to the interests of Rome. 
 This outcome demonstrates the role which ius belli often played in Roman 
foreign relations, one similar to that of iustum bellum. The principles espoused by the 
Romans may not have completely prevented acts of cruelty or excess. However, they 
clearly did often prompt Roman officials to modify their approach to particular situations. 
Furthermore, in cases where cruelty or excess did occur, Romans often registered their 
disapproval of the actions in question. This disapproval could take the form of a negative 
historical framing by a later writer like Cicero or Sallust, or a contemporary initiative by 
the Senate to make some remedy for the situation. Culturally accepted values often work 
in two directions in this manner: they discourage certain actions, and also prompt efforts 
at punishment or amelioration when discouraged actions are taken. Even without a formal 
legal or theoretical discourse, iustum bellum and ius belli clearly fall into the category of 
such cultural values. 
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Principles in Action 
 
It is instructive to return to the example of M. Claudius Marcellus and Syracuse in 
order to see how the principles embodied by iustum bellum and ius belli were cited in 
cases where Roman officials were accused of violating them. The complaints by the 
Syracusans before the Senate cover a number of issues. Marcellus’ delay in engaging in 
conflict with the tyrants Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had allied the city with the 
Carthaginians, had meant that leaders friendly to the Romans within Syracuse had been 
abandoned and many had been executed. In addition, Marcellus’ cruel conduct during a 
previous conflict at Leontini had been the event which provoked the accession of the 
tyrants in the first place. Marcellus’ refusal to collaborate with deserters in order to gain 
the city peacefully also meant that he had an excuse for excessive violence towards a 
traditional Roman ally. The complaints about Marcellus’ plunder of sacra have been 
noted above, but the Syracusans also alleged that he had seized so much landed property 
that they were now unable to support themselves. 
These allegations touch on many issues raised by iustum bellum and ius belli. 
First, Marcellus’ cruelty at Leontini is stated to be the proximate cause which led to the 
domination of the tyrants at Syracuse. That these tyrants were allied with Carthage 
provided the justification needed for the siege of that city. As has been shown, excessive 
violence and cruelty are always discouraged by the Roman principles of foreign relations, 
and although the iustum bellum does not typically trace back the cause of war so far as 
the Syracusans wish to do in this case, the charge of inhumanity is a serious one. 
Marcellus’ failure to take advantage of the plans offered by deserters is a more 
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complicated question. On the one hand, there is a clear history of Roman refusal to take 
part in such subterfuge. At the same time, the Syracusans’ insistence that their leading 
men (who were still supposedly on the side of the Romans) would have surrendered the 
city to him could be construed as an inappropriate refusal of the option of deditio. The 
matter of the confiscated property is similar. While the city was taken by force, and 
therefore ought to have had no expectation that the land would be returned, the fact that 
the Syracusans positioned themselves as allies who had been suppressed by the tyrants 
makes this decision seem more harsh. Certainly a freely surrendered city, or a city of 
allies taken in the context of a larger conflict, would not have received such treatment.169  
Notable too is Marcellus’ response. Rather than disavowing the relevance of the 
claims, as might be expected in a culture where iustum bellum and ius belli were not 
taken seriously, he responds to them by making reference to those same principles. First, 
he makes the broad assertion that in this case the Syracusans were enemies (hostes), and 
therefore his actions are defended by the ius belli.170 His justification for giving them the 
status of enemies (and therefore validating his actions in war) was that they had attacked 
Roman ambassadors,171 had closed the walls of the city to Roman forces thereby bringing 
on the siege, and had engaged the Carthaginians (with whom Rome was then engaged in 
open war) in their defense. These hostile acts justified Rome’s war with Syracuse, and the 
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Syracusans’ enemy status determined the treatment they duly received at Marcellus’ 
hands. As for the offers of surrender, they were not genuine, in his opinion, and none of 
the Syracusans in the embassy which had made these complaints were among those who 
had made such offers. Indeed, even after the first incident, further Roman legates had 
been sent to the city gates to negotiate a settlement, but had been refused.172 As for the 
seizure of property made, all had been done in accordance with ius belli, and the fact that 
Marcellus chose to adorn the city of Rome with his booty showed that he had no doubt 
that his conduct in this matter had been proper.173  
The exchange between Marcellus and the envoys from Syracuse makes the import 
of the principles of iustum bellum and ius belli clear. Rather than dismissing the 
importance of the values which the Syracusans cite, Marcellus attempts to answer their 
claims point by point. He first provides a clear justification for the Roman entry into 
conflict by pointing out that the Syracusans had allied themselves with Rome’s enemies, 
and thus become enemies themselves. He then outlines further hostile acts on their part 
which cemented their enemy status. Then he gives a clear narrative which shows that the 
opportunity of surrender was offered and refused, necessitating the capture of the city by 
force. Finally, as has been noted above, both the moveable and landed property of a city 
taken by force are forfeited to the victor, and therefore the Syracusans’ claims in that 
respect are also invalid. In short, iustum bellum and ius belli have become firm points of 
reference which a Roman general, who is naturally very aware of their implications, may 
use to demonstrate the lawfulness of his behavior in a very precise manner. 
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Conclusion 
 
While Marcellus may indeed have complied with the so-called “letter” of the law, 
clearly the ideal expectations put forward by Cicero were much higher. As Joseph Plescia 
puts it, the Roman citizenry was bound together not just by the rules of war, but by the 
ethics of accountability.174 Still, the fact that such a phenomenon as strict adherence to 
the literal implications of ius belli while ignoring the more “moral” aspects could exist 
says something very important about the role of these cultural values in Roman foreign 
relations. The Romans have always been regarded as a uniquely “legal” society, as is 
usually shown by citing the extensive development of their civil law, especially under the 
Empire. However, it is valid to claim that the legal nature of their societal values has a 
much earlier origin and more pervasive spread than can be deduced by the legal tradition 
contained in the Digest. This nature is a deeply ingrained cultural habit which manifests 
itself in many areas of Roman society, including in its relations with foreign peoples. A 
question naturally raised by this revelation is how and why these values are acted upon in 
the larger context of early Roman imperial expansion. After all, principles which clearly 
originate in the earliest days of the Roman people surely came to be adapted to the needs 
of a changing world and served an important purpose there, as their persistence in the 
second century attests. How they serve Roman interests and reify Roman identity in the 
Mediterranean during this period is an issue to be explored in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 187) was not only the most beautiful man of his 
time, as Philip V had said (and Polybius, who recorded the statement, agreed).175 He also 
had something of a bitter and vengeful temperament. According to Livy, he was 
convinced that M. Fulvius Nobilior (cos.191) had prevented his elevation to the 
consulship when he presided over the elections of the previous two years. As consul 
Fulvius had led the siege against Ambracia, and his victory there had eventually forced 
the Aetolians to make peace with Rome. While consul, Lepidus, in order to take his 
revenge, brought some Ambracian envoys into the Senate where they accused Fulvius of 
violating the law of war. The Ambracians alleged that they had been attacked unjustly, 
since they had been at peace with Rome, complied with the orders of the previous 
consuls, and were ready to be similarly obedient towards Fulvius.176 Despite this good 
behavior, their lands had been plundered, and when their city was threatened with the 
same treatment, they were forced to close their gates. The siege followed, and after the 
city had fallen, it had been pillaged and destroyed, and the women and children had been 
seized and sold into slavery. However, what shocked the Ambracians most of all was that 
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the city’s temples had been stripped of their ornaments, and even the images of the gods 
had been carried away. 
Gaius Flamininus, Lepidus’ fellow consul, defended Fulvius by citing the 
example of M. Marcellus, who had been accused by Syracuse of similar violations 
(discussed above in Chapter Two) after he conducted its siege during the Second Punic 
War. Fulvius’ conduct was therefore not in violation of the normal conduct of war, and in 
fact he was prepared to cite these very acts in his petition to the Senate for a triumph.177 
The attack on Ambracia itself had been justified because the city had allied itself with the 
Aetolians, with whom Rome was then at war, and this action made any previous 
friendship between Ambracia and Rome irrelevant. Flamininus subsequently blocked any 
action against Fulvius.178 However, taking advantage of a day on which Flamininus was 
absent due to illness, the Senate, led by Lepidus, passed a senatus consultum stating that 
the Ambracians should have all of their property returned to them, that they be free to 
live according to their own laws, and even to collect tariffs on goods so long as Rome and 
the members of the Latin League were exempt.179 The matter of the religious objects 
which had been seized was to be referred to the college of pontiffs for it to decide on a 
course of action when Fulvius returned to Rome. In addition, Lepidus took the further 
initiative of having another senatus consultum passed which affirmed that Ambracia had 
not been taken by force (vi captam).  
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On his return to Rome, and while Lepidus was attending to his proconsular 
province, Fulvius successfully overcame Lepidus’ supporters and was awarded a triumph. 
With an army loaded with spoils waiting outside the pomerium, his political capital was 
high, and the tribune who most vocally supported Lepidus was not able to withstand his 
influence. However, although this whole affair was manifestly grounded in domestic 
senatorial power politics, it still gives important evidence for the force of the principles of 
iustum bellum and ius belli in the era after the conclusion of the Second Punic and 
Second Macedonian Wars, when Rome held more overseas territory, and was more 
involved in the larger Mediterranean, than ever before. Livy states that Lepidus had 
coached the Ambracians in how to frame their complaints, and he no doubt did so with a 
mind to focusing them on patent violations of the laws of war. Thus Fulvius is accused of 
not having declared war justly, and having improperly seized religious objects.  
Fulvius’ defender Flamininus countered with arguments meant to bring those 
actions into line with the laws, providing a conventional justification for the attack 
(alliance with the enemy) and citing the precedent of M. Marcellus. The senatus 
consultum subsequently proposed by Lepidus, which declared that Ambracia had not 
been taken by force, was meant to overturn that defense, since it was only in the case of a 
city vi capta that such extensive seizures would have been permitted. So we may see, that 
even though iustum bellum and ius belli did not take on the formality of codified law or 
statute, they can still be said to be legal in character. They form a clear basis for the 
accusations made against Fulvius. Rather than dismissing them out of hand, Fulvius and 
his defenders are forced to address them, and to explain why his actions did in fact 
conform to these principles. The Senate, which has long been the venue for issues 
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involving foreign delegations, is asked to decide on the merits of the case according to its 
knowledge of the norms invoked.  
Also of interest is the other senatus consultum passed by the Senate under 
Lepidus' leadership. Obviously, the return of the goods plundered by Fulvius and the 
recognition of Ambracia as a free city would have had a devastating effect on the status 
of his victory and requested triumph. However, beyond their political implications, these 
actions would make an impact in two further ways. They would serve as a sanction 
against an officeholder who transgressed essential cultural norms, and also as a form of 
compensation to his victims. Although Fulvius’ actions against Ambracia did not 
materially harm the interests of the Senate or Rome, but rather ensured Rome’s victory 
against the Aetolians, his punishment would still serve to enforce important cultural 
values and to promote social cohesion in a society that relied on shared values and shared 
self-concepts. Punishment in this sense can be seen as a way for the punishing body to 
demonstrate its allegiance to traditional ideas of how to relate to foreign peoples. 
Furthermore, willingness to enforce such sanctions even unharmed by the violations is an 
attractive means of signaling to outside observers that the state and its political 
institutions are honest brokers. If the Senate was willing to punish officials who violated 
the laws of war, foreign peoples could be persuaded by such actions that it would not 
intentionally allow violations in the first place, and would be willing to remedy any that 
occurred. 
Modern social science research has supported the idea that those who are willing 
to punish individuals who violate social norms are more likely to be seen as 
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trustworthy.180 However, this research also shows that enforcement of sanctions is not the 
only way to appear trustworthy to outside observers. If there is an opportunity to offer aid 
to another group, this aid can also signal that the one offering it will act in good faith in 
the future. This is the other way in which the senatus consultum returning seized 
Ambracian property may have worked. By remedying the original violation, and 
demonstrating a willingness to help the victims, the Senate could convey to third-parties 
that Rome took such violations seriously and could be relied upon to make amends for 
future breaches.  
This is an appropriate point to explore whether enforcement and signaling 
behavior were consistently and broadly enacted by the Senate in similar cases arising in 
the fifty years after the conclusion of the Second Punic and Macedonian wars. This is the 
period period when Rome first held extensive territory outside the Italian peninsula and 
began to expand its influence throughout the Mediterranean. It is also when foreign 
embassies begin to appear regularly before the Senate to seek redress for acts of abuse 
and extortion committed by Roman officials and allies. These cases are evidence of the 
continuing force of the cultural values contained in iustum bellum and ius belli, and of 
their acceptance as formal standards by which Roman officials’ interactions with foreign 
peoples would be judged. Adherence to these principles was consistently expressed 
through efforts to impose sanctions on those who violated them, and to provide aid 
(monetary and otherwise) to the violators’ victims. In turn, this consistency of application 
fulfilled the dual purposes of expressing fealty to Roman values to an internal audience, 
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and signaling trustworthiness to foreign peoples. It becomes apparent that this nascent 
“law,” with its origins in iustum bellum and ius belli, played a key role in Roman foreign 
relations at this time, a role which was consequently cemented by its ultimate 
formalization into statute by the end of this period.   
 
 
Performing Virtue 
 
 Considering how closely the laws of foreign relations were tied to Roman cultural 
values and identity, it is tempting to assume that internal discipline of Roman officials 
was the chief area in which they were applied. However, in examining events in Greece 
following the conclusion of the wars with Philip V and Antiochus III, it becomes clear 
that Rome did not shrink from holding others to its standards, or from making amends for 
the errors of its formal allies in the same way as it would have for its own generals. 
Strategically, it is unsurprising that Rome maintained a strong interest in affairs in 
Greece. Although the original arguments for Roman involvement there were based on the 
possibility that the Hellenistic kings of that time might choose to follow Pyhrrus’ 
example and venture onto Italian soil,181 Rome also had allies calling for aid. Certainly, it 
was not in line with Roman interests to allow Philip and Antiochus to overrun the East 
and overwhelm budding Roman influence there.  
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 After the Romans’ victory in the Second Macedonian War, the peace negotiated 
by the consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus was engineered to allow Rome to occupy the 
place of friendly superpower to the region. Philip was hemmed in by the historical 
borders of Macedon, but not dethroned, since, as Flamininus put it, “it was not the 
Roman way . . . when victorious the brave should be moderate, gentle, and humane.”182 
Furthermore, the formal peace treaty as drawn up by the Senate declared all Greeks free 
and subject to their own laws, and Romans further gave up claims to some territories that 
could have been said to be theirs by right of war through a famous declaration by 
Flamininus at the Isthmian Games of 196.183 The Roman pattern of dismantling threats 
and declaring Greek cities to be free, while retaining the position of most powerful ally, 
continued when a force led by Flamininus and including Greek allies defeated the 
Spartan tyrant Nabis, freeing the city of Argos, but leaving Nabis in place as the Spartan 
king. Flamininus stayed in Greece until 194 in order to dispense justice and manage the 
disordered affairs of the various city-states that had been occupied by Philip and his 
lieutenants.184 However, his dramatic exit in 194, following a rousing speech at the 
Nemean games, after which Rome withdrew all remaining troops and gave up its last few 
garrisons, did not bring an end to Rome’s involvement in Greek affairs.  
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 Many scholars have examined Flamininus’ declaration of freedom and the rest of 
his time spent in the settlement of Greece in terms of the Roman adoption of a 
particularly Greek vocabulary of freedom, liberty, and autonomy. They posit that the 
adulation of the Greek audience at the Isthmian games was due to Flamininus’ expert 
deployment of terms like ἐλευθερία, which were familiar to the Greeks and carried a 
distinct political meaning.185 Certainly, as can be seen in his letter to Chyretiae noted in 
Chapter Two above, Flamininus had a strong command of the nuances of Greek 
diplomatic rhetoric of the time, and used them to effect what has come to be thought of as 
his unique philhellenism.186 Furthermore, this letter is evidence that his involvement in 
the affairs of the Greek city-states was highly detailed. Yet Flamininus, while enjoying 
wide latitude as the chief representative of the Senate and the Roman people in Greece at 
the time, was not a wholly independent agent. Rather, his conduct during his time in 
Greece, while augmented by his own particular talents and turn of mind, can be seen as 
an extension of Roman attitudes of the time towards foreign relations more generally. 
The Greek city-states, with their wealth, cultural influence, and political standing, were 
clearly important allies to Rome, especially in its challenge to the power of Hellenistic 
monarchs in the East. For that reason, even after Flamininus’ theatrical departure, Rome 
continued to intervene in Greek affairs to check the power of Philip, maintaining strong 
relationships with its allies, and ensuring its dominant influence in the region.  
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 During Rome’s war with Antiochus, Philip saw his opportunity to again expand 
his base of power within Greece, and he took control of several cities in Thessaly and 
Thrace.187 As Philip was now a formal ally of Rome by treaty,188 those victimized by him 
saw the Senate as an appropriate place to seek redress, while other allies of Rome from 
the area also expected the Senate to protect their interests against Philip. Envoys came to 
Rome from Thessaly, Perrhaebia, Eumenes of Pergamum, Athamania, and Maronea, all 
complaining of Philip’s domination over them. Philip’s own envoys protested that he had 
captured those cities in Rome’s service while fighting against Antiochus, and therefore 
they were his by right of war. The Senate, skeptical of the legality of Philip’s claim, felt 
that the situation merited serious consideration, and sent a commission of three senators 
to settle the disputes.189 In addition, all of the cities under Philip’s control were notified 
that they could bring their grievances to the commission’s headquarters in Thessaly.190 
 Rome had sent commissioners to Greece before, during Flamininus’ tenure, in the 
aftermath of the original peace treaty. However, in this case they were not merely 
enforcing a peace treaty with defined terms, but were being asked to judge both Philip’s 
and his alleged victims’ claims according to their broader sense of what was and was not 
licit behavior on the part of an ally. The fact that this was a deliberate and thoroughly 
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considered process, rather than a mere cover for Roman attempts to weaken Philip, is 
conveyed by the events which followed. The commission of three met in Tempe in 185 
and heard various complaints.  Livy described the scene as equivalent to a court hearing, 
with the Romans as judges, the Thessalians, Perrhaebians, and Athamanians as accusers, 
and Philip in the place of a defendant listening to the charges against him.191 The debate 
itself centered on the issue of the correct disposition of the cities and property claimed by 
Philip, and whether the line of possession by the Aetolians, against whom Philip had been 
allegedly fighting on Rome’s behalf, allowed them to be properly taken by right of war. 
In addition, it was stated that Philip had interrupted all sea trade in Thessaly in order to 
divert it to Macedonian-controlled Demetrias, and had even assaulted Thessalian envoys 
on their way to see Flamininus.192 Philip countered by making his own accusations that 
Thessalians and Perrhaebians themselves had improperly seized certain cities, and flatly 
denying all other charges.  
 The commissioners were overwhelmed by the situation, and determined that a 
further legal procedure (formula iuris) would have to be established to properly resolve 
the issues raised by both sides. For the time being the Macedonian garrisons were to be 
withdrawn from all disputed territories, and Philip’s rule limited to the historical 
boundaries of Macedonia, as Rome’s original treaty with him had stipulated. Livy’s 
statement that the commissioners had called for the establishment of a formula meant that 
subsequent hearings concerning these accusations would have the character of a formal 
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trial, one intended to examine the factual and legal circumstances of the accusers’ claims, 
and to determine Philip’s guilt or innocence and any possible penalties. This was a 
procedure clearly established for the benefit of Rome’s Greek allies. However, instead of 
summarily punishing Philip or taking military action against him for harming their 
interests, the Romans chose to treat the situation as a legal case which could be settled on 
its merits. Of course, the standards by which Philip would be judged, as can be inferred 
by the character of the dispute described above, were those constituting the Roman law of 
foreign relations, the fetial law and ius belli. 
The matter was drawn out over the next two years. A further commission meant 
to carry out the hearings was sent from Rome in 184, and issued another order stating that 
that Philip was to withdraw all of his forces from the occupied cities.193 According to 
Livy, in response Philip attempted to silence his accusers with violence, commissioning 
the assassination of Maronean leaders and going to war against the Thracian chieftains.194 
Subsequently, Rome was thronged in 183 by even more delegations from even more 
cities, who had heard that the Senate was giving serious consideration to the grievances 
of those who had been harmed by Philip.195 Philip’s son Demetrius had been sent to 
represent his interests in Rome, but he was unable to offer a satisfactory defense of his 
father’s actions. Finally, another Roman delegation was sent to Macedonia later in 183 
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and Philip, now fearful of provoking a new war with Rome, ultimately complied with its 
orders and withdrew his forces from the occupied cities.196  
There is no doubt that the Senate wished to blunt the power of Philip in Greece. 
Any dominant power in the area could be considered a threat to Roman interests. In 
addition, according to Roman values, allies must be protected from depredation. 
However, the choice to handle their complaints against Philip through this kind of legal 
procedure indicates something more than a simple attempt to prevent him from regaining 
his former position. A trial, even a show trial with a predetermined outcome, was a forum 
through which the Romans could publicly display their virtue. Through it, the Greeks and 
others could witness Rome’s willingness to go out of its way to protect its allies’ 
interests. The evidence that this show of good faith was effective is the strong reaction by 
these states to the earlier commissions. The Greeks saw how Rome had dealt with the 
claims against Philip, and they internalized the image that had been projected of Rome as 
an enforcer of the rights of its allies. Consequently, these Greek cities flooded the 
Romans with embassies making further accusations against Philip, because they had been 
successfully convinced that these accusations would be heard and dealt with fairly. Thus, 
the legal procedures established had done what a military offensive or even a unilateral 
command against Philip could never have accomplished. While the threat of possible war 
was what finally intimidated Philip into compliance, its actual declaration might have 
prompted fear and resistance in the Greeks, who may have been wary that Rome would 
simply replace Philip as their ruler, as they had been before Flamininus’ departure in 
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194.197 Instead, by instating various commissions to hold these hearings, Rome was able 
to achieve several objectives, cowing Philip and strengthening its relationship with its 
Greek allies, without the effort of direct confrontation.  
Of course, Rome did not necessarily need to hold a trial to demonstrate its 
position and values to allies. As was demonstrated by Flamininus’ letter to Chyretiae, 
such statements could be explicit. While the letter to Chyretiae ostensibly served to 
advertise the proper procedure for handling certain property claims, it contains several 
attempts by Flamininus to impress upon his audience that the Romans are a deeply 
virtuous people. In Flamininus’ words, the letter is meant to demonstrate “how in every 
aspect we are champions of what is honorable, . . . so that in this way too you may learn 
our character; that we wish in no matter to be avaricious, valuing above all goodwill and 
a good reputation.”198 Similarly, when the Lycians come to complain to the Senate in 178 
about their treatment at the hands of Rhodes, the Senate reprimands Rhodes in a letter 
that makes its role as a defender of their allies clear. While the Rhodians had been given 
control of Lycia by L. Cornelius Scipio during the conflict with Antiochus as a reward for 
their loyalty, that did not mean that Rome would necessarily tolerate bad behavior. The 
Lycians complained of being treated like slaves, and so the Romans gave them a letter for 
the Rhodians which stated that it would not permit the Lycians or any other freeborn 
people to be given over to the Rhodians or anyone else as slaves. It also stated that the 
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Lycians had the same rights as any other ally of Rome, and that these rights must be 
respected.199  
Whether the letter had any effect on Rhodes’ behavior, we do not know, but it is 
easy to imagine it being publicly inscribed in a Lycian community, like Flamininus’ letter 
to Chyretiae, as a symbol and a warning of Rome’s protective stance towards Lycia.200 
An inscription from what must have been a similar case has been found near Cadiz. It 
records a decree of Lucius Aemilius Paulus made during his pro-praetorship in Hispania 
from 191 to 189: “Lucius Aemilius, son of Lucius, general, decreed that the slaves of the 
people of Hasta, who dwell in the tower of Lascuta, shall be free. The fields and town 
which they had possessed at that time he ordered they should possess and hold so long as 
the people and Senate of Rome are willing.”201  
While the details of the event remain unknown, this example, like the others, 
demonstrates the way in which Rome made use of documents meant to resolve particular 
problems and disputes in order to make public statements about Roman virtue and 
trustworthiness as an ally. Just as in the case of the commissions sent to handle the 
complaints of Greek allies against Philip (himself a nominal ally of Rome), actions taken 
to address specific concerns could be made to stand as signals of Rome’s desirability and 
reliability as an ally to a wider audience. The responsiveness of many Greek city-states to 
this behavior further demonstrates that such signals could be effectively read by this 
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audience and used to guide its actions towards Rome. Thus, it is imperative to consider 
such diplomatic actions not only as expressions of Romans’ devotion to their conception 
of the considerations owed to their allies, but also as signaling behavior, meant to convey 
the image of a Rome whose foreign relations were determined by the dictates of law and 
good faith. 
 
 
Internal Discipline 
 
The Romans did not only perform for an external audience, however. The 
principles of just war were fundamental to the Roman worldview. They could be applied 
just as strictly in cases in which the injured party was no friend of Rome, in which 
Roman actions were unlikely to be noted by third parties, and in which the offenders 
sanctioned were their own officials, rather than an ally acting badly. Two notable 
examples of such cases occur when somewhat obscure Gallic tribes are attacked without 
justification by Roman generals hoping to gain some of the glory that successful battles 
can bring.  
The praetor of 187, M. Furius Crassipes, had been assigned to Gaul, and Livy tells 
us that he was anxious to find an excuse to start a war there, for the sake of his reputation. 
Unfortunately for him, the area was relatively peaceful at the time, and so proper 
justification was lacking. Despite this, he targeted a tribe called the Cenomani, perhaps 
because they had previously been Rome’s enemies, siding with the Carthaginian general 
Hamilcar against Rome in 200, when he was leading the remainder of Hasdrubal’s army 
 
 
99 
 
and fomenting revolts in the area.202 Furius took the Cenomani’s arms, even though they 
had offered no resistance nor provided any other justification for such a seizure. In turn, 
the tribe sent a deputation to Rome to complain and were referred to the consul M. 
Aemilius Lepidus, who was also in Gaul at the time, and who was given authority to 
investigate the matter. Acting as judge, Aemilius heard both the Cenomani’s accusations 
and Furius’ defense, but in the end sided with the Gauls. Furius was then ordered to 
restore the Cenomani’s property to them, and to leave the province.203 
A parallel case occurred in 186 when a group of Gauls crossed the Alps and 
began to construct a new town in Venetia, in the area which would later become 
Aquileia. First, Roman envoys were dispatched across the Alps to investigate the matter, 
but the migrants’ tribe of origin claimed that it had not authorized the move, and 
disavowed all connection with the incident.204  In 183, the consul for that year, M. 
Claudius Marcellus, ordered the proconsul L. Porcius to confront the Gauls with his 
legions at the site of their new settlement.205 Upon his arrival, the Gauls surrendered. 
Nevertheless, Porcius seized their arms and much of their other property. The Gauls 
resented this confiscation and sent envoys to the Senate to protest.206 They explained that 
they had been driven over the Alps by destitution and famine at home and, finding an 
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area which was unoccupied and uncultivated, had settled there with no ill intent. They 
had begun to build a village, which they felt should prove that they did not intend to prey 
upon the people of the surrounding area.207 Originally, Marcellus had warned them that if 
they did not surrender, he would take their intrusion into Italy as a just cause for war. So, 
preferring a certain peace to the uncertainties of war, they had surrendered themselves to 
the fides rather than to the power of the Roman people.208  
The statements of the Gauls at Rome, as rendered by Livy, seem to convey a 
sophistication in understanding of Roman deditio which may be implausible. Still, they 
must have known that a deditio rendered before any initiation of conflict should have 
forestalled Porcius’ broad confiscations of property. Furthermore, it must have been clear 
to them, from their knowledge of Rome’s reputation, that they had some chance of 
success if they presented their case before the Senate. They were right. The Senate 
determined that that the Gauls had been wrong to cross the Alps and attempt to settle in 
Italy without the permission of Rome. However, Porcius’ seizure of their movable goods 
had also been contrary to law, and it was not pleasing to the Senate that those who 
surrendered willingly should be despoiled of their property.209 Accordingly, legates 
would be sent to Marcellus to ensure that, if the Gauls returned over the Alps whence 
they came, everything which had been taken from them would be returned. Livy even 
names the senators sent on this mission, including Lucius Furius Purpurio, so notable for 
his speech before the Aetolian League.  
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Livy tells us that the Gauls received their recovered property and left Italy as 
instructed. There is no evidence that Porcius faced any reprimand for his behavior, 
besides the criticism implied by the Senate’s statement. However, the Roman response to 
this situation, and that involving the Cenomani, could certainly be considered generous. 
If both parties of Gauls had been plundered by Roman officials and left to their fate, there 
would have been no serious damage to Roman interests. The Cenomani had been Rome’s 
enemy, and were no match for Roman legions at that time in any case. The other Gauls 
had clearly intruded on Roman territory, and retaliation should have come as no surprise. 
In both instances, unlike in the case of Philip and the Greek allies, deference to the 
interests of the victims did not seem to offer any particular benefits – the main audience 
for the Senate’s actions would be its own members and the Gauls themselves.  
Still, the Senate considered and judged the facts of these cases as brought before 
them by the injured parties, and evaluated them according to its understanding of the law 
of war. M. Furius Crassipes had no just cause to threaten the peaceful Cenomani, and 
thus his seizure of their arms was invalid and must be corrected. Porcius had violated the 
rules of the deditio offered freely before battle, which disallowed extensive seizures of 
property. The Senate rectified this misstep as well. Even when the apparent benefits of 
obeying Roman principles of foreign relations were small, the Senate chose to expend the 
effort to do so. Clearly, the Senate saw investigations and commissions of this kind as a 
worthwhile investment of Roman resources. It is likely that this is because reification of 
these essential Roman values, values which arose from Roman efforts to ensure divine 
favor, was assumed to be a crucial component of Roman success abroad in and of itself, 
rather than merely a tool by which to manage Rome’s power and influence. 
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Extraordinary Measures 
 
The illicit seizure of property from a surrendered people was no doubt a violation 
of ius belli. Still, it was fairly easy to remedy, and did not seem to elicit much action on 
the part of the Senate against the errant general. Much more serious violations were 
possible, and required different treatment. One of the most striking examples of such a 
case involved M. Popillius Laenas and the Statellates of Liguria. As consul for 173, 
Popillius had been assigned there due to the ongoing conflict between Rome and various 
Ligurian tribes. Livy tells us that the Statellates, alone of all of the Ligurians, had 
declined to take up arms against the Romans.210 Nevertheless, Popillius drew up his army 
outside of their city, Carystum, and the Statellates, fearing the worst, responded by 
sending their forces out to defend it.211 Popillius attacked, and the battle went on for more 
than three hours without a decisive outcome.212 Finally, a Roman cavalry charge broke 
the Statellates’ line, and they fled in a panic towards the city. Livy reports that 10,000 of 
the Statellates were killed and more than 700 were taken prisoner.213 The Romans also 
lost more than 3,000 men.214  
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After the battle, the Statellates offered themselves to Popillius in an unconditional 
surrender. In doing so, Livy tells us, they assumed that he would treat them no more 
savagely than any other Roman general. They were mistaken. Popillius seized their arms 
and other property and destroyed the city. The Statellates who lived there were sold into 
slavery. Popillius then sent a report of all of his actions to the Senate, perhaps assuming 
that it would overlook his illicit behavior and congratulate him on a glorious victory.215 
The Senate instead regarded it as an atrocity. Iustum bellum had been contravened when 
Popillius attacked the Statellates without provocation, and the sacredness of the deditio 
had similarly been disregarded when they were sold into slavery. According to Livy, the 
Senate feared that this treatment would discourage others from surrendering to Rome, if 
they believed it meant their enslavement.216 Popillius was ordered to buy the Statellates 
back out of slavery using whatever profits he had made from their sale, and to restore all 
of their property that could be recovered. The Senate further instructed Popillius that he 
was not to leave his province until the Statellates had been returned to their homes.  
What follows illustrates the difficulty that the Senate might have in punishing a 
disobedient commander. Rather than staying in his province, as soon as Popillius got 
news of the Senate’s decision, he returned to Rome to defend himself. He delivered a 
long and angry speech, directed against the praetor Aulus Atilius whom he blamed for 
targeting him.217 He asked the Senate to impose a fine on Atilius, to rescind the earlier 
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order regarding the Statellates, and to order a public thanksgiving for his victory.218 Many 
senators attacked him for his audacity, and ultimately he slunk back to his province with 
none of his demands fulfilled. With no real enforcement mechanism in place, it was 
difficult for the Senate to force Popillius to action. The fact that Popillius’ brother, Gaius, 
had been elected consul for the next year was no help. He intimidated his colleague into 
keeping quiet about the matter. The Senate retaliated by assigning both consuls to 
Liguria, despite the fact Rome seemed to be headed to war with Perseus of Macedon. By 
refusing to assign either consul to Macedonia until the Statellates’ case was dealt with, or 
even to pass consulta allowing for the conscription of new armies, the Senate felt that it 
could compel the consuls to action. Instead, they declined to leave for their provinces, 
and Gaius made it clear that he would veto any attempt to renew the previous resolution 
against his brother.219 Amid all of this, Popillius wrote to the Senate stating that he had 
fought with the Statellates again, and killed another 6,000 of them, an action which only 
led more Ligurians to take up arms against him.220 
Passions were inflamed on all sides, and two of the tribunes for 172 entered the 
fray by threatening to impose a fine on the consuls and to bring their own resolution 
regarding the Statellates. The Senate gave its approval, and the tribunes presented a bill to 
the concilium plebis, which stated that if any of the Statellates who had surrendered had 
not been restored to their homes by the Kalends of Sextilis, the Senate would put a 
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magistrate under oath who would seek out and punish the person whose bad act had 
enslaved them.221 The plebeian assembly passed the measure, and the Senate assigned the 
praetor C. Licinius to carry it out. The consuls were finally prompted to leave for Liguria, 
and Popillius handed over his forces to them, but avoided returning to Rome for fear of 
being put on trial, especially before a public assembly which was clearly so hostile to 
him. However, he was forced to return when the tribunes threatened another resolution 
allowing Licinius to render judgement in his absence. Unfortunately, Popillius ultimately 
evaded prosecution. He was present for hearings before Licinius, but the praetor, out of 
deference to Popillius’ brother, the consul, postponed further examinations until the new 
magistrates for 170 were set to take up their offices, thus absolving him of his duty. Still, 
further acts of the Senate ensured that many thousands of those who had been wrongfully 
enslaved were freed. They were even granted land on the far side of the Po and resettled 
there at Rome’s expense.222 
This case reveals much about the importance of the law of iustum bellum and ius 
belli to the Romans in this period, as well as an evolution in its use at this time. In the 
face of an atrocious violation of norms, the Senate took extraordinary measures to correct 
the situation and punish the perpetrator. Those opposed to Popillius did not hesitate to 
punish his brother and his other defenders in order to get their revenge on him. The 
Senate was even willing to jeopardize the safety of Rome itself by refusing to allow the 
consuls to prepare for the war against Perseus until this matter was dealt with. While 
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political factors allowed Popillius to escape direct punishment, there can be no doubt that 
significant resources were devoted to rescuing the Statellates from slavery and resettling 
them, which was no small feat. This persistence should not be surprising. Acts which 
violently defied the norms of war and foreign relations could have serious repercussions. 
Roman diplomatic relationships could suffer from the mistrust engendered by them. 
These acts could (and in this case, did) prompt foreign peoples to retaliate with their own 
declarations of war. Not least of these consequences is the possibility that such disregard 
for the law could earn the displeasure of the gods. Furthermore, whatever the 
ramifications, such cruel behavior was simply not Roman. It lay in stark opposition to a 
fundamental cultural narrative of shared values.  
The importance of adherence to the law to Roman identity and success abroad 
may have prompted the involvement of the tribunes and, ultimately, the plebeian 
assembly, in enforcing it. In earlier instances the Senate acts on its own, and takes the 
initiative when it comes to dealing with abuses committed by the magistrates drawn from 
its own ranks. However, in this particular case, the Senate seems unable to enforce any 
sort of discipline on Popillius. Both he and the consuls are recalcitrant in the face of the 
Senate’s threats and resolutions. It is only when the tribunes become involved, and are 
able to pass their resolutions through the plebeian assembly, that Popillius and his 
supporters are forced to respond. Even then, when his prosecution is entrusted to a fellow 
senator, Licinius, Popillius escapes punishment through his personal connections.223 As 
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will be shown, failures like this lead to increasing formalization and innovation in 
procedure, as well as further involvement of the tribunes and popular assemblies in such 
cases over the next two decades.  
 
 
Searching for Solutions 
 
 In 171 a deputation from the two Hispaniae came to the Senate complaining of the 
avaritia and superbia of various Roman magistrates who had been assigned there in 
previous years.224 Although the Spaniards clearly had many grievances, most of their 
complaints related to “pecuniae captae,” i.e. extortion.225  Perhaps for this reason L. 
Canuleius, the praetor assigned to Spain for 170, was instructed to appoint five 
recuperatores from the senatorial order. Evidence concerning the exact nature of the 
recuperatores and their duties is sparse before the Late Republic. However, some brief 
passages from Plautus imply that recuperatores were judges, meant to aid in the return of 
property in cases involving foreign peoples.226 In addition, Livy tells us that in 210, after 
the sack of New Carthage, Scipio Africanus appointed three men, whom Livy calls 
recuperatores, to resolve a dispute between two soldiers concerning which one of them 
had scaled the walls of the city first, and thus was deserving of the military honor known 
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as the “mural crown”.227 In the case which occurs in 171, it is unclear if the recuperatores 
are a formal institution, or simply a general term for arbitrators appointed in case of 
certain kinds of disputes. In either interpretation, the use of recuperatores here indicates a 
proactive effort on the part of the Senate to use a variety of tools to resolve the improper 
seizure of property on the part of Roman officials.  
In this case, the board was to try each of the individual magistrates accused by the 
Spaniards, who were free to choose their own advocates.228 The Spanish deputation chose 
very eminent men as their advocates: M. Porcius Cato, P. Cornelius Scipio, L. Aemilius 
Paulus, and C. Sulpicius Gallus.229 Unfortunately, this step may have hindered their 
cause. The Spaniards were able to bring three previous praetors of Spain before the 
recuperatores. One was acquitted, and the other two went into exile (although this exile 
took them only as far as Tibur and Praeneste.)230 However, a rumor circulated that the 
Spaniards’ counsel had prevented them from accusing anyone of higher rank. According 
to Livy, Canuleius himself gave way under the pressure and left for his allotted province 
so that he would no longer be obliged to oversee the hearings.231 Livy says of this 
ultimate denial of justice, “ita praeteritis silentio obliteratis (thus what was done before 
was erased by silence).”232 The Senate eventually made some concessions to limit future 
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abuse by magistrates in Spain, exempting grain from taxation and ensuring that Roman 
generals would pay a fair market price for the grain they did buy.233 Yet, the specific 
injuries suffered by the Spaniards were not given any further consideration. 
The recuperatores do not reappear in the historical record until the Late Republic. 
Their use may have been limited by their confinement to questions of property. Beyond 
this, the Senate still struggled to deal adequately with cases of illicit abuse and violence 
committed by its generals against foreign peoples. For example, the next year, in 170, 
envoys from Chalcis arrived in the Senate to make complaints about their treatment at the 
hands of C. Lucretius and L. Hortensius. As successive praetors assigned to Greece, both 
men had despoiled its temples, plundered its land, and sold free men into slavery.234 The 
embassy is notably led by Micythio, a Chalcidean leader who had aided the Romans on 
numerous occasions during their wars in Greece,235 and who was dramatically borne on a 
litter into the Senate due to his paralysis. Micythio made a point of enumerating the 
Chalcideans’ various services to Rome during the war against Perseus to demonstrate 
that, against such a strong ally, these abuses could have no possible justification in law. 
The Senate decided to summon Lucretius to answer the charges, but his shaming was not 
confined to the Senate house. The tribunes Manius Juventius Thalna and Cn. Aufidius 
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had taken up Chalcis’ case against Lucretius, and dragged him before a contio. There 
they made multiple accusations and set a date for a trial.236  
The Senate attempted to make some amends to the Chalcideans on its own. A 
letter was sent to Hortensius, who was still in the field, denouncing his actions and 
insisting that he buy back those who had been sold into slavery. The Senate also gifted 
2000 asses to each of the Chalcidean envoys, and even hired vehicles to take Micythio to 
Brundisium in greater comfort.237 However, the Roman people proved more harsh than 
their Senate. When Lucretius’ crimes finally came to trial, the thirty-five tribes of the 
comitia tributa unanimously found him guilty and assessed a fine of one million asses, as 
requested by the tribunes.238 Clearly, it was not only the Senate that was concerned with 
the crimes of Roman generals against foreign peoples. In addition, the use of a trial 
before a public assembly is evidence of the continuing formalization of iustum bellum 
and ius belli. These were no longer just sets of principles used by the Senate to judge the 
appropriateness of a particular official’s behavior. They had become components of 
Roman criminal law, able to be used as a basis for charges in a formal trial before the 
people. Even the use of recuperatores indicates that the Romans of the time were 
searching for formal procedures by which to enforce this law. That search would be 
concluded in the very near future. 
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Lex Calpurnia de Repetundis 
 
We know from a brief reference in Valerius Maximus that in 154 L. Cornelius 
Lentulus Lupus, cos. 156, was found guilty of unspecified crimes of extortion 
(repetundarum.)239 In this case the recuperatores were not used. Rather, a lex Caecilia is 
cited as having been applied.240 This lex may have instituted a special quaestio for 
Lentulus’ trial, an additional signal in the move towards a more criminal complexion for 
cases of abuse against foreign peoples. However, in the end it was the disgraceful result 
of a particular case that prompted a drastic change in how such cases would be handled in 
the future, and ultimately altered the fundamental nature of Roman criminal law in this 
sphere.  
As pro-praetor of Further Spain in 150, Servius Sulpicius Galba targeted the 
Lusitanians for violence and abuse much as M. Popillius had the Statellates. The 
Lusitanians had surrendered themselves to Galba in fidem populi Romani, but Galba had 
sold them into slavery in Gaul. The tribune L. Scribonius Libo promulgated a motion that 
they should be freed, and a special quaestio was initiated to try Galba for his crimes.241 
Cato the Elder argued vigorously on its behalf. Cato’s rival, Q. Fulvius Nobilior, spoke 
for Galba, and Galba himself exploited the people’s sympathy to evade prosecution. He 
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brought in his two sons, still wearing the toga praetexta, and made such piteous speeches 
that the motion to try him was defeated.242 
The Lex Calpurnia de repetundis was passed in this same year, and it has been 
argued that there is a direct connection between it and the failure to prosecute Galba.243 
This law, passed by the tribune L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, established a permanent list of 
senatorial jurors from which the magistrate designated as judge in a case of extortion 
would draw. This was to be Rome’s first permanent criminal court, the place where all 
such cases would be brought, and where the Roman law of foreign relations would be 
formally applied. There is disagreement about the motives for the passage of the Lex 
Calpurnia. Erich Gruen argues that it was a response to the increasing frequency with 
which senators were being prosecuted for crimes of abuse and extortion before the public 
assemblies. In this telling, the Senate wished to regain its prerogative over foreign 
relations and the punishment of its own members.244 Others, like Ernst Badian, believe 
that the law was prompted by a genuine feeling of responsibility in Rome for the well-
being of foreigners and provincials.245 In either case, the establishment of the quaestio de 
repetundis provided the first permanent and exclusive forum for the enforcement of 
iustum bellum and ius belli, ensuring its enduring importance for centuries to come.  
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Conclusion 
 
Many scholars have started their studies of the crime of extortion, or Roman 
criminal law more generally, with the creation of the quaestio de repetundis. Even those 
who choose to look at earlier cases may go no further back than 171 or 173.246 While 
such examinations serve an important purpose, it is equally vital to note that the quaestio 
is only one stage in a long succession of developments. Its existence is predicated upon 
and supported by a deep structure of Roman values which originated with the fetial 
priests, iustum bellum, and ius belli. Without these, and the history of their consistent use 
and gradual formalization, no court of extortion could ever have come into existence. 
More fundamental, perhaps, is the fact that without understanding these underlying 
values and how they were applied, it is not possible to see the role which Roman identity 
and external signaling behavior played in the foreign relations of this crucial period.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CARTHAGE, ALLY OF ROME: THE BREAKDOWN OF ROMAN PRINCIPLES 
 
In 201, after the defeat of Carthage at the Battle of Zama, a group of Carthaginian 
envoys arrived at Rome to negotiate the peace treaty that would formally conclude the 
war. Leading the delegation was Hasdrubal Haedus. According to our sources, this 
Hasdrubal had long opposed the Barca faction in Carthage, and had been seeking peace 
between Rome and the Carthaginians throughout the course of the conflict. When initial 
efforts towards a truce were made in the immediate aftermath of Zama, he had protected 
Roman ambassadors from angry Carthaginian mobs.247 He had also been the first to 
negotiate with Scipio Africanus for peace at that time.248 Now, before the Senate, 
Hasdrubal made an audacious speech, which is summarized by Livy. He warned the 
senators that they should make use of their good fortune in a virtuous and restrained way. 
After all, the reason that the Roman people remained invincible was that in moments of 
victory, they remembered to consider the matter carefully and act wisely. For this reason 
their power had expanded almost more by clemency to the conquered than by conquest 
itself.249 This speech moved the Senate towards a compassionate stance, but then, we are 
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told, one senator stood up and angrily asked Hasdrubal which gods they would swear by 
to conclude this peace, since they had betrayed those gods which they had invoked for the 
previous one. “The same gods,” Hasdrubal replied, “who are so cruel to those who 
violate treaties.”250 
Thus began a fifty-year period during which Rome was at peace with Carthage, its 
former main rival in the Mediterranean, now its ally. Although becoming Rome’s ally 
was a standard element of any treaty after a Roman victory in war, in this case that status 
carried special import. Carthage had been Rome’s bitterest enemy, and during this war 
Rome had come closer to total annihilation than ever before. For these reasons, 
maintaining Roman standards for the treatment of allies may have been a challenge. Yet, 
on closer examination, the Romans took Haedus’ advice, and adhered to their own 
principles of fairness and clemency much better and for much longer than anyone might 
have predicted.  
 The actual terms of the treaty, which the Senate gave Scipio full authority to 
determine, were strict. The Carthaginians were to surrender all of their warships with the 
exception of ten triremes. They were barred from making war on any party without the 
consent of Rome. They were also forced to restore any seized territory to Massinissa, the 
king of Numidia who had aided Rome during the war, and to compensate him for his 
losses. An indemnity of ten thousand talents of silver was imposed, to be paid out in 
installments of two hundred talents per year. In addition, one hundred young men from 
Carthage’s prominent families were to be surrendered to the Romans as surety. Still, the 
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Carthaginians would be allowed to retain the territory and property which they had held 
before the start of the war, and they were left otherwise autonomous.251 Even Hannibal is 
reported to have said that the terms of the treaty were as favorable as could be 
expected.252 Above all the treaty itself was necessary. Carthage had been totally defeated 
in its own territory in Africa, and in the interests of its own preservation, a peace treaty 
was unavoidable.  
 Livy reports that it was mostly practical motives that prompted Scipio to begin 
peace negotiations after Zama. Many of his officers urged an attack Carthage itself. 
However, the siege of such a well-fortified city would have been a costly and time-
consuming operation. Scipio was also concerned that, if he did not conclude the war 
himself, his successor as consul would be able to take credit for all of his successes.253 In 
any case, the Senate and the Roman people wanted peace. In 201, the concilium plebis 
voted unanimously to authorize a treaty with Carthage, and the fetial priests were 
accordingly sent to Africa with the requisite flint knives and sacred herbs needed to 
solemnize the peace.254  
The possibility for tension between the past of Rome’s conflict with Carthage, 
and its ostensibly friendly relationship after the conclusion of the Second Punic War, is 
obvious. However, when the actual events which made up this relationship are closely 
examined, it emerges that, whatever suspicions there may have been of Carthage’s 
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intentions at Rome, both sides made a strong effort to appear to be cordial and helpful 
allies. Rome, in particular, was careful to conform to its traditional standards of behavior 
towards foreign allies. However, despite this outward comity, in the end conflict did 
again arise between the two powers. Consideration of the fraught relationship between 
the two states provides a unique insight into the power of traditional Roman values 
around foreign relations to encourage restraint and moderation in difficult situations. In 
addition, a thorough examination of the eventual breakdown in relations which led to the 
Third Punic War and Carthage’s destruction shows how those values were strained, and 
ultimately changed, by Rome’s increasing power.  
 
 
Between the Wars 
 
The question which is typically posed with respect to the Third Punic War is 
“Why did Rome choose to destroy Carthage?” After all, when the Carthaginians had been 
defeated in 202, a hefty war indemnity was levied, and the treaty which concluded the 
war imposed strict limits on Carthaginian militarization. From this point on, Carthage 
posed no obvious threat. Furthermore, as will be shown, Carthaginian relations with 
Rome were at least ostensibly deferential, if not slavish, and Carthage was so effectively 
hemmed in by Rome’s Numidian ally, Massinissa, that it could have little capacity for 
other conflicts. Taking all of this into account, Rome’s destruction of Carthage in 146 is 
puzzling. A few theories have been proposed to explain this action. One, which is 
effectively summarized by Frank Adcock, is that Rome destroyed Carthage and annexed 
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the province of Africa in order to prevent a Numidian takeover and domination of North 
Africa.255 Another explanation is advanced by William Harris, who contends that 
Carthage, being the richest state in the immediate periphery of Rome, and having 
completed indemnity payments in 152, presented a lucrative target for Romans bent on 
self-enrichment and enlarging Rome’s commercial power.256 A further theory, perhaps 
the most natural in light of the evidence, is that an irrational desire for revenge, and an 
irrational fear of the dangers posed by Carthage’s continued existence, drove Rome to 
destroy the city.257  
All of these interpretations likely have something of value to add to our 
understanding of this period. However, in order to better explore these and other possible 
factors in the lead-up to the Third Punic War, it is perhaps more helpful to reverse the 
initial question, instead asking, “Why did Rome wait so long to destroy Carthage?” After 
all, if Rome wished to establish a base of power in North Africa, or to absorb Carthage’s 
significant wealth and trading power, surely the right time to do so would have been on 
the occasion of the devastating defeat of that state at the conclusion of the Second Punic 
War. Rather, when examining the years between the conclusion of the peace treaty in 201 
and the initiation of the third war in 149, there is no indication that Rome harbored 
aggressive intentions towards Carthage. Instead, Rome positions itself as an unbiased ally 
of Carthage, scrupulously obeying the terms of the treaty. While this upright image is in 
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some ways belied by Rome’s failure to check Massinissa’s encroachments upon 
Carthage’s historical territory, this failure appears more as a desire to favor the closer 
relationship that Rome had with Massinissa, rather than as part of a systematic anti-
Carthaginian policy.258 
In some ways the lack of immediate acquisitive aggression resembles Rome’s 
forays into Greece around the time of the Second Macedonian War, when Rome was 
willing to exert a strong influence in the area, relying on the support and compliance of 
its allies, but refrained from taking an imperial role. This is a distinct phase of Roman 
foreign relations, where we see Rome content to ensure its own safety by checking the 
power of any Mediterranean rivals and making friendly alliances with smaller states 
which were unable to challenge it. There were exceptions. Rome had gained control of 
Spain after the Second Punic War and encountered a more hostile environment there 
along with its new territory. Similarly, while some of the Gallic tribes of the Alps 
maintained peaceful relations with Rome, Rome looked upon Northern Italy as its 
rightful possession and was engaged in frequent conflict there. However, in North Africa 
and the East, where established states and networks of power had greater purchase, Rome 
was mostly content to assure its own dominant influence (whether through war or 
alliance).   
Carthage, by being a good and compliant ally, played a role in ensuring that the 
Roman Senate did not feel the need to engage more actively in North Africa. Carthage 
held scrupulously to the terms of the 201 peace treaty. In addition, Carthage did 
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everything that could be reasonably expected to ensure Roman goodwill towards it. In 
200, the Senate sent envoys asking for the surrender of Hamilcar, who was rousing 
armies of Gauls and Ligurians against Rome, and for the return of the remaining Roman 
deserters, some of whom were living openly in Carthage.259 The Carthaginians replied 
that they could not surrender Hamilcar, having no control over his actions, but only 
declare him an outlaw and confiscate his property. As for the deserters, they had already 
sent back as many as they could find, and would send an embassy to the Senate to explain 
the situation.260 In addition, they sent 200,000 modii of wheat to Rome and another 
200,000 to the Roman armies fighting Philip V in Macedonia.261 This extra gift may have 
been made to match Carthage’s rival in Africa, Massinissa. He had become a close ally of 
Rome through his aid in the Second Punic War, and was now providing both grain and 
cavalry for the Roman war effort against Macedon.262 Certainly it was important that 
Carthage, being disarmed and with a strong and ambitious neighbor in Massinissa, 
remain on friendly terms with Rome. Thus these additional offers were probably meant to 
curry favor and prove that Carthage’s position as Rome’s ally was not a mere title 
resulting from the treaty, but indicative of a genuinely friendly relationship.  
The feeling may have been (at least somewhat) mutual. When an embassy from 
Carthage brought the first installment of tribute to Rome in 199, after making up for the 
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impurity of their silver by borrowing the shortfall locally, it requested, if the Senate was 
so disposed, the return of Carthaginian hostages.263 Apparently the Senate was favorable 
to this request, and one hundred hostages were returned with the promise that the rest 
might be restored in return for good behavior.264 In the meantime the Senate acquiesced 
to the Carthaginians’ request that the remaining hostages be moved from Norba, where 
they were not comfortable, and permitted them to go to Signia or Ferentinum.265 This 
indulgence from the Senate indicates a cordial relationship between Rome and Carthage 
at this time. Even when it was suspected that the Carthaginian prisoners had fomented a 
slave rebellion the next year, this did not seem to affect the relationship, and there is no 
record of any exchange on the matter between Rome and Carthage itself.266 
Further evidence of the cordiality of the relationship between Rome and Carthage 
may lie in the fact that there was a strong, elite pro-Roman and anti-Hannibal faction at 
Carthage in these years. Members of this group were in communication with their friends 
among the Roman leadership, and warned that Hannibal was colluding with Antiochus III 
and urging Carthage to war.267 Livy states that Hannibal was as popular among the 
common people of Carthage as he was unpopular among the elite, and that he attempted 
many reforms of the Carthaginian state in their favor.268 However, when, despite P. 
                                                          
263 Livy 32.2 
 
264 Livy 32.2.4: de ceteris, si in fide permanerent, spes facta. 
 
265 Livy 32.2.5 
 
266 Livy 32.26: Due to the suspicions against them, the Carthaginian hostages were confined to private 
custody and restrained with heavy chains.  
 
267 Livy 33.45 
 
268 Livy 33.47 
 
 
122 
 
Scipio’s advice against intervening in Carthaginian politics, the Roman Senate sent a 
group of ambassadors to Carthage in 195 in order to intimidate Hannibal and his 
supporters, Hannibal saw that he had no option but to flee into exile.269 As the anti-
Carthaginian senators had claimed he would, Hannibal went to Antiochus, thus 
cementing their impression that he had been the driving force of any war-mongering at 
Carthage, especially as the pro-Roman faction continued to keep Rome apprised of 
Hannibal’s suspected movements.270 It even went so far as to attempt to arrest Aristo, a 
Tyrian who was supposedly an agent of Hannibal and Antiochus at Carthage, in order to 
turn him over to Rome; but he escaped before they could do so.271 
Perhaps, Hannibal’s exit was enough to make the Roman senators feel secure in 
their relations with Carthage. Perhaps, as Livy tells it, the mere presence of Aristo at 
Carthage indicated more support there for Hannibal than the Romans would have 
liked.272 In any case, when Carthage sent an embassy to Rome in 193 to complain of 
Massinissa’s capture of certain of their territories, the Senate felt an obligation to obey 
the forms dictated by Roman values, if not the spirit, just as they had in previous cases. 
Several sources state that around this time Massinissa had seized the area surrounding 
Emporia, a Carthaginian subject territory, and compelled the towns within it to pay him 
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tribute.273 The Carthaginians, not being permitted by their treaty with Rome to make war 
on Massinissa on their own initiative, sent an embassy to Rome to complain of this 
treatment. Seeing this, Massinissa sent his own embassy to dispute whether the territory 
had ever properly belonged to Carthage. The Carthaginian ambassadors pointed out that 
Emporia had been within their borders as declared by P. Scipio at the end of the war; 
however, their case was hurt by their seeming incompetence in the matter of Aristo. 
Against them, the Numidians urged that they had the right of possession from before the 
time of the treaty.274 Accordingly the Romans sent a commission to determine the 
boundary, including P. Scipio, whose authority should have been absolute on the 
question.275 According to Livy, the matter was left undecided because that was the most 
expedient course for Rome. 276 Polybius and Appian do not specify the resolution of this 
particular matter, but both say that the Romans were determined to favor Massinissa 
because they were convinced that this was in the best interests of their state.277 In either 
case the appropriated territory remained in Massinissa’s possession. 
This failure by Rome to do justice when called in by allies can be interpreted in 
several ways. Patrick Walsh proposes that it may be a result of indecision by the Senate 
which did not wish to be seen as dismissing a legitimate complaint by its Carthaginian 
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allies or failing to favor Massinissa.278 This failure to act could also be seen as retribution 
against Carthage, whose allegiance was under suspicion due to Hannibal’s flight to 
Antiochus and the Aristo affair – and Livy states that this was a motivation for 
Massinissa timing his attack in this year.279 Charles Saumagne implies another alternative 
when he says of Livy’s account that “the two powers argue exactly as two peasants from 
the Roman suburbs who demand a magistrate be called in to hold a debate in iudicio.”280 
Saumagne here particularly indicates a court case decided by the principle of uti 
possidetis, which entitles the party which retains possession of a piece of land after a 
conflict to title to that land by virtue of this possession.  
Another alternative line of reasoning would be that the Numidians had claimed 
the territory through legitimate capture according to ius belli. This seems to be the vein in 
which the Numidians argue their claim to Emporia before the Senate, since they say that, 
in the past, possession of this area had always rested with the party that was better 
armed.281 Perhaps then the case was not left undecided as such by the Roman arbitrators – 
after all, Livy is the only source which records this outcome specifically. Rather, P. 
Scipio and the others saw the situation on the ground and decided that the correct course 
of action was to leave matters as they were. The Numidians, having correctly asserted 
that possession ought to lie with those who had conquered and held the land by virtue of 
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ius belli, were allowed to keep it.282 In this way, it is possible that the resolution of this 
affair was not, as some would assume, a dereliction of duty or barefaced favoritism on 
the part of the Roman commissioners, but rather a situation in which they fell back upon 
established Roman principles in order to resolve a dispute between allies, however 
convenient the outcome may have been for their interests. After all, what is principled 
may also be what is advantageous. 
In any case, Roman support for (or complaisance towards) Massinissa’s 
encroachments was not enough to sour the relationship between Rome and Carthage. 
Shortly afterward in 191 a Carthaginian embassy came to the Roman Senate to offer 
500,000 modii of wheat and another 500,000 of barley, in aid of the war with Antiochus, 
and to transport half of it free of charge to Rome (and the other half, presumably, to 
where it was needed for the Roman army.)283 In addition they offered to prepare a fleet of 
ships for Roman use at their own expense, and to pay in full the remaining balance of the 
tribute that had been imposed by the 201 treaty.284 Again, there was an element of 
competition for the position of most helpful ally, as Massinissa too had sent an embassy 
to Rome to offer his own portion of grain as well as cavalry and even elephants to aid the 
war effort.285 The Senate told both parties that Rome would be happy to take the grain if 
they would accept payment for it. As for the fleet and the lump sum offered by the 
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Carthaginians, the Romans would only accept such ships as were required by the 
treaty,286 and they categorically refused to accept any of the tribute money before it came 
due.287  
Of course, these offers do admit of other motives than trying to please Rome. 
Carthage may have been attempting to discharge its debt at a time when it could 
comfortably do so (according to Appian, Carthage continued to prosper during this 
period)288 and end a tiresome obligation. In this way a friendly offer of aid could have 
been made to serve two purposes. Still, disclosure of the ability to easily mount a fleet on 
short notice and at their own expense may not have been the most apt way to assure 
Rome of Carthage’s submissiveness. Either way, this episode seems to be a sign that both 
sides were still on good terms, even if Rome wished to appear not to be dependent on 
Carthage’s services, and to prolong its treaty obligations.289  
Another sign of the relatively placid nature of these relations is the fact that the 
next territorial dispute between Carthage and Massinissa in 182, which Rome was asked 
to arbitrate, is in fact quietly resolved. The piece of territory in question had passed back 
and forth between Carthage and Massinissa for some years, but had come into the 
possession of Massinissa only within the past year. The short duration of this possession 
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weakened Massinissa’s case somewhat before the arbitrators, and Livy states that he was 
afraid that the decency (pudor) of the Romans would make them fear appearing to favor a 
friendly king against common enemies.290 Here Livy probably overstates the matter, as 
there is no evidence that the Carthaginians were then seen as the implacable enemies 
which later narratives present.291  
As before, the Romans are in a difficult position, being forced to choose between 
two allies, one of whom is clearly more favored, but both of whom it is important to keep 
subdued. The arbitrators, at a loss, refer the case to the Senate. There is no account of the 
specific resolution of this case. However, Livy later states that in 180 one hundred 
hostages were returned to the Carthaginians. At the same time peace was made between 
Carthage and Massinissa, “who at that time with an armed force was occupying the land 
which was in dispute.”292 It is unclear from this account what the eventual distribution of 
territory was that allowed peace to be made. However, it is reasonable to assume that 
Massinissa kept at least some of the territory he had gained. Despite the apparent 
weakness of his claim, this does not necessarily imply an injustice on Rome’s part. After 
all, Livy uses the term pax to refer to the situation between Carthage and Massinissa, 
implying some kind of formal agreement, the terms of which must have been negotiated 
between the two parties. The release of the hostages might have been offered to the 
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Carthaginians to induce them to accept this agreement and to enable both Rome and 
Massinissa’s people to live on peaceful terms with them.  
An apparent pattern has arisen in all of the recorded interactions discussed above. 
In the first place, it is not helpful to attempt to evaluate the relationship between Rome 
and Carthage alone. It is obvious that there is an interconnected relationship between 
Rome and Carthage and Massinissa. Both Carthage and Massinissa are the major allies of 
Rome in North Africa.293 Both seem to compete for Rome’s approval and protection 
while attempting to preserve their own bases of power. Massinissa has the advantage of 
being a favored ally who provided aid to Rome during the Second Punic War, while 
Carthage has the corresponding disadvantage of having become an ally by treaty upon 
losing that war. Furthermore, Carthage’s actions are severely restricted by this treaty, and 
it is not allowed to raise any forces to defend itself against attack. Still, Rome appears to 
arbitrate the disputes between the two according to the forms of Roman justice, if not in 
the spirit of what a modern reader might see as just. Where Massinissa has a strong claim 
to territory, he wins his claim before Rome. Where Massinissa’s claim is weak, a 
favorable peace agreement is arranged between the two parties at Rome’s behest. All 
along, both Carthage and Massinissa strive to be allies who prove their loyalty to Rome 
by their generosity with their resources. Rome thus benefits by this competition in 
maintaining a favorable balance of power in North Africa and ensuring its allies’ 
continued loyalty. Throughout, Rome is able to claim that it has acted in all fairness and 
according to Roman values in each case – a stance reinforced by the Roman Senate’s 
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scrupulous refusal of any excessive gifts of grain, money and arms from either Carthage 
or Massinissa.  
However, this equilibrium could not be maintained forever, and it began to break 
down within the next decade. The catalyst for this shift in relations is predictable: the 
suspicion (supported by Numidian insinuations) that Carthage is colluding with Rome’s 
enemies. The same specter had been raised before in the case of Antiochus, but it seems 
that then Rome was sufficiently appeased by the expulsion of Hannibal. This time Rome 
could not be so easily calmed. Starting in 174, Massinissa begins to allege that the 
Carthaginians were in communication with Perseus of Macedon. Massinissa even says 
that the Carthaginian Senate had met with the Macedonian ambassadors at night in the 
temple of Asclepius.294 Considering the well-known Roman cultural aversion to 
clandestine nighttime activities, this report gives a particularly sinister cast to the alleged 
meeting.295 No doubt the allegation was troubling to Rome, since its most dependable 
ally in the East, Eumenes of Pergamum, came to Rome himself to warn the Romans that 
Perseus had long been making preparations for war soon after.296 Still, these accusations 
did not immediately affect the relationship between Rome and Carthage. In 172, Carthage 
and Numidia again brought their territorial disputes to the Senate, but any attempt to 
arbitrate was interrupted by the commencement of the Third Macedonian War in 171.297 
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While Livy puts some enraged speeches into the mouths of the Carthaginian 
representatives, and repeated insinuations into those of the Numidians, no decision was 
made and the case was deferred until the parties could better prepare their arguments.298 
Livy does note that gifts were given, and all of the appropriate signs of hospitality shown, 
to both embassies.299  
Still the onslaught of accusations continued, and, in 170, Massinissa’s son, 
Gulussa, came to Rome to offer his father’s assistance in the war against Perseus, but also 
to warn the Romans to beware of the Carthaginians. He told the Senate that they were 
building a large fleet, which was ostensibly meant to aid the Romans against Perseus, but 
“when this was ready and equipped it would be in their power to have what enemies and 
allies they would.”300 This is the fear that was to underlie Roman relations with Carthage 
over the next quarter century leading up to Carthage’s destruction. No gifts of wheat 
(which Carthage subsequently offered again to Rome)301 could assuage this fear, which 
had ebbed and flowed since the end of the Second Punic War: that Carthage would 
become an ally to, and a staging ground for, the attacks of Rome’s other, now mightier 
enemies. 
At times Carthage’s apparent submission could calm these suspicions temporarily. 
Furthermore, in the absence of Carthaginian aggression, and with Massinissa acting as a 
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counter-weight, Rome was satisfied with playing the role of a fair-minded patron, 
obedient to its own concepts of justice and good faith. Indeed, as has been shown, this 
was Rome’s fallback position once it had successfully asserted itself. Carthage was not 
seen as the treacherous and implacable enemy of later times, merely as another 
vanquished antagonist in a long list of such, albeit uniquely positioned. Furthermore, 
Roman senators may have believed that their treatment of Carthage could lead to 
collateral benefits by signaling Rome’s clemency towards the conquered. Certainly, Livy 
seems to think that the Roman attitude toward Carthage served this purpose, since he has 
the Rhodians beg for the freedom of those states which had sympathized with Antiochus 
by citing the example of Carthage “free with its own laws.”302  
It is clear then that, when not compelled by some pressing need, Rome relied 
upon traditional values to determine its course of action towards Carthage and preferred 
to leave well enough alone. It responded to Carthaginian complaints in a way reminiscent 
of how had dealt with other, similar complaints from other allies. The endless 
commissions and investigations of territorial disputes between Carthage and Numidia are 
reminiscent of those organized by Rome to deal with the disputes between Rome’s Greek 
allies and Philip V. In turn, Carthage had dutifully offered aid to Rome in its war efforts, 
the same as any other ally, and despite incidents like that concerning Aristo, the general 
tenor of the relationship was positive.  
Thus it is possible to answer the question of why Rome waited so long to destroy 
Carthage: Carthage was an ally. The relationship between Carthage and Rome during this 
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time bore no trace of serious problems. Carthage had obeyed the terms of the treaty and, 
for the most part, had done its best to tamp down any issues that might upset Rome. A 
properly justified and motivating reason to destroy Carthage did not yet exist. In the 
absence of such a reason, Rome’s general response in such situations was to seek to 
maintain order rather than to aggressively expand its power. It took the reawakened fear 
of Carthage as a launching point for some greater power (Antiochus, Perseus, and the 
like) to bring on the gradual degradation of relations which brought about the Third Punic 
War and Carthage’s ultimate destruction.   
 
 
 Just War 
 
Despite an identifiable motive, the utter violence with which Carthage was razed 
is still shocking. Equally shocking was the devastation faced by another strategically 
valuable and historic city, Corinth, later in the same year. Two years after the total defeat 
of Macedon in 148, and its conversion into a Roman province, the Achaean League 
declared war on Rome.303 After the Roman army had defeated the Achaeans in their first 
battle, the consul L. Mummius moved on to Corinth. His legions broke the Achaean line, 
entered, and utterly destroyed the city while seizing any valuable property.  
Just as the example of Rome’s dealings with Greece after the end of the Second 
Macedonian War provided insight into the actions of Rome in North Africa around the 
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same time, a comparison between the treatment of Corinth and that of Carthage may be 
instructive. Both constituted a sharp departure from previous policy. In the East Rome 
had long advocated, at least nominally, Greek freedom and leniency towards those who 
had been allied with Philip or Antiochus. Similarly, in North Africa, as has been shown, 
Rome pursued a policy of treating both Numidia and Carthage as valuable allies and 
refraining from interfering in their internal politics. Yet, in 146, the principles that had 
earlier guided Roman behavior towards Carthage and Greece were abandoned. War, 
which would usually be concluded by a deditio, treaty, and the return of surrendered 
territory by Rome, took an entirely different path. Instead, these conflicts end not with a 
peaceable surrender, or even with a city captured by force of arms and some property 
taken as booty. Instead Rome takes the drastic action of demolishing these cities so 
completely that neither is re-established again for decades. Unfortunately, the 
fragmentary nature of Polybius’ Histories for this period, and the loss of Livy’s full text 
covering the period after 167 means that a consistent account of the reasons for this 
radical change in Roman behavior are difficult to find.  
Still, the situation of Rome seems to have been much more difficult at this time 
than during the previous conflicts. The emergence of the Macedonian pretender 
Andriscus, and his destabilization of Greece, may have indicated to the Romans that their 
previous strategy of leaving Macedonia intact, and advocating for Greek autonomy, may 
not have been wise. The Achean League’s declaration of war would only have confirmed 
this perception. Around the same time, Viriathus emerged as a leader of the Lusitanian 
rebellion in Spain, and became a serious problem for Rome there. In North Africa, 
Massinissa’s continued determination to expand his territory and power at Carthage’s 
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expense may have begun to seem threatening to Roman interests, since Carthage was 
powerless, under the terms of the 201 treaty, to provide any real counterweight there. In 
general, Rome found itself seriously involved in more places outside of Italy than ever 
before and under pressure on all sides of the Mediterranean. Together, these new 
pressures could have forced a reconsideration of the traditional Roman default towards 
clemency.  
Another insight may be contributed by Cicero, who commented on the destruction 
of both Corinth and Carthage. In his second speech De Lege Agraria of 63, Cicero 
summarized the motives behind this destruction while speaking against a proposal to 
colonize Capua. Capua, he says, was one of only three cities, the others being Carthage 
and Corinth, which our ancestors could not allow to exist, because these three alone were 
able to aspire to the power and name of an empire. 
 
deleta Carthago est, quod cum hominum copiis, tum ipsa natura ac 
loco, succincta portibus, armata muris, excurrere ex Africa, imminere 
duabus fructuosissimis insulis populi Romani videbatur. Corinthi 
vestigium vix relictum est. erat enim posita in angustiis atque in 
faucibus Graeciae sic ut terra claustra locorum teneret et duo maria 
maxime navigationi diversa paene coniungeret, cum pertenui 
discrimine separentur. 
 
Carthage was destroyed because, with both its large population, and 
also the nature of its location, surrounded by harbors, defended by 
walls, it seemed to jut out from Africa and to endanger the two most 
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fruitful islands of the Roman people.304 Of Corinth there is scarcely a 
trace left. For it was positioned on the straits and in the jaws of 
Greece so that by land it was the gateway to many places and nearly 
joined two different seas, both highly navigable, separated by only a 
slight distance.305 
 
Clearly, in Cicero’s estimation, the explanation for the harshness with which Carthage 
and Corinth were destroyed was not, at heart, the conduct of their respective states, but 
the strategic advantage which any other enemy might gain against Rome by possessing 
them. This seems a plausible claim, considering the signs in Livy that it was the prospect 
of Carthaginian collusion with Antiochus and Perseus that was most disturbing to the 
Roman Senate.  
 In the midst of these circumstances, the balance which generally tilted in favor of 
Rome’s compliance with its own foreign relations norms may have shifted. As Andrew 
Guzman writes in his article “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,” the 
calculation which puts reputation ahead of other advantages, and promotes signaling 
trustworthiness through compliance with rules, is more important when the stakes are 
low.306 The reputational cost of violating a norm must be higher (or at least perceived as 
higher) for the actor than the ostensible benefits of doing so. When a state is presented 
with a situation of great importance, it may choose not to comply with principle, even if 
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that decision brings a severe reputational cost. Therefore, in the case of Carthage, Rome 
may have been presented with a choice in which the available information portrayed a 
situation so dangerous that reputational damage was a no longer a meaningful 
consideration.  
 With this underlying motive in mind, it is still necessary to examine how the 
Romans contrived to act on their fear of Carthage. Polybius and Appian claim that the 
determination to destroy Carthage had been fixed in the minds of Roman senators as 
early as 157.307 This is reputedly the point at which Cato the Elder began to consistently 
call for Carthage’s destruction at the end of all of his speeches, while Scipio Nasica, 
defender of Africanus’ legacy, continued to oppose this plan.308  As rumors swirled, Cato 
urged that war be declared, while Scipio Nasica warned against doing anything rash.309  
What delayed the Romans in putting this same plan into action was the lack of 
opportunity and a justifiable pretext, according to Polybius.310 For, he says, the 
appearance of righteous justification enhances the value of a Roman victory while 
diminishing the risks brought by defeat. In fact, Polybius claims, Rome nearly abandoned 
the idea of war altogether out of fear of the impression it might create on other peoples.311 
The fact that a lack of legal justification might prevent a Roman attack on Carthage 
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indicates that the Romans were intensely aware of the possible collateral diplomatic 
damage of undertaking unjust war, and also attuned to the signaling effects of 
maintaining their principled appearance. In addition, there was clearly a strain of Roman 
thought, represented by Scipio Nasica, that exercising restraint in this case would keep 
Rome from abandoning its values.312  
 The beginnings of a campaign to discredit the Carthaginians may have been in 
154, when the Periochae of Livy record another set of Roman legates being sent to 
arbitrate between the Carthaginians and Massinissa and finding in Carthage a large 
supply of wood for making ships.313 Later in the same year the Carthaginians supposedly 
compelled a large army of Carthaginian-allied Numidians to range themselves against 
Massinissa. In response, more Roman envoys were sent to express their displeasure with 
this display and also with Carthage’s accumulation of naval materials. They proposed to 
make peace between Carthage and Massinissa, assuring the Carthaginians that Massinissa 
would be forced to evacuate the disputed land. These envoys were subsequently attacked 
by a radical segment of the Carthaginian people led by Hamilcar’s son Gesco.  Due to 
this attack, and although Carthaginian officials agreed to comply with Roman demands, 
the Roman Senate was left outraged by the violence done to their amabassadors in 
contravention of customary principles concerning their inviolable status.314 More rumors 
were forthcoming from Massinissa about Carthaginian war preparations; another Roman 
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embassy was sent in 150, and it returned with more ominous reports about Carthage’s 
military capabilities.315  Still, while Cato and his supporters argued for an immediate 
dispatch of Roman armies to Africa, Scipio Nasica continued to say that there was as yet 
no just cause for war. The Senate ultimately agreed, and the matter of Carthage was put 
off until the next year.316 
 Donald Baronowski claims that the allegations of shipbuilding and violence 
towards Roman ambassadors are likely inventions, either by contemporary sources 
seeking to give additional justification to the war, or by later writers.317 This is a credible 
claim, yet, in either case, it merely reinforces the need that the Romans felt to make their 
actions seem righteous, both to other peoples who were observing them in order to 
evaluate their behavior as a power and ally, and to the Romans themselves within their 
own system of values. After all, it can be presumed that one of the chief audiences for 
these narratives would be Romans themselves, who were strongly invested in their 
identity as uniquely virtuous actors abroad. However, the Romans ultimately did not need 
such inventions to be strictly justified in their actions towards Carthage at this time. That 
is because, as all our sources agree, continuing Roman dilatoriness about the problem of 
Massinissa finally pushed the Carthaginians to raise an army of their own to confront 
him. It is from that moment that their cause was lost, because it was then that they openly 
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contravened the terms of the treaty of 201. This violation gave the Romans all the legal 
justification that was needed to bring war to Carthage.  
 Rome immediately began to raise an army. Carthage perceived the danger in this 
move, although the Romans declared that the force was only meant to be used in an 
emergency.318 To raise an army before allowing the intended opponent to meet Rome’s 
demands was, after all, contrary to the fetial law, as has been shown in Chapter Two. The 
Carthaginians, already hard pressed by Massinissa, decided to head off war with Rome 
by condemning to death the generals Hasdrubal and Carthalo, who had led the effort 
against Massinissa, and blaming them for the entirety of the conflict.319 Carthage then 
sent ambassadors to Rome to disown the whole affair, and ask how it could atone for the 
broken treaty. The Senate answered “You must satisfy the Roman people.”320 At first the 
Carthaginians were puzzled and took no action, thereby failing to satisfy Rome’s 
enigmatic demand. Thus Rome formally declared a bellum iustum, bolstered by the fact 
that Carthage had both broken the treaty and refused its repetitio. The Carthaginians, now 
in a panic, took the only action they could, and probably the one which Rome had been 
demanding all along. They made an unconditional surrender of their city and themselves 
to the protection of Rome.321 
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 As has been shown in previous chapters, the normal course of affairs after a 
deditio in fidem is made was the creation a peace treaty and the eventual return of the 
conquered city and associated property to its people. The wanton devastation of city and 
property was unlawful and actively discouraged. Even when a city was captured without 
surrender, by force of arms, the city itself was allowed to remain intact, although certain 
valuables were seized. This was the just tradition on which Rome prided itself. However, 
while these traditional Roman values emphasized clemency, the technical legal 
ramifications of the deditio, once made, were that Rome was in complete control of 
Carthage, so its people, property, and existence were at Rome’s mercy. As Saumagne 
points out, by making the deditio, the Carthaginians had wiped away the previous dispute 
over the treaty and created a completely new legal situation.322 This situation meant that 
the terms of any peace would be wholly dictated by Rome, and acceptance by Carthage 
was pre-determined by the deditio. Any resistance to those terms would therefore be in 
breach of the deditio and provide a new casus belli.  
The Romans, already having Carthage’s destruction in mind, made the terms of 
peace as distasteful as possible. First, the Carthaginians were told that they would be 
allowed their freedom and their own laws, their territory and all other personal property. 
However, Rome demanded not only three hundred hostages, sons of their prominent 
families, but also that Carthage obey whatever other conditions were imposed by the 
consuls who had been charged with the war. No mention was made of the city itself.323 
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The hostages were accordingly sent to the consuls encamped at Lilybaeum, from where 
they were conveyed to Rome and kept prisoner in the dockyards.324 Then, the consuls 
landed in Africa and ordered  the Carthaginians to surrender all their weaponry, which 
amounted to more than two hundred thousand pieces of arms and two thousand 
catapults.325 Having reduced the Carthaginians to the utmost subjection, the consuls made 
their final demand: the Carthaginians were to evacuate the city and rebuild it on another 
site at least ten miles from the sea.326 Livy’s epitomist says that the outrageousness 
(indignitas) of this final demand is what drove the Carthaginians to war. 327 How could it 
not have? The Carthaginians, as much as the Romans, were invested in their own cultural 
identity, which placed them in that seafaring city, surrounded by harbors, jutting out into 
the Mediterranean. Without it, they would cease to share that collective identity and 
become some people entirely other to what they had been before. So, faced with a 
termination of their existence, they mounted a resistance, which was defeated three years 
later in 146. Polybius tells us that Scipio Aemilianus, who commanded at the siege of 
Carthage, wept when he saw the city in flames.328 Rome had achieved its practical 
objective, but this did not negate the inherent respect that a Roman general might feel for 
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a once strong and vibrant rival, or the distress that he might feel privately at Rome’s 
amoral callousness. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 From the account above it is obvious that Rome carefully orchestrated the 
downfall of Carthage in order both to comply with its own highly formalized and legal 
conception of right, and to signal correspondingly the righteousness of its cause to 
outside observers. Thanks to Polybius, it is possible to gauge the effectiveness of this 
strategy in the latter case. According to him, the Greeks were divided in opinion: some 
thought that Rome had followed a sensible course with a state that seemed determined to 
menace it at every opportunity, others felt that ambition for power had perverted Roman 
policy.329 Some said the Romans had pushed the Carthaginians into desperation by 
disguising their motives, and others that the Carthaginians should have known what 
making the deditio could mean. Polybius stands for this latter group when he makes the 
following argument: the Romans had not committed an impiety, for an impiety was a 
violation against the gods, whom they had not offended by their actions. Nor had the 
Romans committed treachery, since they had not made a breach of any oath or 
agreement. Finally, they had not broken with law, custom, or fides, since the deditio had 
entitled them to do as they saw fit.330  
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Still, there is a sense of unease with Roman conduct in this matter that permeates 
the literary sources. From Polybius’ claims that the Romans were actively seeking a 
pretext for war with Carthage, to the extreme and uncharacteristically cruel demands 
placed on the Carthaginians once they had surrendered, the conduct of the Third Punic 
War was a clear departure from traditional Roman values surrounding the proper 
treatment of a legitimate enemy. While technically within the terms of the deditio, 
Roman actions violated the norms of clemency which usually characterized the process – 
the same norms which the Senate had not hesitated to enforce in the past. The destruction 
of Carthage in 146 was a defining event for Rome on its path to a Mediterranean empire. 
It also marked a shift in the role of traditional Roman principles in war. The events of the 
Third Punic War show that, while the Romans may have remained concerned with 
formally remaining within the bounds of their own laws of war, they were willing to 
abandon the broader values which had long been associated with those laws in order to 
eliminate a calculated risk. War was no longer confined to immediate grievances and 
threats. It had become a tool of empire, and with this change Rome began to more fully 
take on a new identity, that of a supreme imperial power.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION: ROME’S GUARDIANSHIP OF THE WORLD IN RETROSPECT 
 
 “But when by toil and justice the republic had become renowned, with great 
kings vanquished in war, fierce tribes and mighty peoples subdued by force, and 
Carthage, the rival of Roman power, had been destroyed root and branch, and all seas and 
lands lay open, then Fortune began to grow savage and to overturn everything.”331 In this 
way the mid first century historian, Sallust, explains how Rome came to its current state 
of affairs, wracked by conspiracy and torn apart by elites’ lust for power, greed, and 
ambition. With the path now open to Rome’s domination of the Mediterranean, according 
to Sallust, the leisure and wealth this dominion afforded became a burden and 
affliction.332 The pursuit of wealth overturned fides and introduced arrogance, brutality, 
and neglect of the gods. Love of power brought active deceit, and led Romans not to 
value the inherent worth of their allies, but rather to exploit them.333 Sallust ends this 
passage with the following reflection: “[Our ancestors] took nothing from the conquered 
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but their power to do harm. But we now, the most cowardly of men, with the greatest 
wickedness, have deprived our allies of that which those brave and victorious men left, as 
if the only use of imperium were to do injustice.”334 
Velleius Paterculus, writing during the reign of Tiberius, presents a similar view. 
According to him, while Scipio Africanus opened the way to world power by defeating 
Carthage, Scipio Aemilianus had opened the way to depravity by destroying it. Freed 
from fear of Carthage, Romans plunged headlong into corruption. Indeed, the structure of 
Velleius’ text neatly reflects this trajectory. Book one starts at the founding of Rome and 
covers its gradual emergence as a major Mediterranean power, ending with the 
destruction of Carthage in the Third Punic War. His second book starts with the rise of 
the Gracchi and focuses on the internal civil discord which eventually led to the Civil 
Wars that ended the Republic. The general narrative of decline from the heights of 
Roman achievement by men like Scipio Africanus to the violence and tumult present 
throughout the last century of the Republic is standard among writers from the Late 
Republic through the reign of Tiberius.335  
In fact, much of the historical record of the Early and Middle Roman Republic 
comes from those for whom the Civil Wars that ended the Republic were within living 
memory. Those writers formed by the dissolution of the Republic must have felt a special 
concern to record what they saw as the golden days of the Roman state. Throughout this 
dissertation the preoccupations and predilections of Roman writers of this period have 
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been ever-present. Even when the material of their histories can be considered to be 
generally accurate, their particular biases shape their narrative. Often, the shape of their 
construction of the Roman past is obvious. In De Officiis, Cicero gives the following 
exalted praise of the justice and virtue of the state in earlier days: 
 
Verum tamen, quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, 
non iniuriis, bella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus 
erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum, nationum 
portus erat et refugium senatus, nostri autem magistratus 
imperatoresque ex hac una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si 
provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent; itaque illud 
patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari. 
 
In truth, so long as the rule of the Roman people was maintained by 
acts of service, rather than injustices, wars were waged for our allies or 
to defend the empire, and their conclusions were marked by clemency 
or only requisite punishments. The Senate was a harbor and place of 
refuge for kings, peoples, and nations, and our magistrates and generals 
strove to gain the greatest fame by faithfully and justly defending our 
provinces and allies. Thus our rule could be more truly called a 
guardianship of the world than an empire.336 
 
This exaggerated picture of Roman virtue is given in the lead-up to Cicero’s 
account of its failure. While Sallust and Velleius Paterculus attribute Rome’s moral 
decline to the destruction of Carthage, Cicero points to the domination of Sulla as the 
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origin of the dissolution of traditional Roman values. “For any wrong against the allies 
had ceased to seem unjust,” he says, “when such cruelty could be exhibited towards 
Roman citizens.”337 In this he references the brutal proscriptions of the Roman elite 
which Sulla initiated.  
Despite disagreements over the initial cause, a common thread runs through these 
narratives of moral degradation. Sallust, Velleius Paterculus, and Cicero all point to 
Rome’s style of empire as the true indicator of the loss of moral rectitude. Sallust is 
explicit that Roman allies were treated with cruelty and disregard. Velleius complains 
that discipline in war was abandoned.338 Cicero bemoans the oppression and ruination of 
so many foreign states by over-ambitious Roman generals.339 Each sees evidence for the 
decline of Rome in the abandonment of good faith and principle in the treatment of 
foreign peoples. Each also draws a clear narrative, wherein the violation and 
abandonment of principle, like iustum bellum and ius belli, do not lead to the loss of an 
empire, which, on the contrary, continues to expand. Instead, they meant the breakdown 
of Roman institutions and the loss of a culturally unique Roman political life. For Cicero, 
the tolerance of over-ambitious and brutal generals after Sulla led to the toleration of one 
supremely ambitious and ruthless man, Caesar. For this reason he says, “only the walls of 
Rome’s houses stand and remain . . . the Republic is completely lost.”340 
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As Virgil writes in the Aeneid, Romans were not known for their art, rhetoric, or 
science. Instead their unique skill was to rule the world with justice, as only they could.341 
While the unflattering evaluation of contemporary Roman moral decline by authors who 
wrote through the reign of Tiberius extends to many different aspects of Roman culture, 
the Roman conduct of empire is perhaps one of the most poignant. For Roman writers of 
this period, the just conduct of empire is the defining characteristic of Romans, and the 
loss of the commitment to rule justly means the loss of their identity as a people.  
 
 
Exemplary History 
 
From Rome’s first days, war and expansion had been among the chief drivers of 
its success as a state. However, while the earliest conflicts with Italian enemies remained 
an important part of Roman collective memory, the period that is most frequently cited 
and idealized with reference to displays of virtue is that extending from the mid-third to 
mid-second century. This is the time when Rome was emerging as Mediterranean power 
rather than merely an Italian one, and the flurry of conflicts and new relationships with 
numerous foreign peoples provided constant opportunities for the display of Rome’s style 
of foreign relations. While, as has been shown, the conduct of Roman generals was not 
always ideal, Roman writers continually drew from this period to provide exempla of 
virtuous behavior in war.  
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Livy’s history, which forms the basis for most of this dissertation, was explicitly 
designed as a catalogue of exempla, modeling the virtues and vices of the Roman past 
through narrative, so that the audience may more easily choose which to imitate and 
which to avoid. Each figure or story stands as a marker on a moral compass which the 
reader can use to guide, contextualize, and judge their own and their contemporaries’ 
behavior. The past becomes a reference for the possible range of practices and values, 
good and bad. Of course, as Matthew Roller points out, to work as a discourse this 
assumes a perfect continuity of societal ethos between the past and present.342 In some 
ways, the continued and intensive use of exemplarity by Roman writers of the Late 
Republic would seem to insist on this continuity and at the same time regenerate it. Each 
writer made use of exempla in a way which suited their purpose. Livy ostensibly merely 
catalogues the relevant events and actors in chronological order, while making use of 
narratological devices to guide his audience to his desired interpretation. Cicero, on the 
other hand, makes use of the examples of great men to explicitly persuade his audience to 
accept a particular conclusion. In either case, the result intended is that the audience be 
driven to emulate figures presented as embodying the values which ensured Roman moral 
continuity and success. This emulation is seen as necessary to the continued existence of 
the empire, since it was through the virtuous actions of Roman heroes of the past that the 
empire was gained.  
Scipio Africanus is the most prominent subject of frequent exemplification. The 
hero of Zama, conqueror of Spain, whose mind was constantly trained on matters of 
                                                          
342 Roller 2009: 215 
 
 
 
150 
 
public service,343 appears to be an understandable model of proper conduct in war and 
foreign relations. However, when it comes to matters relating directly to iustum bellum 
and ius belli, Africanus is cited most frequently with reference to extortion and the 
seizure of property. Livy’s epitomator records that, unlike other generals, he did not 
conceal the gifts given to him by kings, but rather entered the intended bribes of 
Antiochus into the public accounts and kept them as rewards for exceptional soldiers.344 
Africanus is also repeatedly referenced by Cicero in his speeches against Verres, where 
he proves a useful tool to denounce Verres’ rapacious extortion. Africanus apparently 
adorned the cities of Sicily with monuments taken from Carthage, rather than coveting 
them himself, the same monuments which Verres later appropriated.345 He is also often 
listed for effect among others who were virtuous in their austerity: Paulus did not touch 
the wealth of Macedon, Africanus was none the richer for Carthage, and L. Mummius 
preferred to adorn Italy with the spoils of Corinth rather than his own house.346  
In this way it is clear that particular figures are often strongly associated with 
particular principles. M. Atilius Regulus, as has been shown in Chapter Two, becomes 
synonymous with the concept of fides, even to an enemy, because of his return under oath 
to Carthaginian custody.347 C. Fabricius, the incorruptible general of the third century, 
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demonstrates the traditional Roman abhorrence of treachery in war, by delivering back to 
Pyrrhus the deserter who had offered to poison him.348 Cato the Elder, revered generally 
for his austerity and strict morality, is used in Cicero’s De Officiis to demonstrate the 
importance of being a licit combatant in war, when he writes to his discharged son to 
warn him not to go into battle.349 
Exempla could also be cautionary. The cases of Q. Pompeius and C. Hostilius 
Mancinus contrast what may be considered the conduct of a dishonorable man with that 
of an unlucky one. Both men were consuls assigned to Spain, Pompeius in 141 and 
Mancinus in 137, and both faced the Numantines, whom Rome had long been unable to 
subdue. Pompeius proved no match for them, and, after a series of disasters, found 
himself stuck in his camp with only raw recruits for soldiers, constantly harassed by the 
Numantines. Without the knowledge of the Senate, he made secret overtures to 
Numantia, and allowed it to publicly offer an unconditional surrender, while covertly 
agreeing to terms. Once his successor in office arrived, Pompeius denied ever having 
made such an agreement, but was contradicted by witnesses.350 Pompeius was sent back 
to Rome, and the controversy continued. The Senate invalidated the treaty he had made, 
and a proposal was made to surrender him to the Numantines as the guarantor, following 
the example of Postumius and the Caudine Forks peace. However, Pompeius had friends 
in the Senate. His plea for mercy was accepted, and he was saved.351  
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Cicero states that Mancinus’ behavior in the same situation was more honorable. 
As consul for 137, his assignment to Spain was beset by bad omens: the sacred chickens 
had escaped from their coop while he was sacrificing before his departure.352 
Accordingly, he was defeated by the Numantines and forced to make peace with a 
personal oath to save his soldiers. On his return to Rome the Senate, as expected, refused 
to accept the treaty. However, when a bill was proposed for his surrender to Numantia, 
unlike Pompeius, he advocated for it, and it passed. The consul for the following year, L. 
Furius, attempted to turn him over to the Numantines, but he was rejected by them. 
Plutarch remembers Mancinus as not a bad man, but the most unlucky of Roman 
generals.353 
The cases of Pompeius and Mancinus, like that of Regulus, are taken by Cicero to 
demonstrate the importance of keeping an oath to the enemy, even if that obedience to 
fides means your own death. Death is perhaps the ultimate sacrifice to virtue. T. Manlius 
Torquatus, descendant of the three time Roman dictator, knew this well. In 140 his 
natural son, D. Iunius Silanus, was accused before the Senate by the Macedonians of 
taking bribes and seizing property while assigned to that province as praetor. This case 
most likely would have been referred to the quaestio de repetundis, but the Senate 
deferred to Torquatus’ request to investigate it on his own, due to his outstanding 
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reputation.354 Torquatus then conducted a trial in his own home, listening to testimony for 
three days before pronouncing his verdict: “Since it has been proven in my estimation 
that my son Silanus took bribes from our allies, I judge him unworthy of the Republic 
and my house, and I order him out of my sight immediately.”355 Silanus hanged himself 
the next night, and Torquatus declined to attend the funeral.  
Valerius Maximus, whose work, Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, has its purpose in 
neatly categorizing the exempla of the Roman past “so that those who wish to take 
examples may be freed from the labor of a long search,” categorizes this episode with the 
group “On the Severity of Fathers towards their Children.”356 However, Torquatus’ 
severity was meant not only to satisfy his own moral standards, but was also enacted in 
the interests of the state.357 Similarly, Cicero cites the same event in De Finibus to 
demonstrate how good men disregard their own desires and pains in the interests of Rome 
(pro patria).358 Torquatus in particular was well-suited to take on such a role. His 
ancestor of the same name was famous for having handed over his own son for execution 
when he violated orders by engaging the enemy without permission. Sallust even shows 
Cato the Younger citing this incident when arguing for the execution of the Catilinarian 
conspirators, arguing that if Torquatus could sacrifice his own son for the sake of the 
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Republic, even if the latter had only acted out of excessive courage, then why should the 
senators hesitate to act in the case of treason?359 
Even when no particular case is cited, the “ancestors” (maiores) are a common 
trope by which authors seek to impress the importance of particular virtues and behaviors 
on their audience. In the companion speech of Caesar given by Sallust in the same 
monograph, Caesar cites instances in which the maiores acted against impulse to choose 
the correct and lawful path. Notably, the two examples he gives are both instances of 
clemency towards foreign peoples. During the Third Macedonian War, Rhodes, a former 
Roman ally, had supported Perseus. Despite this betrayal, when the war ended in 168, the 
maiores had declined to punish Rhodes, so that no one could say that they were greedy 
for its wealth. Similarly, Caesar cites the case of Carthage after the Second Punic War, 
which, he says, was guilty of many crimes. Still, the maiores never took occasion to 
retaliate: they considered what behavior was worthy of themselves, rather than what they 
were able to justly do to their enemies.360 It was this restraint with regard to foreign 
peoples that was to be admired and emulated. After all, it was by this means that the 
empire itself was gained. As Cicero states in his speech Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino, 
Rome’s ancestors did not graspingly desire the lands of other peoples, and by this upright 
behavior they enlarged and exalted the Republic, empire, and the name of the Roman 
people. Through their virtue a small and weak state became great and prosperous.361 
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While it can be seen that exemplary individuals – especially war heroes – are 
often cited to provide exempla of particular virtues or principles, it is the Roman maiores 
more generally who are made to lend their gravitas to a wide range of righteous 
behaviors. As Joanna Kenty puts it, the mos maiorum is a powerful idea because it 
includes both the actual institutions which made up the Roman state, and the broader 
value system which supports it.362 In essence, they encompass both particular lawful 
behaviors, like the transfer of seized enemy property to the state, and the general virtues 
of restraint and clemency which allowed Rhodes and Carthage to survive defeat by Rome 
intact in these instances. In fact, some scholars have attributed the longevity of the 
Republic to the Romans’ ability to create a stable political culture by envisioning a strict 
continuity between current actions and the values of the past.363 In the Roman 
conception, the ethics and behaviors of the maiores should ideally dictate the behavior of 
contemporary Romans.  
What these texts provide to their contemporary readers is the opportunity to 
become exempla themselves by enacting the values which had made Rome great. 
Furthermore, it is no coincidence that so many of these examples are of the justice, 
restraint, clemency, and principle which Roman ancestors showed towards foreign 
peoples. While, according to Cicero, it is a virtue to cultivate your own lands,364 the 
success of this virtue becomes apparent in Roman behavior when Rome conquers others. 
It is clear to him and to others cited above, that Rome was ideally suited to rule the world 
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because of this unique dedication to institutions, laws, and a broader ethics of foreign 
relations. The current state of Rome, which these writers deplore, had developed because 
Romans had lost their focus on these values, and thus were no longer able to check the 
depravity of their generals. Those empowered to oppress and subjugate foreign people do 
not hesitate to do the same to their fellow citizens. The insistent citation of particular 
exempla and the mos maiorum during this period is meant to bring Rome back into line 
with the virtues that made it great. The greatest, decidedly, are the virtues of clemency 
and restraint at home and abroad.  
 
 
The Legacy of the Lex Calpurnia de Repetundis 
 
According to Michael Alexander’s comprehensive catalog of Roman trials, there 
are sixty-two attested cases of extortion of provincials prosecuted between 149 and 50 
B.C.E.365 The permanent quaestio established by the Lex Calpurnia clearly saw regular 
and even frequent use over these years. This is significant because the extortion court 
represents an important aspect of the legacy of Roman foreign relations law. Its 
persistence and activity from 149 on show that the Romans were still very much engaged 
in the suppression and punishment of those who violated certain foreign relations norms. 
Furthermore, the nature of the court itself and the law against repetundae demonstrated a 
broad-based concern for the victims of such abuses. Similarly, the rhetoric used by 
                                                          
365 Alexander 1990 
 
 
 
157 
 
Cicero in the prosecution of C. Verres for extortion displays the respect with which 
Romans regarded the standards established by their ancestors regarding the treatment of 
foreign peoples, and their desire for Rome to continue to be seen as a state that was 
uniquely just and generous, especially towards its allies. For these reasons the continued 
existence and use of the quaestio de repetundis is an essential element in understanding 
the tenacity of these Roman cultural values, and their continued salience in a state that 
had been strongly impacted by its widening imperial power.  
 The original intention of the Lex Calpurnia which instituted the extortion court 
(quaestio de repetundis) is disputed. Chapter Three presented the court as a natural part of 
the process of formalization that took place with regard to the enforcement of legal 
principles surrounding the proper treatment of foreign peoples. Others, like Erich Gruen, 
have argued that it represented an effort by the Senate to retake control of cases that 
otherwise might have been tried before the plebeian assembly.366 John Richardson has 
even contended, based on the seeming mismatch between the precipitating incident of 
Galba’s crimes and the law that was subsequently passed, that the Lex Calpurnia was 
intended to protect the interests of Roman citizens rather than foreign peoples and 
provincials.367 Whatever the primary reason for the law may have been, Cicero regards 
the original purpose of the Lex Calpurnia and the quaestio which it established as having 
been the protection of allies and those friendly to the Roman people. Citizens, after all, 
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have access to civil actions and the private law, “This,” says Cicero, “is a law of allies – a 
right of foreign nations.”368 
Modern scholars’ focus on the political use of the quaestio is understandable. In 
some of the earliest known cases a strong element of political rivalry is recorded by our 
sources. In 138 two different cases were brought before the quaestio. In one, Q. 
Pompeius, C. Hostilus Mancinus’ equally hapless but luckier predecessor in Numantia, 
was prosecuted for extortion by Q. and L. Metellus and Cn. and Q. Caepio. The 
prosecutors failed to secure a conviction. Both Cicero and Valerius Maximus say that this 
was not because the charges were false. Rather, because the Metelli and Caepiones came 
from noble families and had brilliant reputations, the jury members did not wish to seem 
to be succumbing to the influence of their status or to be acting in the service of some 
private grudge.369 Similarly, in the second case, when L. Aurelius Cotta was prosecuted 
before the quaestio by Scipio Aemilianus, he was acquitted because the senators in the 
jury thought that it was unfair for a defendant to be defeated by the overwhelming power 
of his accuser.370  
Even so, convictions for misconduct towards foreign peoples were not impossible 
to obtain under other circumstances. With the support of Scipio Aemilianus, the tribune 
L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla passed a law in 137 which instituted a secret ballot for trials 
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before the people, except in cases of treason.371 Gruen assumes that this law was 
proposed in order to benefit Aemilianus’ political allies because of earlier failures to 
secure their desired verdict before the extortion court.372 In any event, in the same year 
the consul M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina had been assigned to Spain. However, he was 
ordered to wait before taking any action there because of the uncertain outcome of the 
peace made by Mancinus with the Numantines. Appian tells us that he grew dissatisfied 
with his idleness and for this reason falsely accused the Vaccaei, another Celtiberian 
tribe, of having broken their treaty with Rome by aiding the Numantines during the 
recent war. He then attacked and laid siege to their main city, Pallantia, and plundered 
their countryside.373 Messengers who came to Aemilius from Rome with orders from the 
Senate not to further antagonize the Vaccaei were ignored. However, the siege of 
Pallantia went badly, and Aemilius was forced to withdraw his troops. He was then 
recalled to Rome, tried before the people, and fined.374 The success of this case shows 
that the principle of iustum bellum still had a strong influence on Roman behavior. 
Accordingly, in his Gallic War, Caesar is careful to frame many of his conflicts with 
Gallic tribes in terms of the protection of Roman allies and the immediate danger posed 
by some of these tribes to Roman Italy.375  
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This period was one of transition for Rome, from a primarily military power to 
one that also controlled an increasing number of extra-Italian provinces, and had 
obligations to the residents of those provinces. It is no surprise, then, that the quaestio de 
repetundis  came to eventually overshadow any other judicial proceedings with respect to 
the claims of foreign peoples. Gaius Gracchus attempted to use the court as a political 
weapon against senators, many of whom had opposed him and some of whom had 
murdered his brother. He did this by changing the composition of the jury rolls for the 
court. According to his law, passed around 123 and often called the Lex Acilia,376 it 
would now be made up of members of the equestrian class rather than senators. However, 
as Adrian Sherwin-White convincingly argues, Gaius’ agenda was much broader than a 
simply bribing the equites or curtailing the power of the Senate. His measure is also 
specifically targeted at checking the corruption of Roman power, wherever it might 
encroach upon the life of non-Roman peoples.  
Following Crawford’s reconstruction of the Tabula Bembina, on which the law is 
inscribed, the inscription lists the beneficiaries of the law (and potential plaintiffs) as 
Italian allies and Latins, citizens of nations outside of Italy, and all of those who are 
negotiating while under the power of the Romans or protected by the friendship of the 
Roman people.377 Almost all peoples who had any form of interaction with the Roman 
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state would be covered by the law, regardless of status. Any case involving property or 
money that has been seized or given as a bribe is open to prosecution, and the law also 
names the magistrates liable for such offenses, from consuls down to military tribunes. 
This was a broad statute, meant to address corruption of all kinds and at multiple levels of 
Roman administration. It was not a narrow political measure meant solely to target 
senatorial power, or even one which would only benefit certain classes of foreign 
peoples. Provincials who had suffered extortion by a governor, non-allied foreign people 
who had had their property seized by an overzealous praetor, and kings who had been 
enticed to give a bribe, were all entitled to bring claims under. While the law only deals 
with matters of material property, it is important to remember that the proper disposition 
of property was a major feature of the ius belli, and those who honored its principles, like 
Scipio Africanus, were highly praised and remembered for their restraint. Also, as has 
been shown above in the case of M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina, there were other legal 
avenues for claims of abuse against provincials and foreign states or peoples. Extortion 
and financial corruption were Gaius’ focus in formulating this law, perhaps because they 
were emerging as more frequent problems at this time.  
From this point on, the number of documented trials for repetundae continues to 
increase, and the court becomes a regular feature of Roman political life. Thanks to 
Cicero, we have a clear idea of the kind of rhetoric that was used, as well as of the values 
and ideals that were commonly appealed to in order to influence a jury. In 70, in one of 
his earliest and best-known series of speeches, Cicero argued for the conviction of Gaius 
Verres, the former governor of Sicily, on charges of extensive corruption and extortion 
committed during his tenure there. Sicily was particularly significant by Cicero’s 
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account, first for personal reasons, since he had been a quaestor there in 75. Secondly, as 
Cicero put it, Sicily was the first place to become a Roman province, and “the first which 
taught our ancestors what a glorious thing it was to rule over foreign peoples.”378 The 
court itself was constituted by the Roman maiores in service of such allies, he claims; the 
many laws de repetundis, the procedure, the speeches of the advocates, all were for the 
allies’ benefit, and the senators, now returned by Sulla to their place in the jury rolls, 
were there in the court to listen seriously to the grievances of those allies.379  This was 
only right, as Rome was the benefactor of Sicily, and thus charged with the protection of 
its people and property.380 
Verres’ offenses are framed by Cicero as a distinct and major departure from 
traditional Roman practice, both towards provinces in general and Sicily in particular. 
According to Cicero, even before Roman rule, most of Sicily was already allied with 
Rome, and the few cities that were taken by force in war had their property returned by 
Rome. All were free to maintain their own autonomy.381 Such was Rome’s favor towards 
Sicily that Scipio Africanus adorned it with the spoils of Carthage. Even M. Claudius 
Marcellus is made out to be a champion of the Sicilians. Despite what is known about the 
complaints concerning his plunder of Syracuse, according to Cicero’s narrative he left 
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379 Cic. Verr. 2.2.15; 1.1.42; Vasaly 2009: 114 argues that these appeals are meant to warn senators that 
their actions may have an impact on whether or not senators maintain a monopoly on the juries of the 
standing courts.  
 
380 Cic. Verr. 2.2.8 
 
381 Cic. Verr. 2.3.12-13 
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that city unharmed and its riches intact after the siege was broken in 212.382 Cicero 
compares his own actions with those of other virtuous predecessors, perhaps most 
notably Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 96) who prosecuted M. Iunius Silanus in 109 
for an illegal war waged against the Cimbri and his injury of Domitius’ hospes 
Aegritomarus.383  
In general, Cicero’s speech leans heavily on the idea of the inherently just 
imperial rule of the Roman ancestors, even those “maiores” were no more than a 
generation removed from the actors in this case. In addition, provincial governance is 
represented as merely a continuation of the same policies and principles that applied to 
allies and conquered people previously. This is why Scipio Africanus and M. Claudius 
Marcellus, who never governed a province in the way that Verres was intended to, can be 
held up as examples for ethical behavior by Cicero. In the same way he can equate 
himself to the prosecutor of a case of unjust war. Although the quaestio de repetundis had 
been confined to matters of material extortion and corruption by Gaius Gracchus’ Lex 
Acilia, it was still viewed by Romans as reinforcing other, broader principles of just 
foreign relations. Also necessary, as Cicero’s narrative of Sicily’s incorporation into the 
empire shows, was for his contemporaries to act in continuity with the past. One of the 
chief criticisms which Cicero levels at Verres is that he not only extorted wealth from the 
Sicilians, but also did so by overturning traditional ways of transacting business and law. 
He altered the collection of Sicily’s grain tithe to his advantage, rather than following the 
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laws that went back to Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, regarding its sale, and meddled with 
inheritance laws to favor his friends.384  
In this way it is possible to view the extortion court, at least as used conceptually 
by the Romans, as an institution meant to maintain continuity with the best of Rome’s 
past. The language of “our ancestors” continued to permeate discourse around war and 
provincial governance. Nor did the principles of the past only make their appearance in 
rhetoric. The extortion court was also intended to put those principles into practice 
through a stable institution that would exist for the protection of the rights of Rome’s 
allies as well as of the foreign peoples who came into contact with Rome more generally. 
While many scholars have argued correctly that the court became a forum for Roman 
politicians to target their rivals, it also remained a space where those who had been 
abused and extorted could air their grievances and seek recompense. The language of 
Cicero shows us that this latter purpose had not become an afterthought in the Late 
Republic, but was still considered to be, at heart, the court’s primary function. From this 
it is possible to understand that the values which had originated with the fetials, and 
which were enforced by the Senate, were still practiced even after the shocking departure 
from principle which was the Third Punic War. 
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The Discourse of Imperial Rule 
 
The discourse concerning the proper treatment of foreign peoples and provincials 
was not only present in speeches before the extortion court. As Roman provincial 
territory increased, a language of principled governance and imperial power emerged 
which drew on the values that were a demonstrated part of Rome’s past. From 61 to 59, 
Quintus Cicero, the younger brother of M. Cicero, was the propraetor charged with 
governing the province of Asia. Sometime at the end of 60 or the beginning of 59, M. 
Cicero sent his brother a letter outlining his advice on the proper conduct of a provincial 
governor. Unlike in war, Cicero writes, Fortune plays almost no part in the success of a 
governor. Instead Quintus’ virtue and temperance will ensure that he fulfills his 
obligations to the Republic in this matter.385 Despite providing this guidance, M. Cicero 
insists that he is not writing to Quintus to tell him how to act, but rather to praise his 
conduct of the past two years:  
 
praeclarum est enim summo cum imperio fuisse in Asia biennium sic 
ut nullum te signum, nulla pictura, nullum vas, nulla vestis, nullum 
mancipium, nulla forma cuiusquam, nulla condicio pecuniae, quibus 
rebus abundat ista provincia, ab summa integritate continentiaque 
deduxerit. 
 
For it is wonderful to have spent two years in Asia with the highest 
imperium without any of those things with which that province 
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abounds having led you away from the strictest integrity and self-
control – not statue, nor painting, nor cup, nor piece of clothing, nor 
slave, neither the beauty of anyone, nor business arrangement.386 
 
 
The letter is full of language like this, praising self-control and moderation, care 
for the lives and property of the people of the province, and caution about the motives of 
others who might attach themselves to a provincial governor. Miriam Griffin points out 
that the letter also admonishes Quintus for his quick temper and susceptibility to the wiles 
of his subordinates.387  
This letter presents the other side of the narratives of Roman moral decline which 
began this chapter. Heavy emphasis is laid upon the avoidance of extortion and improper 
seizures of provincial property, warnings which tie into descriptions of the deterioration 
of Roman ethics supposedly brought on by access to the luxury of the East, and the 
continued activity of the extortion court.  While M. Cicero is consistent in warning his 
brother that his own entourage of Roman officials might not have the same pure motives 
as himself with regard to governance, he still presents ethical conduct as an achievable 
goal for a Roman provincial governor during the Late Republic.  
In addition to private letters and court oratory, Cicero again drew upon these 
themes in speeches before the people, notably in his Pro Lege Manilia, advocating the 
appointment of Pompey as commander against Mithridates.388  He points to Pompey as 
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the exceptional Roman who could both conquer the enemy and refrain from plundering 
them.389 Cicero evidently believed that the Roman people could be moved to support 
Pompey’s command by the argument that he would be the best general in terms of the 
fair treatment of Rome’s allies and conquered peoples, just as much as they might be 
persuaded by visions of imperial glory or desire for the safety of the Roman state. As 
Alexander Yakobson puts it, “The demand that the allies be treated fairly is able to stand, 
rhetorically, on its own feet; it does not necessarily have to be justified by appeals to 
Rome’s (enlightened) self-interest.”390 
Of course, the praise which Cicero heaps upon his brother and Pompey implies a 
corresponding criticism of other Roman commanders who have fallen from the standards 
set by the ancestors. As Griffin observes Roman sources are full of disapproval for the 
actions of Roman generals and governors. Caesar puts this disapproval in the mouths of 
Gallic leaders, who characterize Roman rule as equivalent to slavery.391 Similarly, Sallust 
has the Numidian king Adherbal denounce Roman friendship as fickle and meaningless 
in the face of his brother Jugurtha’s bribery.392 Even so, these laments about Roman 
disregard for principle and corruption are only comprehensible in a world where the 
Romans were still very much preoccupied with the problem of ethically ruling their 
empire. That is the common thread which unites the various elements presented by this 
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chapter: narratives of moral decline, the use of exempla from the past, cases before the 
quaestio de repetundis, and the discourse on proper provincial governance. Each of these 
indicates the importance that principled rule of the empire had in the Roman collective 
consciousness. Ethical conduct in service of the empire ensured continuity with a revered 
Roman past and with the cultural values that defined what it meant to be Roman. 
Deviation from the norms of provincial governance severed that connection and led to 
disunity and the decay of the Roman state.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many Roman authors mourned the downfall of Carthage as the end of an era. A 
golden age of virtuous generals and morally grounded foreign relations was seen to have 
ended. The emergence of greed, cruelty, and self-serving rule was understood to have 
replaced it. However, while the balance of power in the Mediterranean had certainly 
shifted with the elimination of the Carthaginian threat and the simultaneous subjection of 
Greece, the ideals and principles which had guided earlier times were far from wholly 
abandoned. Rather they lived on, not only in the memories and writings of those who still 
revered the old Roman heroes and the virtues of the ancestors, but also through the 
extortion court and the emerging norms of provincial government.  
Throughout this dissertation it has been shown that the Romans maintained strong 
traditional values concerning just relations with foreign peoples. These values developed 
over time, and played an important role during the period when Rome began to vastly 
 
 
169 
 
expand its power and influence outside of Italy. Not only did these values impact those 
generals who violated them and those peoples who suffered in consequence. They also 
played a part in shaping Rome’s entire foreign policy. Wars could not be embarked upon 
without proper justification, and so they might be delayed until such time as a valid injury 
arose. Surrenders had to be honored, and the expectations of clemency and generosity 
upheld. All of the values that had sprung from the fetiales and the ius belli contributed to 
the shape of Roman rule as much as the abundance of Italian conscripts and Italy’s 
natural resources had. 
Moreover, Roman cultural values were the basis of the image which Rome 
wished to project to the outside world. Loyal Greek allies were important to Roman 
foreign objectives, so Rome honored their requests and complaints and devoted resources 
to settling their disputes with Philip V. To gain control over Liguria was deemed 
necessary to Roman security, so the cruelties of Popillius towards the Statellates could 
not be tolerated. More than any individual act, the public insistence by the Romans on 
compliance with a certain set of foreign relations principles, and the equally public 
punishments and compensations which they handed out, were an integral part of 
managing Rome’s imperial expansion. After all, such expansion would be impossible 
without the goodwill of allies as well as the belief, at least by some peoples, that Roman 
hegemony would be ultimately beneficial, or at least not overly harmful, to their interests. 
This same attitude seems to have been prevalent among the Romans themselves. Their 
ancestors had followed the strictures of Roman religion and mores in war and peace, and 
this conduct had led them to success. Therefore, to ensure their own success, and to honor 
the values which constituted the identity of Rome, the Romans must continue to act upon 
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the same values. This continuity of outlook gave legitimacy to any ventures they might 
undertake, and also created social cohesion through the repetition and reification of 
traditional practices.  
The marked impact that these traditional practices and values had on foreign 
relations during the Roman Republic opens up new perspectives on the ongoing debate 
about the motives and strategy behind Roman imperialism. Established views that 
emphasize a reactive Rome driven by fear of injury, or by greed, or by ruthless self-
interest, cannot be sustained intact. Instead they must be tempered by the knowledge that 
the Romans not only acted out of immediate considerations and interests, but were also 
guided by cultural discourses about what it meant to be Roman, and therefore what it 
meant to be just and clement towards one’s enemies and friends. The modern debate 
centering around Roman imperial strategy began in part because Romans’ motivations 
are difficult to detect, and their approach to imperial expansion is sometimes hesitant, 
sometimes aggressive, and by no means accounted for by a single explanation. Thus, the 
boundaries instituted by Roman ideas of just war and ius belli, while not always perfectly 
observed by Romans, possess some essential explanatory power. So, for example, even 
though they cannot explain every aspect of Roman/Carthagininan relations between 200 
and 146, they do provide insight into how and why the Romans engaged diplomatically 
with Carthage during those years. In this way, events and actions on the part of the 
Romans which otherwise may seem arbitrary or disadvantageous become consistent and 
explicable once they are understood to be within the bounds of Roman cultural and legal 
traditions.  
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While this dissertation makes some of the first meaningful connections between 
traditional Roman religious and cultural values and an emerging law of foreign relations, 
it necessarily leaves certain avenues of study unexplored. I do not examine the operations 
of the extortion court in detail, or comprehensively analyze the nature of the many cases 
which were heard in it. An investigation along these lines might be further able to trace 
the process which allowed the cultural norms discussed in this dissertation to become 
formalized legal principles. Furthermore, such an examination would perhaps be able to 
fully explain the balance of motives, political and ideological, that drove the use of the 
quaestio de repetundis in the years after the Gracchan reforms. Such an analysis could 
provide a counterpoint to the proliferation of scholarship which sees the court as 
primarily a venue for personal and factional disputes among the Roman elite.  
There is also room for further exploration of the religious and cultural roots of 
other aspects of Roman public law. The kind of formalization which Jörg Rüpke has 
observed as occurring within religious rites and traditions could also be extended to the 
way in which Roman societal norms became law.393 This method may be particularly 
illuminating when applied to the criminal or public law, which many scholars have 
tended to see as a political development because of its associations with figures like 
Gaius Gracchus and Sulla. Instead of using political motives alone to explain the creation 
and proliferation of quaestiones from 149 through the end of Sulla’s domination in 80, a 
parallel investigation into the cultural origins of the values which became the basis for 
these courts would no doubt prove valuable. As my dissertation has shown, Roman 
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public law emerges when long-held values are subject to repeated use and refinement. 
The tracing of this process would no doubt enhance our understanding of the nature of an 
underrepresented aspect of Roman legal history.394  
Countless factors influenced Romans in their relations with foreign peoples under 
the Republic: self-interest, the desire for power, fear, and even greed. However, the 
influence of traditional Roman principles must also be taken into consideration. The 
Romans wished to follow in the ways of their ancestors and present themselves as 
uniquely just and clement in a world which was often unfair and cruel. To this end, the 
Romans looked to the essential values of their society to create an image that was both 
advantageous and culturally significant. Thus for the Romans the ideal rule of an empire 
was gained by following Cicero’s advice: “Let us embrace this idea . . . to turn away from 
fear and hold on to compassion. Thus we will most easily obtain what we want, both in 
private and in public life.”395 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
394 For a legal anthropology perspective on this process, see Vinogradoff 1966. 
 
395 Cic. Off. 2.24: id amplectamur, ut metus absit, caritas retineatur. Ita facillime, quae volemus, et privatis 
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